The State challenges the circuit court’s recitation of law in COL 5, which states: 5. Exigent circumstances exist when “immediate police response is reasonably required ‘to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the likely escape of a suspect or the threatened removal or destruction of evidence.’ ” State v. Vinuya, 96 Hawai'i 472 , 488, 32 P.3d 116 , 132 (2001) (quoting State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505 , 512, 606 P.2d 913 , 918 (1980)). The State also challenges COL 7, which concludes:

Our holding does not prevent police executing a warrant from immediately entering the premises if exigent circumstances justify such an entry. State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 512, 606 P.2d 913, 918 (1980). The State cites Lloyd as an example of a case where a warrantless entry of a home was justified by the circumstances, but as indicated below, those circumstances are not present in this case.

"[L]aw enforcement officers may not enter the home of a suspect to effect his arrest, without his consent or without prior judicial authorization, in the absence of exigent circumstances." State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 510-11, 606 P.2d 913, 917 (1980). Exigent circumstances exist when immediate police response is reasonably required "to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the likely escape of a suspect or the threatened removal or destruction of evidence."

Whereupon, Officer Lee conducted the search. It is now settled that any warrantless entrance of a private dwelling by the police can only be justified under the "exigent circumstances" exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Payton v. New York, 48 U.S.L.W. 4375 (1980); State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 606 P.2d 913 (1980). Thus, the police entry in this case can only be justified if Officer Lee reasonably believed that entry was necessary "to prevent imminent danger to life."

Exigent circumstances are those under which "the demands of the occasion reasonably call for an immediate police response." State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 512, 606 P.2d 913, 918 (1980). Such circumstances exist where there is an imminent threat of harm to a person, where there is a danger of serious property damage, where a suspect is likely to escape, or where evidence is likely to be removed or destroyed.

Other courts have demonstrated similar flexibility in analyzing the facts of exigency. See State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 118 (N.D. 1979) ( Dorman guidelines "not to be interpreted as cardinal maxims, rigidly applied to every case"); see generally, United States v. Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1354 (9th Cir.) ("exigency does not evolve from one single fact" but rather the "totality of the circumstances"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836, 99 S.Ct. 119, 58 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978); State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 511, 606 P.2d 913, 918 (S.Ct. 1980) (exigent circumstances measured by totality of circumstances); Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 801, 329 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1975) (same); J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7:7 at 211 (1982) (flexible interpretation of Dorman guidelines "easier to apply on the street and in the courtroom"). As the D.C. Circuit aptly noted, "[T]he very term 'exigency' commands that analysis be shaped by the realities of the situation presented by the record."

While "the term `exigent circumstances' is incapable of precise definition," State v. Elliott, 61 Haw. 492, 495-96, 605 P.2d 930, 933 (1980), "[g]enerally speaking . . . [it] may be said to exist when the demands of the occasion reasonably call for an immediate police response." State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 512, 606 P.2d 913, 918 (1980). More specifically, it includes situations presenting an immediate danger to life or of serious injury or an immediate threatened removal or destruction of evidence.

Here, the Los Angeles Police Department telephoned the Honolulu Police Department and informed them that a footlocker addressed to appellee, known to contain marijuana, would be arriving in Honolulu some six hours later. Clearly, Honolulu police officers had probable cause to arrest appellee when he took possession of the footlocker and also had probable cause to seize the footlocker based on the information received from Los Angeles. See State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 509, 606 P.2d 913, 916 (1980); State v. Hook, 60 Haw. 197, 202, 587 P.2d 1224, 1228 (1978). Probable cause to seize the footlocker, however, does not permit the greater intrusion of a warrantless search of its contents.

State v. Barnes, 58 Haw. 333, 568 P.2d 1207 (1977).State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 509, 606 P.2d 913, 916 (1980).

. State v. Lloyd, 61 Haw. 505, 509, 606 P.2d 913, 916 (1980).