State v. Lucero

36 Citing cases

  1. Grisham v. Romero

    483 P.3d 545 (N.M. 2021)   Cited 31 times
    Holding governor and secretary had substantial discretion under Public Health Emergency Response Act to issue restrictions on businesses to protect against COVID-19 pandemic

    But this writ petition centers around questions of constitutional law and statutory construction—matters we review de novo. State v. Lucero , 2007-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489. We have also noted that extraordinary writs may be appropriate even if there would be a remedy by appeal, where the public interest implications of the question posed are significant.

  2. Grisham v. Reeb

    480 P.3d 852 (N.M. 2020)   Cited 12 times
    Noting that "even the general civil enforcement provision (discussed below) requires an administrative hearing before a fine may be imposed"

    {12} We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Lucero , 2007-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489. In construing the language of a statute, our goal and guiding principle is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.

  3. State v. Yancey

    451 P.3d 561 (N.M. 2019)   Cited 6 times
    Expressing disapproval of the notion that "certain specific words ... can ever function, in and of themselves, as irrefutable proof that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty plea"

    Our review of these matters is de novo. State v. Lohberger , 2008-NMSC-033, ¶ 18, 144 N.M. 297, 187 P.3d 162 ; State v. Lucero , 2007-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489. {12} Rule 5-303 NMRA "essentially codifie[d]" Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and requires "an affirmative showing on the record that [a guilty] plea was voluntary and intelligent."

  4. Bank of N.Y. v. Romero

    320 P.3d 1 (N.M. 2014)   Cited 104 times
    Holding that "blank indorsement ... established the [b]ank as a holder because the [b]ank [was] in possession of bearer paper"

    "We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo." State v. Lucero, 2007-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489. The Bank of New York's argument that federal law preempts the HLPA relies on regulatory provisions of the New Mexico Regulation and Licensing Department's Financial Institutions Division recognizing that "[e]ffective February 12, 2004, the [federal Office of the Comptroller of Currency] published a final rule that states, in pertinent part: 'state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's ability to fully exercise its federally authorized real estate lending powers do not apply to national banks' (the 'OCC preemption')" and concluding that "[b]ased on the OCC preemption, since January 1, 2004, national banks in New Mexico have been authorized to engage in certain banking activities otherwise prohibited by the [HLPA]."

  5. State v. Ordunez

    283 P.3d 282 (N.M. 2012)   Cited 51 times
    Concluding the district court lacked jurisdiction over the petition to revoke probation after the probationary term expired

    {6} This case presents no factual dispute for us to review, and we must only determine whether the district court correctly interpreted and applied the law. “We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo.” State v. Lucero, 2007–NMSC–041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489. III.

  6. State v. Cruz

    150 N.M. 548 (N.M. 2011)   Cited 6 times

    “We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo.” State v. Lucero, 2007–NMSC–041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489. {6} This is the first time we apply the Act in its modern form, as it has been approximately ninety years since we last spoke on this subject.

  7. State v. Myers

    256 P.3d 13 (N.M. 2011)   Cited 14 times
    Recognizing that a judicial construction is unforeseeable when it either "contradicts binding precedent on the same question, upon which the accused could have relied" or it expands the scope of otherwise "narrow and precise" statutory language

    We review such "issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo." State v. Lucero, 2007-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489. The Court of Appeals Analysis of Myers II

  8. City of Santa Fe v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co.

    147 N.M. 699 (N.M. 2010)   Cited 15 times
    Recognizing that New Mexico courts interpret statutes "using the plain language of the statute as the primary indicator of its intent"

    Whether the public policy underlying the Little Miller Act allows sureties to contractually limit the time the governmental entity has to sue is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Lucero, 2007-NMSC-041, ¶ 8, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489 ("We review issues of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo."); K.R. SwerdfegerConstr., Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, Univ. of N.M., 2006-NMCA-117, ¶ 23, 140 N.M. 374, 142 P.3d 962 ("Whether a contract is against public policy is a question of law for the court to determine from all the circumstances of each case." (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

  9. State v. Johnson

    147 N.M. 177 (N.M. 2009)   Cited 39 times
    Concluding that the ordinary meaning of “school employee” applied where the term was not defined in the relevant statutory section or elsewhere in the Criminal Code

    Therefore, as a matter of statutory construction, our review is de novo. State v. Lucero, 2007-NMSC-041, ¶ 8,142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489. {10} "The principal command of statutory construction is that the court should determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature[.]"

  10. State v. Chavarria

    146 N.M. 251 (N.M. 2009)   Cited 61 times
    Holding that a defendant who pleads guilty and understands the maximum potential sentence waives his right to appeal on grounds of cruel and unusual punishment

    The Criminal Sentencing Act (the Act), NMSA 1978, §§ 31-18-12 to -26 (1977, as amended through 2003), confers authority on the trial court to impose a criminal sentence in accordance with its provisions. See, e.g., State v. Lucero, 2007-NMSC-041, ¶¶ 9-11, 142 N.M. 102, 163 P.3d 489; Trujillo, 2007-NMSC-017, ¶ 8, 141 N.M. 451, 157 P.3d 16; see also § 31-18-13(A) ("Unless otherwise provided in this section, all persons convicted of a crime under the laws of New Mexico shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Sentencing Act. . . .").