But if "a particular instruction would exaggerate, minimize, or withdraw from the jury's consideration some pertinent evidence," then such instruction is improper. Ohrt, 398 S.W.3d at 338; see Schack v. Prop. Owners Ass'n of Sunset Bay, 555 S.W.3d 339, 355 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2018, pet. denied) (observing that a jury instruction is an improper comment on the weight of the evidence if it encourages the jury to give undue weight to certain evidence or if it assumes a disputed fact); State v. Luby's Fuddruckers Rests., LLC, 531 S.W.3d 810, 820 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2017, no pet.) (finding that an instruction improperly comments on the weight of the evidence when it encourages the jury to give undue weight to certain evidence or when it suggests the trial court's opinion concerning an issue). Additionally, "not every correct statement of the law belongs in the jury charge."
In other jurisdictions, it has been said that the comparable sales approach is the preferred method of valuing condemned property, or that the existence of comparable sales evidence thus precludes the use of other valuation methods. See, e.g., United States v. 103.38 Acres of Land, 660 F.2d 208, 211 (6th Cir. 1981); State v. Luby's Fuddruckers Rests., LLC, 531 S.W.3d 810, 815-16 (Tex. App. 2017); Sweet v. Town of West Warwick, 844 A.2d 94, 98 (R.I. 2004). But in this Commonwealth we have stated that while "[c]omparable sales are helpful in determining value . . . other methods may be used."
IP argues that Coker's testimony was not probative because he "assumed" certain facts; Signature, as a company, was not able to recover company value and there was no evidence of foreseeability to support the damages award. The case IP references in its brief for this argument relates to "lost profits" and market value in a land condemnation case, State v. Luby's Fuddruckers Restaurants, LLC , 531 S.W.3d 810 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2017, pet. ref'd). We do not find the analysis on point for this case.
We review a challenge to the trial court's jury charge under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Luby's Fuddruckers Restaurants, LLC, 531 S.W.3d 810, 819 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2017, no pet.). A trial court has wide discretion in submitting instructions, and a court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to include the instructions. SeeShupe , 192 S.W.3d at 580 (holding that omission of negligent entrustment issue was harmless); see alsoState v. Luby's Fuddruckers Rests, LLC , 531 S.W.3d 810, 822 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2017, no pet.) ; Muhs v. Whataburger, Inc. , No. 13-09-00434-CV, 2010 WL 4657955, at *9 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Nov. 18, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The Court overrules Gasaway’s fourth and fifth issues.
We therefore review a trial court’s decision to submit or refuse a particular question, instruction, or definition for an abuse of discretion. State v. Luby’s Fuddruckers Restaurants, LLC , 531 S.W.3d 810, 819 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.); seeThota v. Young , 366 S.W.3d 678, 687 (Tex. 2012). The trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without regard for any rules or guiding principles.