Narrowed to its essence, the holding in Garrett was simply that the State had failed to produce evidence sufficient to show that defendant's possession of the tire tool was "without lawful excuse" as required by the statute. This much is made clear by the subsequent decision in State v. Lovelace, 272 N.C. 496, 158 S.E.2d 624 (1968). Defendants in that case were apprehended in the middle of the night at the entrance to a restaurant.
Evidence of the existence of concerted action may come from other facts. It is not, therefore, necessary for a defendant to do any particular act constituting at least part of a crime in order to be convicted of that crime under the concerted action principle so long as he is present at the scene of the crime and the evidence is sufficient to show he is acting together with another who does the acts necessary to constitute the crime pursuant to a common plan or purpose to commit the crime. In State v. Lovelace, 272 N.C. 496, 158 S.E.2d 624 (1968), two men, Dixon and Lovelace, were convicted of the felonious possession of implements of housebreaking. The tools were seen in the actual possession of Dixon only.
It is not, therefore, necessary for a defendant to do any particular act constituting at least part of a crime in order to be convicted of that crime under the concerted action principle so long as he is present at the scene of the crime and the evidence is sufficient to show he is acting together with another who does the acts necessary to constitute the crime pursuant to a common plan or purpose to commit the crime. In State v. Lovelace, 272 N.C. 496, 158 S.E.2d 624 (1968), two men, Dixon and Lovelace, were convicted of the felonious possession of implements of housebreaking. The tools were seen in the actual possession of Dixon only.
5 N.C. App. at 314–15, 575 S.E.2d at 528–29 (holding that the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that it could convict defendant of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver on the basis of an acting in concert theory given that "there was evidence that the defendant had constructive possession and was acting in concert"); State v. Garcia , 111 N.C. App. 636, 640–41, 433 S.E.2d 187, 189 (1993) (holding that "[t]he evidence was sufficient for the trial court, when considering it in a light most favorable to the State, to find that defendant acted in concert with [another individual] to possess the cocaine"); State v. Cotton , 102 N.C. App. 93, 98, 401 S.E.2d 376, 379 (1991) (holding that "the trial court did not err in instructing on acting in concert for the [possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver] offense"), have upheld controlled substance possession convictions on the basis of an acting in concert theory. In addition, this Court held in State v. Lovelace , 272 N.C. 496, 498–99, 158 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1968), that the defendant had been properly convicted of possession of implements of housebreaking, with the items in question being a large screwdriver and a hammer, on the basis of evidence tending to show that the defendant and another man "were acting together" and "were attempting to use [the tools] to force entry into the restaurant" even though "the tools were only seen in the hands of [the other man]," suggesting that the doctrine of acting in concert is available to show a defendant's guilt of possessory offenses other than those involving contraband. See alsoState v. Golphin , 352 N.C. 364, 456–58, 533 S.E.2d 168, 228–29 (2000) (finding no error in the trial court's decision to instruct the jury that it could find that the defendant was guilty of possession of a stolen vehicle on the basis of an acting in concert theory in the course of also allowing the jury to convict the defendant of robbery with a dangerous weapon and first-degree murder in reliance upon the doctrine of acting
The defendant argues under his first assignment of error that the case against him should have been dismissed because the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding by the jury that he acted in concert with his mother in the murder of his father. If two or more persons act together with a common purpose to commit a crime, each of them who is actually or constructively present at the time the crime is committed is responsible for the acts of the others done in the commission of the crime. State v. Joyner, 297 N.C. 349, 255 S.E.2d 390 (1979); State v. Westbrook, 279 N.C. 18, 181 S.E.2d 572 (1971), death sentence vacated, 408 U.S. 939, 33 L.Ed.2d 761 (1972); State v. Lovelace, 272 N.C. 496, 158 S.E.2d 624 (1968). The defendant argues that there is not sufficient evidence to show he was actually or constructively present when the injection was made to find that he acted in concert with his mother to murder his father.
Where two or more persons `join in a purpose to commit a crime, each of them, if actually or constructively present, is not only guilty as a principal if the other commits that particular crime, but he is also guilty of any other crime committed by the other in pursuance of the common purpose . . . or as a natural or probable consequence thereof.' State v. Westbrook 279 N.C. 18, 41-42, 181 S.E.2d 572, 586 (1971), death sentence vacated, 408 U.S. 939 (1972) (emphasis supplied); accord, State v. Lovelace, 272 N.C. 496, 158 S.E.2d 624 (1968). State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. at 55, 274 S.E.2d at 200.
Where two or more persons "join in a purpose to commit a crime, each of them, if actually or constructively present, is not only guilty as a principal if the other commits that particular crime, but he is also guilty of any other crime committed by the other in pursuance of the common purpose . . . or as a natural or probable consequence thereof." State v. Westbrook, 279 N.C. 18, 41-42, 181 S.E.2d 572, 586 (1971), death sentence vacated, 408 U.S. 939 (1972) (emphasis supplied); accord, State v. Lovelace, 272 N.C. 496, 158 S.E.2d 624 (1968). There was, consequently, no error in the trial judge's failing to submit the offenses of accessory before or accessory after the fact in the cases against defendant Moore.
State v. Morgan, 268 N.C. 214, 220, 150 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1966) (“Obviously, gloves, flashlights, and socks are not breaking tools.”). Further, while screwdrivers may be implements of housebreaking, see State v. Lovelace, 272 N.C. 496, 158 S.E.2d 624 (1968), the State presented no evidence that defendant possessed the screwdriver at issue without lawful excuse. At least two screwdrivers were found in defendant's car, which was parked within 100 yards from the victims' house.
When this evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, it is sufficient to support a rational inference that Defendant Parks was acting together with Defendant Dumas pursuant to a common plan or purpose to rob the State's witnesses. See State v. Lovelace, 272 N.C. 496, 158 S.E.2d 624 (1968) (holding that the defendant's presence outside the door of a restaurant with the other defendant at 1:45 a.m. while the other defendant held the hammer and screwdriver and when both men had been drinking was sufficient evidence to uphold trial court's denial of motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence under the doctrine of acting in concert). The fact that the record also contains other evidence tending to show that Defendant Parks did not help Defendant Dumas pick up the money and the cell phones, that Defendant Parks looked uncomfortable during the robbery, and that Mr. Phoumsanath believed that Defendant Parks refused to participate in the robbery goes to the weight and credibility of the State's evidence rather than to its sufficiency, when taken in the light most favorable to the State, to support a conviction.
It has been long held that "[e]veryone who enters into a common purpose or design is equally deemed in law a party to every act . . . which may afterwards be done by any one of the others, in furtherance of such common design." State v. Lovelace, 272 N.C. 496, 498, 158 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1968). The essential elements of robbery with a dangerous weapon are (1) the unlawful taking or attempted taking of the property from another person with (2) the possession, use, or threatened use of a firearm or other dangerous weapon, (3) by which the life of the other person is endangered or threatened.