Opinion
No. 3-704 / 02-0957.
Filed December 24, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Joel D. Novak, Judge.
Gerald Long appeals the judgment and sentence entered upon his conviction for second-degree murder. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Roxann Ryan, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and George Karnas and James Ward, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.
Gerald Long appeals the judgment and sentence entered upon his conviction for second-degree murder raising issues of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
Gerald Long was convicted of first-degree murder, but that conviction was overturned by the Iowa Supreme Court in 2001 and remanded for a new trial. State v. Long, 628 N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 2001). Upon remand, Long was initially found to be incompetent and the criminal proceedings were suspended according to Iowa Code section 812.3 (2001). However, on March 6, 2002, the district court determined his competency had been restored and it set the matter for trial.
After his competency was restored, the State and Long reached an agreement regarding the disposition of the charges. The State agreed to reduce the charge to second-degree murder and Long signed a document which purported to waive various rights, stipulate to a trial on the minutes of testimony, and ask the court to enter a finding of guilt. The document was captioned, "WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL AND STIPULATION TO TRIAL ON THE MINUTES OF TESTIMONY" ("Waiver and Stipulation"). Among the rights Long agreed to waive and critical to this appeal were his right to a jury trial, his right to challenge his conviction by means of a motion in arrest of judgment, and his right to appeal. During the hearing in which the waiver and stipulation was offered to the court, Long and his counsel assured the court his waiver of rights was voluntary. In addition, the court engaged Long in a colloquy regarding his waiver of the rights including the right to appeal.
The district court accepted the waiver and stipulation and entered a finding of guilt to the amended second-degree murder charge. It sentenced Long to an indeterminate term not to exceed fifty years. Long then filed a timely notice of appeal, framing both issues as ineffective assistance of counsel. He first claims trial counsel was ineffective in advising him to waive his right to appeal. He next claims counsel breached an essential duty by failing to determine whether, due to the effects of his medications, he was able to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his jury trial rights. The State counters that this appeal should be dismissed due to Long's valid waiver of his appeal rights. In the alternative, the State claims Long's counsel was not ineffective.
Nature of the Proceedings.
There is confusion regarding the nature of the underlying proceedings, stemming from the "waiver and stipulation" Long presented to the district court. The document has certain attributes of both a bench trial on stipulated facts and a plea of guilty. Our supreme court has previously held a bench trial on a stipulated factual record is not the same as a guilty plea proceeding.
State v. Everett, 372 N.W.2d 235, 237 (Iowa 1985). If a defendant intends to plead guilty, a trial court must adhere to the guilty plea procedures set forth in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)( b). If a defendant is in fact stipulating to a bench trial on the minutes of testimony, then a trial court must: (1) verify that the defendant has waived his right to a jury trial in accordance with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.17(1); (2) confirm the extent of the factual record to which the parties are stipulating; and (3) find the facts specially and on the record, separately state its conclusion of law, and render an appropriate verdict as required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.17(2). See State v. Sayre, 566 N.W.2d 193, 196 (Iowa 1997).
The record before us here appears to establish substantial compliance with both rule 2.17 and the enhanced procedural requirements of rule 2.8(2)( b). As noted, the district court fully complied with the requirements outlined in Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)( b) for the taking of a plea. Even more telling regarding the nature of this proceeding is the waiver and stipulation, which stated Long understood the sentencing option which was "mandated due to the death that I caused." The waiver and stipulation concluded by asking the court to "accept this stipulation and to enter a finding of guilt." In response to Long's waiver and stipulation, the court stated, "I want there to be no uncertainty that at the end of this proceeding I will find that you are, in fact, guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the amended charge of Murder in the Second Degree." (Emphasis added). Later in the colloquy, but before proceeding to making a finding, the court stated, "the State has entered into a plea bargain with your attorneys. . . ." Although the parties clearly did not call this procedure a "guilty plea," we conclude the essential nature of this procedure was more akin to a plea proceeding than a bench trial on a stipulated record.
While the waiver and stipulation along with the in-court colloquy present some confusion in terms, it does not rise to the level of the ambiguity our supreme court found present in both State v. Sayre, 566 N.W.2d 193 (Iowa 1997) and State v. Nikkel, 597 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa 1999). Both of those cases necessitated a remand due to the court's inability to definitively ascertain whether the defendants had plead guilty or stipulated to a bench trial on the minutes, making appellate review an unworkable task. Sayre, 566 N.W.2d at 196; NIkkel, 597 N.W.2d at 488. Here, regardless of the form of the proceeding, Long is able to appeal by couching his complaint in terms of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Lucas, 323 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Iowa 1982) (noting that when a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is made, our supreme court has allowed an exception to the general rule of error preservation).
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Long claims his counsel was ineffective in failing to determine whether Long's mental condition allowed him to make a voluntary waiver of his jury trial rights. When there is an alleged denial of constitutional rights, such as an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, we review the totality of the circumstances in the record de novo. Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 920 (Iowa 1998). Ordinarily, we prefer to leave ineffective assistance of counsel claims for postconviction relief proceedings. State v. Hischke, 639 N.W.2d 6, 8 (Iowa 2002). While we often preserve ineffective assistance claims for a possible postconviction proceeding, we consider such claims on direct appeal if the record is sufficient. State v. Casady, 597 N.W.2d 801, 807 (Iowa 1999). We find this record adequate to address Long's claim on direct appeal.
The standards required for a defendant to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are well established. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984); Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142-45 (Iowa 2001). Here, Long must show that (1) his counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted. State v. Terry, 544 N.W.2d 449, 453 (Iowa 1996).
Long's specific claim appears to be that the medications he was taking prevented him from making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his jury trial rights. He asserts, with little factual support or further argument, that counsel should have (1) confirmed he was able to make such a waiver, and (2) challenged the proceeding below as being involuntary. It is clear a criminal defendant's waiver of his jury trial rights must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.17(1).
On November 20, 2001, the district court entered an order for examination to determine Long's competency. He was subsequently declared to be incompetent, sent to the Oakdale facility, and the facility was directed to attempt to restore Long's competency. At a January 16, 2002, hearing, the State informed the court that Dr. Curtis Frederickson at Oakdale had determined Long to again be competent. However, the court provided defense counsel additional time to have Long re-examined by Dr. James Gallagher, the psychiatrist who had originally found him to be incompetent. On March 6, 2002, the district court held another hearing in which the State presented Dr. Gallagher's new conclusion that Long "seem[ed] competent to proceed to trial." The report authored by Dr. Gallagher, while noting some concerns, concluded Long's appearance had improved, his thoughts seemed to track better, and he was ready to work with his attorneys and proceed to trial. The court subsequently entered an order declaring Long competent to stand trial with the understanding his medication continue.
In the proceeding in which the court accepted the waiver and stipulation, Long's counsel made several professional statements regarding Long's competency. She stated that Long was on medication. Counsel also informed the court that based on working with him for several months and after consultation with Dr. Gallagher, she believed Long to be "fully competent to make informed, intelligent decisions, in this case." Based on this representation, the court asked Long directly whether the medication affected his ability to understand the proceedings or enter them voluntarily. Long replied: "No, sir."
Based on our review of the transcript and record we find no reason to question Long's ability to knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter into the plea. We therefore conclude trial counsel breached no duty in failing to make further inquiry into whether Long was competent to enter the waiver and stipulation or challenge the proceedings based on his lack of voluntariness. His plea suffers no infirmities and his conviction and sentence are affirmed.