Other cases have found that a person may be in custody, even if not arrested, when "there are significant restraints on his freedom of movement which are imposed by some law enforcement agency." State v. Louis , 240 Kan. 175, Syl. ¶ 2, 727 P.2d 483 (1986) ; see also Louis , 240 Kan. at 183, 727 P.2d 483 (substantial competent evidence supported conclusion that a person was in custody when he had a blood sample taken at the hospital at the request of police officers). And Kansas caselaw is awash with examples of indigent criminal offenders who were never formally arrested yet were still in custody for purposes of determining agencies' payment responsibilities.
We find nothing in the record, then, to suggest that bags were not placed on the hands of all shooting victims, including Jamison, as a matter of standard practice. For this reason, we find no merit in Jamison's analogies to United States v. Turner, 761 A.2d 845 (D.C. 2000), and State v. Louis, 240 Kan. 175, 727 P.2d 483 (1986). In Turner, the police collected hair, saliva, and blood samples first, then proceeded to question the defendant.
Consequently, this court has held that a law enforcement interview of an accident victim at a hospital is not a custodial interrogation unless the victim's confinement is instigated by law enforcement or controlled for custodial purposes. State v. Louis, 240 Kan. 175, 181, 727 P.2d 483 (1986); State v. Brunner, 211 Kan. 596, Syl. ¶ 3, 507 P.2d 233 (1973), disapproved in part on other grounds by State v. Murry, 271 Kan. 223, 21 P.3d 528 (2001); see State v. Canaan, 265 Kan. 835, 847, 964 P.2d 681 (1998) (defendant was not in custody where he was alone for significant periods of time and was not arrested at hospital; purpose of officers' presence at hospital was to determine when defendant would be released so they could later question him); see generally, What Constitutes “Custodial Interrogation” at Hospital by Police Officer Within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring that Suspect Be Informed of His or Her Federal Constitutional Rights Before Custodial Interrogation–Suspect Hospital Patient, Annot. 30 A.L.R.6th 103, 120. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the officers exercised any control over Warrior's hospitalization before her interviews.
K.S.A. 22-2201(1). Another definition of custody is provided in State v. Louis, 240 Kan. 175, 727 P.2d 483 (1986): " 'A person who has not been arrested is not in police custody unless there are significant restraints on his freedom of movement which are imposed by some law enforcement agency.' "
The court finds that the proper test to be applied when determining whether a person is under arrest when the test of a person's blood, breath or urine is taken under 18 U.S.C. § 3118, is whether at that time there were some significant restraints on his or her freedom of movement which were imposed by a law enforcement official. State v. Louis, 240 Kan. 175, 181, 727 P.2d 483 (1986); see Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322-24, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (a person is in custody if there has been a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest). Specialist Smith testified that following the preliminary breath test and field sobriety tests, he found probable cause to believe that the defendant was driving under the influence.
But the Court of Appeals noted this court has more broadly determined an individual is in custody if “ ‘there were some significant restraints on his freedom of movement which were imposed by some law enforcement agency.’ ” 2011 WL 2040254, at *3 (citing State v. Louis, 240 Kan. 175, 181, 727 P.2d 483 [1986] [applying the test used in custodial interrogation cases to the word “custody” for purposes of implied consent statute allowing blood-alcohol testing, K.S.A. 8–1001] ). Concluding this broader restraints-on-freedom test applied to the determination of whether an individual was in a sheriff's custody for purposes of obligating the county to pay for the individual's medical care, the Court of Appeals held: “Once an arrest is made, charges are filed, or other restraints are placed upon the individual's liberty, the sheriff assumes responsibility for all later costs associated with the person's medical care.” 2011 WL 2040254, at *5.
Additionally, Perez-Marquez' argument that no other person could agree with the district court's decision is also not persuasive because similar, or harsher, sentences have been affirmed when challenged on appeal. See State v. Louis , 240 Kan. 175, 184-85, 727 P.2d 483 (1986) (finding no abuse of discretion in sentencing defendant to six consecutive sentences for six counts of vehicular homicide); State v. McNaught , 238 Kan. 567, 585-87, 713 P.2d 457 (1986) (finding no abuse of discretion in sentencing defendant to maximum sentence possible for vehicular homicide).Thus, the district court's decision to sentence Perez-Marquez to three consecutive terms of 12 months in the county jail, together with a 24-month probationary period on an underlying sentence of 13 months' imprisonment for the aggravated battery conviction, was not arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.