But this writ petition centers around questions of constitutional law and statutory construction—matters we review de novo. State v. Lucero , 2007-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489. We have also noted that extraordinary writs may be appropriate even if there would be a remedy by appeal, where the public interest implications of the question posed are significant.
{12} We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Lucero , 2007-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489. In construing the language of a statute, our goal and guiding principle is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
Our review of these matters is de novo. State v. Lohberger , 2008-NMSC-033, ¶ 18, 144 N.M. 297, 187 P.3d 162 ; State v. Lucero , 2007-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489. {12} Rule 5-303 NMRA "essentially codifie[d]" Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and requires "an affirmative showing on the record that [a guilty] plea was voluntary and intelligent."
"We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo." State v. Lucero, 2007-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489. The Bank of New York's argument that federal law preempts the HLPA relies on regulatory provisions of the New Mexico Regulation and Licensing Department's Financial Institutions Division recognizing that "[e]ffective February 12, 2004, the [federal Office of the Comptroller of Currency] published a final rule that states, in pertinent part: 'state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's ability to fully exercise its federally authorized real estate lending powers do not apply to national banks' (the 'OCC preemption')" and concluding that "[b]ased on the OCC preemption, since January 1, 2004, national banks in New Mexico have been authorized to engage in certain banking activities otherwise prohibited by the [HLPA]."
{6} This case presents no factual dispute for us to review, and we must only determine whether the district court correctly interpreted and applied the law. “We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo.” State v. Lucero, 2007–NMSC–041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489. III.
“We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo.” State v. Lucero, 2007–NMSC–041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489. {6} This is the first time we apply the Act in its modern form, as it has been approximately ninety years since we last spoke on this subject.
We review such "issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo." State v. Lucero, 2007-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489. The Court of Appeals Analysis of Myers II
Whether the public policy underlying the Little Miller Act allows sureties to contractually limit the time the governmental entity has to sue is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Lucero, 2007-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489 ("We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo."); K.R. SwerdfegerConstr., Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, Univ. of N.M., 2006-NMCA-117, ¶ 23, 140 N.M. 374, 142 P.3d 962 ("Whether a contract is against public policy is a question of law for the court to determine from all the circumstances of each case." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Therefore, as a matter of statutory construction, our review is de novo. State v. Lucero, 2007-NMSC-041, ¶ 8,142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489. {10} "The principal command of statutory construction is that the court should determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature[.]"
The Criminal Sentencing Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 31-18-12 to -26 (1977, as amended through 2003), confers authority on the trial court to impose a criminal sentence in accordance with its provisions. See, e.g., State v. Lucero, 2007-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 9-11, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489; Trujillo, 2007-NMSC-017, ¶ 8, 141 N.M. 451, 157 P.3d 16; see also § 31-18-13(A) ("Unless otherwise provided in this section, all persons convicted of a crime under the laws of New Mexico shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Sentencing Act. . . .").