Opinion
No. 2-175 / 00-2045.
Filed June 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, BOBBI M. ALPERS, Judge.
On discretionary review, the State appeals from a district court's grant of the defendant's motion for costs. REVERSED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel L. Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Murray W. Bell, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.
Thomas Pastrnak and Candy K. Pastrnak of Pastrnak Law Firm, P.C., Davenport, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and VOGEL and EISENHAUER, JJ.
On discretionary review, the State appeals from a district court's grant of the defendant's motion for costs. The State contends the district court erred in determining Iowa Code section 815.5 (1999) allows the defendant to recover his expert witness fees from the government. We reverse.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings . Thomas Paul Lunardi was charged with willful injury, child endangerment resulting in serious injury and multiple acts of child endangerment. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the district court found Lunardi not guilty and assessed costs of the case to the State. Lunardi moved to recover expert witness fees, deposition costs, and fees for service of subpoena, totaling $33,340.60. The district court denied Lunardi's motion.
Lunardi filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). The district court then corrected its earlier findings, concluding that Iowa Code section 815.5 covers Lunardi's request for expert witness fees. The State was granted discretionary review.
II. Scope of Review . Our review of questions of statutory interpretation is for errors at law. State v. Kress, 636 N.W.2d 12, 17 (Iowa 2001). In interpreting statutes, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent. State v. Snyder, 634, N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa 2001). We normally construe statutes on the basis of their ordinary and commonly understood meanings. State v. Bonstetter, 637 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Iowa 2001). Where statutory language is clear, we need not search for another meaning. Id. However, where a statute is ambiguous or reasonable minds could differ as to its meaning, we look to the rules of statutory construction for the interpretation. State v. Iowa Dist. Court, 630 N.W.2d 838, 840 (Iowa 2001).
To the extent that Lunardi raises a constitutional question, our review is de novo. State v. Ryan, 501 N.W.2d 516, 517 (Iowa 1993).
III. Preservation of Error . The State preserved this issue for our review by timely appeal of the district court's order on Lunardi's motion to reconsider.
IV. Iowa Code section 815.5 . Iowa Code section 815.5 states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 622.72, reasonable compensation as determined by the court shall be awarded expert witnesses, expert witnesses for an indigent or partially indigent person referred to in section 815.4, or called by the state in criminal cases.
The district court found that although section 815.5 specifically mentions witnesses for indigent persons and those called by the State, "it does also reflect that reasonable compensation as determined by the Court shall be awarded expert witnesses." The district court concluded this "generic language" applies to Lunardi.
We find the district court erred in concluding section 815.5 covers the expert witness fees incurred by Lunardi. Had section 815.5 been intended to include all expert witnesses, not just those called by the State or those for indigent persons, the statute could simple have read, "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 622.72, reasonable compensation as determined by the court shall be awarded expert witnesses." By reading section 815.5 to apply to all expert witnesses, the district court rendered the last half of the statute superfluous. Because a less strained construction is possible, we reject this interpretation. See State v. Hauan, 361 N.W.2d 336, 338 (Iowa Ct.App. 1984) ("When interpreting the meaning of a statute, we avoid construction which renders a part of the statute superfluous or redundant, and instead presume that each part of the statute has a purpose.").
Iowa Code section 622.72 sets the amount of compensation expert witnesses may receive in all cases at a maximum of $150 per day. Section 815.5 allows an exception to this maximum in cases where the defendant is indigent or the expert is called by the State. Therefore, if section 815.5 applied to all expert witnesses, it would also render the limit set in section 622.72 meaningless. We consider statutes together and try to harmonize them. Snyder, 634 N.W.2d at 615.
The only interpretation of section 815.5 that comports with rules of statutory interpretation is to view the two references after the original use of "expert witness" as explanatory. In other words, section 815.5 only applies to expert witnesses for indigent persons and those called by the State. Because Lunardi never proved he was indigent, we find he is not entitled to have his expert witness costs paid by the government.
Lunardi argues the State is obligated to pay his expert witness fees as a "cost" under Iowa Code section 815.13. Section 815.13 merely specifies when a county or city is obligated to pay costs associated with the prosecution of criminal actions. It allows the county or city to recover witness fees and mileage costs from a defendant when a defendant is found guilty. Iowa Code § 815.13. However, if a defendant is acquitted, the county or city recovers these fees, not from the defendant, but from the State. Id. These provisions of section 815.13 specifically refer to cases prosecuted under county or city ordinance. Id. Additionally, section 815.13 makes no mention of reimbursing costs incurred by a defendant. We reject Lunardi's argument.
We likewise reject Lunardi's argument that disallowing him to recover his expert witness fees from the State violates his equal protection rights. Had Lunardi proved his indigence, and made application, he may have been entitled to have his expert witness expenses paid by the State. See English v. Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Iowa 1981). However, a motion to determine indigency must be brought no later than forty days after arraignment. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(4). Lunardi failed to bring a timely motion to determine indigency, waiting until six months after his acquittal to do so. As a result, he is not entitled to recover his expert witness costs as an indigent defendant.
Because the district court erred in finding the State was required to pay Lunardi's expert witness costs under section 815.5, we reverse.
REVERSED.