Because RSA 265–A:18, IV, the current statute, does not contain such an express requirement, Cardin does not control our analysis. The defendant also cites State v. Lougee, 137 N.H. 635, 631 A.2d 922 (1993), decided after Cardin. In Lougee, we again recognized that "unless the defendant clearly waives his right to present the issue to the jury, proof of the defendant's prior conviction must be made beyond a reasonable doubt as part of the State's case-in-chief."

We decline to decide today what the applicable standard of proof is in this regard, and instead accept, for the purposes of argument, the defendant's contention that the State must prove the existence of the defendant's prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Compare State v. Lougee, 137 N.H. 635, 636, 631 A.2d 922 (1993) (proof of defendant's prior conviction to enhance sentence must be made beyond a reasonable doubt as part of the State's case-in-chief), with State v. McLellan, 146 N.H. 108, 113, 767 A.2d 953 (2001) (generally, facts supporting sentence need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt). Assuming that the State had the burden of proving the existence of the defendant's prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt in the trial court, on appeal the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found the existence of the prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

We have previously held, however, that "sameness of name is insufficient evidence of identity, even when the name is unusual." State v. Lougee, 137 N.H. 635, 637, 631 A.2d 922 (1993) (quotation omitted), impliedly overruled on other grounds as recognized by State v. Thompson, 164 N.H. 447, 451, 58 A.3d 661 (2012). Consequently, more was required than merely asserting that the perpetrator of the crimes and the defendant, who was not present, shared the same name.

Only if no rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence most favorably to the State, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt will we reverse the conviction. State v. Lougee, 137 N.H. 635, 636-37, 631 A.2d 922, 924 (1993). [2] The State introduced evidence that the victim had been living in a group home for several years and that she takes some form of medication. Witnesses testified that the victim was "handicapped"; that she "looked mentally retarded"; that she was once a resident of New Hampshire Hospital; that there was "something mentally wrong" with her. No expert or medical testimony was offered, however, to describe or explain the victim's mental condition.

The Legislature cannot dispense with a "written accusation" by the grand jury, but it can prescribe new forms of indictments, and dispense with some of its technical formalities. See Lougee v. State, 11 Ohio 68; State v. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. 767.'"

" (Italics ours.) See, also, Lougee v. State, 11 Ohio 68; State v. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. 767. The legislature of our state has, by the short form of indictment adopted in chapter 638 of the Code, abolished all of the old common-law rules with reference to the specifications required in charging offenses under the old rule.

The Legislature cannot dispense with a "written accusation" by the grand jury, but it can prescribe new forms of indictments, and dispense with some of its technical formalities. (See Lougee v. State, 11 Ohio St. 68; State v. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. 767.) In this State, the Legislature long ago provided a simplified form of indictment. "All the forms of pleading in criminal actions, heretofore existing, are abolished; and hereafter, the forms of pleading, and the rules by which the sufficiency of pleadings is to be determined, are those prescribed by this Code. (Code Crim. Pro. § 273, originally section 289 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as reported by the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings to the Legislature in 1850.)