Opinion
No. 3-205 / 02-0443
Filed June 13, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Washington County, James Q. Blomgren, Judge.
Defendant appeals his convictions for first-degree murder and first-degree burglary. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Robert Ranschau, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, Barbara Edmondson, County Attorney, and Eric Goers, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vogel, JJ.
Trent Lorence challenges the sufficiency of evidence for his convictions of first-degree murder and first-degree burglary. We affirm.
Background Facts. The facts surrounding the killing are not in dispute. On November 2, 2000, Trent Lorence (Lorence) began his evening at home with his father. At some point, Lorence went to David Clark's (Clark) residence to see if he was awake. Clark was sleeping so Lorence returned home. Lorence retrieved a gun and returned to Clark's residence. Lorence entered the home and approached Clark while he slept. Using a Sprite can as a silencer, Lorence shot Clark in the head. Lorence then took approximately $120 from Clark's wallet and Clark's Ford Explorer. The police arrested Lorence the following evening when he returned to the scene driving Clark's vehicle. Clark died as a result of the gunshot wound to the head at the hospital on November 3, 2000.
Lorence raised two defenses at trial: diminished responsibility and insanity. A jury found Lorence guilty of murder in the first degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1, 707.2(1), 707.2(2) and 707.11 (1999), and burglary in the first degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.3. The district court sentenced Lorence to life in prison for first-degree murder and a twenty-five year term for first-degree burglary, to be served concurrently. Lorence appeals.
Scope of Review. We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for errors at law. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 610 (Iowa 2001). A verdict is upheld if supported by substantial evidence, which means evidence sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant's guilt. Id. Evidence is sufficient to support a verdict if it raises "a fair inference of guilt as to each essential element of the crime," but it "must do more than raise suspicion, speculation or conjecture." State v. LaPointe, 418 N.W.2d 49, 51 (Iowa 1988). We view the totality of the record in the light most favorable to the State, drawing any and all legitimate inferences that can be reasonably deduced from the evidence. State v. Williams, 574 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1998). Credibility assessments are the province of the jury, and it is free to accept, reject, and weigh the evidence as it sees fit. State v. Maring, 619 N.W.2d 393, 395 (Iowa 2000). It is only in rare cases where a witness's testimony is "so impossible, absurd, and self-contradictory that the court should deem it a nullity." State v. Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d 493, 503 (Iowa 1997).
Sufficiency of Evidence. Lorence claims there was insufficient evidence for a rational factfinder to convict him of murder and burglary based on the evidence he presented of both diminished responsibility and insanity. The State disagrees, asserting there was sufficient evidence of Lorence's mental capacity to form the specific intent to commit these crimes as well as understand the natural consequences of his acts and the difference between right and wrong.
"[P]roof of . . . diminished responsibility is admissible on the issue of the defendant's ability to form a specific intent, where such intent is an element of the crime charged." State v. Plowman, 386 N.W.2d 546, 547 (Iowa Ct.App. 1986) (quoting Veverka v. Cash, 318 N.W.2d 447, 449 (Iowa 1982)). Both first-degree murder and first-degree burglary are specific intent crimes. State v. Gramenz, 126 N.W.2d 285, 290-92 (1964); State v. Sinclair, 622 N.W.2d 772, 779-80 (Iowa Ct.App. 2000). For a conviction of first-degree murder, the defendant must have the specific intent to act willfully, deliberately and with premeditation. Gramenz, 126 N.W.2d at 288. A specific intent to commit a felony, assault, or theft is required for a first-degree burglary conviction. Iowa Code § 713.1, 713.3; Sinclair, 622 N.W.2d at 780.
A defendant does not have the burden of proof to prove diminished responsibility. State v. Stewart, 445 N.W.2d 418, 422 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989). Instead,
[t]he State retains its burden of persuasion and initial burden of production on the issue of specific intent. The [defendant] has the burden to produce evidence on the defense, and when such evidence is introduced it must be considered by the jury in determining whether the State met its burden to prove specific intent.
Skinner v. Ruigh, 351 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Iowa 1984) (citing State v. Rinehart, 283 N.W.2d 319, 320 (Iowa 1979)); State v. Stewart, 445 N.W.2d 418, 422 (Iowa Ct.App. 1989).
Insanity is defined in the Iowa Code as follows:
A person shall not be convicted of a crime if at the time the crime is committed the person suffers from such a diseased or deranged condition of the mind as to render the person incapable of knowing the nature and quality of the act the person is committing or incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to the act. Insanity need not exist for any specific length of time before or after the commission of the alleged criminal act.
Iowa Code § 701.4. "[The] [l]aw presumes all men sane until the contrary is established by competent evidence to the satisfaction of the jury." State v. Arthur, 160 N.W.2d 470, 473 (Iowa 1968) (citations omitted). The defendant has the burden of proof to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Iowa Code § 701.4; State v. Buck, 510, N.W.2d 850, 852 (Iowa 1994) (citing State v. James, 393 N.W.2d 465, 466-67 (Iowa 1986) (upholding constitutionality of placing such burden on defendant), appeal dismissed, 481 U.S. 1009, 107 S.Ct. 1881, 95 L.Ed.2d 489 (1987)).
Four doctors evaluated Lorence prior to trial. Dr. John Garfield, a licensed clinical psychologist, interviewed Lorence closest in time to the shooting, on November 17, 2000. Dr. Garfield testified Lorence did not make eye contact and stared straight ahead or at the floor during the interview. When asked a question, Lorence would begin to answer but would trail off in mid-sentence and become silent. Dr. Garfield found Lorence's poverty of speech pronounced and his thought associations abnormal. Lorence told Dr. Garfield in the interview that he had been shot several times and had come back from the dead with no trace of injury. Lorence was not medicated during the interview.
Dr. Garfield next interviewed Lorence on March 14, 2001; again, Lorence was not medicated. During this interview Dr. Garfield found Lorence more verbally productive but his facial expressions were flat and he spoke in a monotone voice. Dr. Garfield observed behavior indicating Lorence was paranoid. Lorence told Dr. Garfield he was being controlled by demons. Lorence also expressed that the demonic possession enabled him to die and rise from the dead and raise others from the dead. When his parents visited, Lorence thought they were imposters sent by the demons. During Dr. Garfield's August 16, 2001 interview, Lorence was highly medicated. He reported auditory hallucinations, including receiving personal messages from the television and radio. He reported that prior to the shooting, while working at the convenience store and listening to the radio, the disk jockeys were broadcasting personal information about him. Dr. Garfield's final interview with Lorence occurred on September 17, 2001, it was in this interview the shooting was discussed. Lorence explained he was at his father's house on November 2, 2000, sitting in the rocking chair while invisible people rocked the chair. Lorence went to see Clark but he was asleep; Lorence returned to his father's residence. Lorence stated he was unsure what happened next but remembered retrieving a gun. He returned to Clark's home and pointed the gun at Clark's head. Lorence stated he attempted to turn away from Clark but his finger "slipped" on the trigger and the gun was discharged. After Lorence was taken into custody, Lorence checked his pulse throughout the day because he thought he was dying and coming back to life repeatedly.
Dr. Kathryn Hall, a psychiatrist, interviewed Lorence four times, the first interview was held eleven months after the shooting on October 3, 2001. Dr. Hall found Lorence's thinking disorganized, causing him to have difficulty communicating although he appeared to follow what she was saying. Lorence's medication was adjusted after Dr. Hall's first interview. Lorence communicated to Dr. Hall the same information he told Dr. Garfield. Lorence expressed he was under the influence of "an evil presence" when he shot Clark. Dr. Hall testified Lorence was experiencing his first episode of psychotic symptoms on November 3, 2000.
Both Dr. Garfield and Dr. Hall agree Lorence lacked sufficient mental capacity to form the specific intent to commit an assault, theft, willful injury, or a murder. In their opinions, Lorence suffered from such a deranged or diseased condition of the mind as to make him incapable of knowing or understanding the nature or quality of his acts. They also opined Lorence did not have the mental capacity to deliberate, premeditate, and act willfully.
Dr. Curtis Fredrickson, a staff psychiatrist at Oakdale, interviewed Lorence on May 22, 2001, approximately six and a half months after the shooting. He testified Lorence was very anxious that day and told Dr. Fredrickson he heard voices. Dr. Fredrickson also testified Lorence was slow to respond to questions and his responses were difficult to follow as his thinking was tangential. In response to questioning about the shooting, Lorence stated, "strange feelings, possessions, but like guidance or someone trying to make you do things . . . Several other people could have done it also." Dr. Fredrickson did not offer an opinion on the issue of insanity or diminished responsibility.
The final doctor to evaluate Lorence was Dr. Michael Taylor, a psychiatrist who testified on the State's behalf. The interview occurred on July 30, 2001, nearly nine months after the killing. Lorence told Dr. Taylor that he was not experiencing auditory hallucinations or delusions on the night of the killing. While Dr. Taylor agrees with the other doctors that Lorence suffers from schizophrenia, he was unwilling to diagnose a subtype, i.e., paranoia. He also minimized the relevance of Lorence's state of mind subsequent to the shooting, instead focusing on what information he could gather about Lorence's state of mind on the day in question. This included Lorence's version of events surrounding the shooting. While Lorence told Dr. Taylor he thought something was controlling him, he also said he was trying to stop himself from shooting Clark. He stated he knew the gun was loaded and that the safety was on. After the shooting, Lorence said he took Clark's keys to his vehicle, then went to his house to gather some of his belongings as he was trying to get out of town. Dr. Taylor opined Lorence did have the capacity to understand the nature and quality of his acts and understand right from wrong and did not suffer from such a diseased or deranged condition to impair that capacity. Dr. Taylor also testified Lorence had the capacity to form the specific intent to deliberate, premeditate, and act willfully.
Lorence argues there was insufficient evidence to uphold his convictions of first-degree murder and first-degree burglary based on the expert testimony. Lorence asserts evidence of his mental impairments were sufficient to raise a substantial question as to his abilities to act deliberately and with premeditation. Lorence's mother, Karen, testified to his change in appearance during the months prior to the killing. Lorence was always well-groomed and wore nice clothes. In the months leading up to the killing, Karen noticed he let his hair grow out, did not shower, or wear clean clothes. A few of Lorence's friends also testified that his behavior had changed and he would discuss things that made no sense. He talked about death being another dimension to take you to the next stage of your life. He also expressed that people could be killed and brought back to life. Other witnesses testified that Lorence did not exhibit unusual behavior in the time leading up to the murder.
The State does not deny Lorence's mental illness; however, it contends the impairment did not keep Lorence from forming the requisite intent, or from understanding the natural consequences of his acts or the difference between right and wrong. The State points to evidence apart from the expert testimony that could lead the factfinder to return a guilty verdict in this case. This evidence included: Lorence stated he borrowed the gun from a friend; after an initial visit to Clark's house, Lorence returned with the gun; and he used a Sprite can as a silencer on the gun. The State asserts the foregoing demonstrates both planning and understanding of the act committed. In addition, Clark's wallet was found empty next to him but Lorence claims he does not remember stealing the cash from the wallet. The State further argues Lorence's attempt to flee and do so in Clark's vehicle after the shooting is evidence he knew what he had done was wrong and therefore understood the natural consequences of his acts and the need to put some distance between himself and the crime scene.
The question before us is not whether the evidence in the record unequivocally mandates a conviction, but whether the entire record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, would allow a rational jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 610 (Iowa 2001). Given that the jury was free to accept or reject any of the evidence, State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Iowa 2001), and considering the deference granted to its credibility assessments, State v. Wells, 629 N.W.2d 346, 356 (Iowa 2001), we find the record contains substantial evidence in support of the verdict. We agree with the State Lorence failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence his defense of insanity. We further agree the State carried its burden to prove Lorence acted with specific intent.