See also State v. Jones, 417 So.2d 788 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). As to reasonable suspicion justifying detention and inquiry, see State v. Hunt, 391 So.2d 760 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Appellee relies on State v. Lundy, 334 So.2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). The facts in Lundy are very similar to the facts in this case.
The marijuana found in the brown paper sack and the marijuana received at the police station, obtained as a result of an illegal arrest, is also inadmissible. See State v. Lundy, 334 So.2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).Id. at 1270 (emphasis added).
It is apparent both that Harrell did not have anything remotely resembling the reasonable suspicion of R.J.M.'s wrongdoing which is required to justify a search of a student by a school official; A.B. v. State, 440 So.2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); State v. D.T.W., 425 So.2d 1383 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); and that R.J.M.'s production of the weapon, occurring as it did during the very course of the thus-unlawful search, must be deemed a product of and tainted by that search rather than a voluntary surrender or abandonment of the knife. Kraemer v. State, 60 So.2d 615 (Fla. 1952); State v. Lundy, 334 So.2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Earnest v. State, 293 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); State v. Neri, 290 So.2d 500 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), cert. dismissed, 302 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1974). Accordingly, the adjudication under review is reversed with directions to discharge the respondent.
The police officer could only conduct a carefully limited, self-protective search of the outer clothing of such person to discover the presence of weapons. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Lundy, 334 So.2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); State v. Ramos, 378 So.2d 1294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). As a result, the search here was illegal per se. Having found an initial unconstitutional seizure, this court must decide whether the state proved by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's consent to the search of the vehicle was not a product of the illegal police action.
Based on responses given by appellant to further investigatory questions while he was thought to be only a possible witness, probable cause developed to effect an arrest. State v. Stevens, 354 So.2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) citing State v. Lundy, 334 So.2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Affirmed.
However, it is clear that at best the officers involved here had no more than a reasonable or founded suspicion, entitling them only to briefly detain the Volvo's occupants and search them only to the extent necessary to disclose a weapon. § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1979); Schnick v. State, 362 So.2d 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); State v. Lundy, 334 So.2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). The state contends that the search was proper under Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), and section 933.19(1), Florida Statutes (1979), which adopts the Carroll doctrine. Carroll held that an automobile may be searched without a warrant if the officer conducting the search has probable cause to believe that contraband is being transported therein.
To constitutionally accomplish a weapons frisk, additional incriminating evidence apart from the profile, pointing to weapons possession would appear to be required to justify a frisk. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); State v. Lundy, 334 So.2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). 3
The right to search does not automatically follow once the right to detain is established. State v. Lundy, 334 So.2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Temporary detention, unlike arrest, does not itself authorize a search "incident to detention."
The search should have been suppressed. See also, State v. Lundy, 334 So.2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). There seems to be some confusion about the effect of the information provided by the confidential informant in this case.
On the other hand, if the seizure is a temporary detention for investigation, there is never any right to conduct such a full-blown search of the person detained, as such is not necessary to accomplish the detention. The police may only conduct a carefully limited, self-protective search of the outer clothing of such person to discover the presence of weapons; moreover, this limited search does not automatically follow upon a valid temporary detention, but can only be accomplished based on articulable or founded suspicion that the person detained is armed. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968); State v. Lundy, 334 So.2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Such a showing is made, however, where the basis for the prior valid temporary detention is articulable or founded suspicion of criminal activity involving an actual or potential threat of violence.