Opinion
I.D. No. 9807014400
Submitted: April 24, 2002
Decided: July 24, 2002
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief. Summarily Dismissed.
OPINION
On November 16, 1998, Defendant pled guilty to one count of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree, and the State entered a nolle prosequi on the remaining 10 counts of the same crime. These charges stemmed from Defendant's unlawful conduct with his eldest daughter. On January 15, 1999, this Court sentenced Defendant to 18 years at Level V, suspended after 15 years for 3 years at Level II. Defendant did not file a direct appeal. His conviction therefore became final on February 15, 1999.
See Rule 61(m)(1).
On April 24, 2002, Defendant filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61 (Rule 61). As a threshold matter, the motion was filed more than three years after his conviction became final and is therefore procedurally barred by Rule 61(i)(1). The exception to the three-year time bar contained in Rule 61(i)(5) requires a defendant to show either that the Court lacked jurisdiction or that there was a miscarriage of justice in the course of the proceedings. This exception is narrow and has been applied only in limited circumstances, such as when the right relied upon has been recognized for the first time after the conviction is final. The right which Defendant asserts has not been recognized at any time, nor will it ever be.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 555 (Del. 1990).
Defendant, along with numerous other defendants whose crimes involved sexual misconduct with family members, seeks relief from his conviction under the Protection From Abuse Act ("PFA statute"). Defendant claims that he has a protected liberty interest, that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction over him, that justice miscarried and that his conviction violated both due process and equal protection of law. He claims that these issues were never raised because his attorney's representation was constitutionally ineffective.
See, e.g., State v. Torres, supra; State v. Brock, Del.Super., I.D. No. 9611002565, Cooch, J. (June 13, 2002); State v. Anderson, Del. Super., I.D. No. 30306671, Cooch, J. (June 13, 2002); State v. Grayson, Del.Super., I.D. No. 30500267DI, Cooch, J. (June 13, 2002).
The usual standard for evaluating ineffectiveness claims is whether counsel's conduct was professionally unreasonable and whether the alleged errors were prejudicial to the defendant. To apply this analysis to the allegations raised by Defendant Lloyd would be an exercise in futility. The PFA statute provides a civil remedy to family members, living spouses or individuals who have a child in common from abusive, violent, harassing or threatening behavior by other family members. It is intended to protect individuals against domestic violence. Defendant's assertion that he is a member of the protected class of individuals under the PFA statute is worse than frivolous. Equally troublesome to the Court is the fact that at least 12 such motions have recently been filed with the Prothonotary. Each one manifests a distortion of the intention of the PFA statute, and none presents anything other than conclusory assertions purporting to be viable grounds for relief from criminal convictions.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
State v. Torres, Del.Super., I.D. No. 30101192DI, Ableman, J. (May 24, 2002)
Defendant Lloyd has not shown a miscarriage of justice in his plea agreement, pursuant to which the State agreed to drop eleven charges of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse First Degree and Lloyd pled guilty to only one such charge. Fortunately for Lloyd, his attorney did not argue that Lloyd was protected under the PFA statute. A worse argument can hardly be imagined. Procedurally, Lloyd's motion is barred by the three-year limit. Substantively, the motion is frivolous, at best.
Defendant Lloyd's motion for postconviction relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
It Is So ORDERED.