State v. Lopes

7 Citing cases

  1. State v. Smith

    332 P.3d 326 (Or. Ct. App. 2014)

    In this pretrial appeal, the state contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the criminal charges against defendant, pursuant to ORS 161.370(9)(a), on the ground that it lacked authority to order the involuntary administration of medication for the purpose of restoring defendant's competence to stand trial. Recently, in State v. Lopes, 355 Or. 72, 322 P.3d 512 (2014), the Supreme Court held that Oregon trial courts have such authority under ORS 161.370. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for reconsideration in light of Lopes.

  2. Or. State Hosp. v. Butts

    358 Or. 49 (Or. 2015)   Cited 4 times
    Describing statutory framework and trial court’s responsibilities for competency determinations; declining in mandamus proceeding to substitute reviewing court’s judgment of weight of competing evidence for that of trial court

    A Sell order is a court order directing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs to render a defendant competent to stand trial in accordance with the due process requirements enunciated in Sell v. United States, 539 US 166, 123 S Ct 2174, 156 L Ed 2d 197 (2003). SeeState v. Lopes, 355 Or 72, 77-78, 322 P3d 512 (2014) (discussing Sell). I. BACKGROUND

  3. Bean v. Matteucci

    986 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2021)   Cited 92 times
    Finding that Younger factors were satisfied in challenge to pending state court murder proceeding

    In August 2017, the Douglas County District Attorney moved the circuit court to issue an order directing that Bean be forcibly medicated to restore his competency to stand trial. In April 2018, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Sell v. United States , 539 U.S. 166, 123 S.Ct. 2174, 156 L.Ed.2d 197 (2003), and State v. Lopes , 355 Or. 72, 322 P.3d 512 (2014). Under Sell , the government may forcibly administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges to restore the defendant's competency to stand trial "only if the treatment is medically appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related interests."

  4. Johnson v. Md. Dep't of Health

    470 Md. 648 (Md. 2020)   Cited 11 times

    Use of the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard lessened the risk of an erroneous deprivation of Mr. Johnson's right to be free of unwanted medication. See United States v. Bush , 585 F.3d 806, 814 (4th Cir. 2009) ("A higher standard ... minimizes the risk of erroneous decisions in this important context."); accord , e.g. , United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola , 623 F.3d 684, 692 (9th Cir. 2010) ; United States v. Gomes , 387 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2004) ; United States v. Grape , 549 F.3d 591, 598 (3d Cir. 2008) ; United States v. James , 938 F.3d 719, 720-21 (5th Cir. 2019) ; Barrus v. Mont. First Judicial Dist. Court , 398 Mont. 353, 456 P.3d 577, 583 (2020) ; Cotner v. Liwski , 243 Ariz. 188, 403 P.3d 600, 604 (2017) ; State v. Lishan Wang , 323 Conn. 115, 145 A.3d 906, 916 (2016) ; Warren v. State , 297 Ga. 810, 778 S.E.2d 749, 753 (2015) ; State v. Lopez , 355 Or. 72, 322 P.3d 512, 529 (2014). We adopt that standard for Sell determinations in Maryland.

  5. State v. Valencia

    329 P.3d 771 (Or. 2014)

    Relator filed a petition for writ of mandamus regarding the “Sell” order entered by the trial court on December 4, 2013. This court previously held the petition in abeyance pending a decision in State v. Lopes, SC S061395. This court now has decided that case, State v. Lopes, 355 Or. 72, 322 P.3d 512 (2014). The trial court's “Sell” order is ambiguous as to whether the court applied the proper evidentiary standard identified by this court in Lopes—clear and convincing evidence.

  6. State v. Valencia

    330 P.3d 21 (Or. 2014)

    The court has directed that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue. WHEREFORE, in the name of the State of Oregon, you are commanded either (1) to amend the “Sell” order to confirm that the court used the correct evidentiary standard as identified in State v. Lopes, 355 Or. 72, 322 P.3d 512 (2014), or (2) to vacate the “Sell” order and rehear the matter, applying the appropriate evidentiary standard identified in Lopes.

  7. State v. Holden

    53 Conn. Supp. 290 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2014)

    While the due process clause and the statutory requirement do not condition an order permitting involuntary medication of a defendant on a psychiatric guarantee of success, they require far more than it is “worth a try.” See, e.g., State v. Lopes, 355 Or. 72, 101–103, 322 P.3d 512 (2014) (evidence adduced gave the court pause since psychiatrist recommended involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to restore defendant to competency because in his opinion, “the medications were ‘worth trying’ ”; there is a difference between medication that is “worth trying” and medication that meets the Sell standard). This court finds that Dr. Cotterell's testimony on this issue was loose and equivocal, such that this court cannot find that state has proven this factor by clear and convincing evidence either under the Sell standard (forced medication is substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial), or under the statutory standard (“[t]o a reasonable degree of medical certainty, involuntary medication of the defendant will render the defendant competent to stand trial” [emphasis added] ).