It is also well settled that the legislature has the authority to make negligent conduct a crime. See State v. Lucero, 87 N.M. 242, 245, 531 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 239, 531 P.2d 1212 (1975). The issue in this case, then, is not whether we must read the mens rea element into a criminal statute because the child abuse statute contains a mens rea element.

The Legislature's decision to require only criminal negligence, and no showing of a general criminal intent, for child abuse stems from "[t]he obvious public interest . . . [in] the prevention of cruelty to children." State v. Lucero, 87 N.M. 242, 245, 531 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Ct.App. 1975). "The usual rationale for [not requiring a showing of a general criminal intent] is that the public interest in the matter is so compelling or that the potential for harm is so great that the interests of the public must override the interests of the individual."

We suspect that part of Defendant's confusion lies in his reference to cases in which child abuse has been characterized as a strict liability crime that does not require proof of intent. State v. Trujillo, 2002-NMCA-100, ¶ 14, 132 N.M. 649, 53 P.3d 909; State v. Herrera, 2001-NMCA-073, ¶ 13, 131 N.M. 22, 33 P.3d 22; State v. Ungarten, 115 N.M. 607, 609, 856 P.2d 569, 571 (Ct.App. 1993); State v. Leal, 104 N.M. 506, 509, 723 P.2d 977, 980 (Ct.App. 1986); State v. Fuentes, 91 N.M. 554, 557, 577 P.2d 452, 455 (Ct.App. 1978); State v. Lucero, 87 N.M. 242, 244, 531 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Ct.App. 1975). Our first portrayal of child abuse as a strict liability crime was made when New Mexico courts applied a civil negligence standard for negligent child abuse.

Similarly, other states, in their criminal child abuse statutes, include the term "negligence" therein. For example, in State v. Lucero, 87 N.M. 242, 531 P.2d 1215, cert. denied, 87 N.M. 239, 531 P.2d 1212 (1975), the court held that a criminal child abuse statute does not require proof of criminal intent. Rather, as the court pointed out, "[t]he Legislature has the authority to make a negligent act a crime as well as an intentional one."

"The existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence." State v. Lucero, 87 N.M. 242, 244, 531 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Ct.App. 1975), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 239, 531 P.2d 1212 (1975) (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500, 71 S.Ct. 857, 862, 95 L.Ed. 1137 (1951)). At common law, it is a good defense to have had an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances that, if true, would make the act for which the person is indicted an innocent act.

Shedoudy, 45 N.M. at 524, 118 P.2d at 286. In other words, whether the criminal intent of an accused is to be regarded as essential for conviction is a matter of statutory construction, State v. Craig, 70 N.M. 176, 372 P.2d 128 (1962), in light of the common law rule that existence of a criminal intent is essential. Shedoudy, 45 N.M. at 524, 118 P.2d at 285; see also State v. Barber, 91 N.M. 764, 581 P.2d 27 (Ct.App. 1978); State v. Lucero, 87 N.M. 242, 531 P.2d 1215 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 239, 531 P.2d 1212 (1975); State v. Mascarenas, 86 N.M. 692, 526 P.2d 1285 (Ct.App. 1974); State v. Fuentes, 85 N.M. 274, 511 P.2d 760 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 265, 511 P.2d 751 (1973); State v. Pedro, 83 N.M. 212, 490 P.2d 470 (Ct.App. 1971); and State v. Austin, 80 N.M. 748, 461 P.2d 230 (Ct.App. 1969). Because a defendant who does not have the mental state required by law for the commission of a particular offense cannot be convicted, a determination must be made of what mental element is required by the statute under which Reese was convicted.

Whoever commits abuse of a child is guilty of a fourth degree felony, unless the abuse results in the child's death or great bodily harm, in which case he is guilty of a second degree felony.State v. Lucero, 87 N.M. 242, 531 P.2d 1215 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 239, 531 P.2d 1212 (1975), held that the child abuse statute, Section 40A-6-1, N.M.S.A. 1953 (2nd Repl. Vol. 6, Supp. 1973) (which has been recodified as § 30-6-1, N.M.S.A. 1978 (Cum. Supp. 1981)), is a strict liability statute.

People v. Gonzales, supra. [ 188 Colo. 272, 534 P.2d 626 (1975)]. See State v. Lucero, 87 N.M. 242, 531 P.2d 1215 (N.M.Ct.App. 1975); State v. Llopis, 257 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1971). "We have not, however, hesitated to construe 'may' as importing a greater degree of certainty, where necessary.

The courts have long recognized children may be subject of special protection under the criminal law. UnitedStates v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998); UnitedStates v. Ransom, 942 F.2d at 775; People v. Noble, 635 P.3d 203 (Colo. 1981); State v. Lucero, 531 P.2d 1215 (N.M.App. 1975). The Constitution permits the legislature wide latitude in defining which groups should be included and which should be excluded.

"[C]hildren, who are often times defenseless, are in need of greater protection than adults." State v. Lucero, 87 N.M. 242, 245, 531 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Ct.App. 1975). However, in designating the crime as, at a minimum, a third degree felony, Section 30-6-1(E), the Legislature did not intend to criminalize conduct creating "a mere possibility, however remote, that harm may result" to a child.