Opinion
No. 4-811 / 04-0687
Filed December 22, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pocahontas County, Ronald H. Schechtman, Judge.
Defendant-appellant, Jeremy Michael Lloyd, appeals from the sentence given him following his guilty pleas to the charges burglary in the second degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.5 (2003); willful injury, in violation of section 708.4(2); and operating while intoxicated, in violation of section 321J.2. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Guddall, Assistant Attorney General, Ann Beneke, County Attorney.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Zimmer, JJ.
Defendant-appellant, Jeremy Michael Lloyd, appeals from the sentence given him following his guilty pleas to the charges burglary in the second degree, in violation of Iowa Code sections 713.1 and 713.5 (2003); willful injury, in violation of section 708.4(2); and operating while intoxicated, in violation of section 321J.2. Defendant claims that the district court erred by failing to state sufficient reasons for the imposition of consecutive sentences. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
Defendant pled guilty to the charges of burglary in the second degree, in violation of sections 713.1 and 713.5 (2003); willful injury, in violation of section 708.4(2); and operating while intoxicated, in violation of section 321J.2. The charges of assault while participating in a felony and assault with intent to commit sexual abuse were dropped.
Defendant was charged with these crimes after he entered a home without permission, hit the victim in the head with a tire iron, and attempted to force intercourse with the victim.
The district court accepted the guilty plea, finding it was intelligently and voluntarily entered and had factual basis. At sentencing the district court cited numerous factors that it considered in fashioning defendant's sentence. The district court cited defendant's criminal record, defendant's age, the opportunity to rehabilitate defendant, protection of the community, the nature of the offense, and the impact on the victim as factors in sentencing. Following consideration of these factors the district court stated that neither a deferred judgment nor probation was appropriate. The district court then sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term not to exceed ten years and a $1,000 suspended fine for the second degree burglary offense, an indeterminate term not to exceed five years and $750 fine for the willful injury offense, and term of thirty days in county jail, with all but two days suspended, and $1000 fine for operating while intoxicated. The district court further ordered that the sentences run consecutively. Defendant claims that the district court erred by failing to state sufficient reasons for the imposition of consecutive sentences.
II. ANALYSIS.
We may address challenges to the legality of a sentence for the first time on appeal. State v. Dann, 591 N.W.2d 635, 637 (Iowa 1999); see also State v. Thomas, 520 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994). We review sentencing for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; State v. Cooley, 587 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Iowa 1998). Where a challenged sentence does not fall outside statutory limits, we review the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion; reversal on this ground is warranted only if the court's discretion has been exercised "on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable." State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996).
The district court must "state on the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence." Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)( d). The district court must provide specific reasoning regarding why consecutive sentences are warranted in the particular case. State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 690 (Iowa 2000). "Although the reasons do not need to be detailed, they must be sufficient to allow appellate review of the discretionary action" of imposing consecutive sentences. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d at 690. The reasons, however, are not required to be specifically tied to the imposition of consecutive sentences, but may be found from the particular reasons expressed for the overall sentencing plan. State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Iowa 1989). Thus, we look to all parts of the record to find the supporting reasons. Id.
Certain factors are to be considered by the district court in exercising its sentencing discretion. In exercising its discretion, "the district court is to weigh all pertinent matters in determining a proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the defendant's age, character, and propensities or chances for reform." State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Iowa 1995) (quoting State v. Johnson, 513 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa 1994)).
In the present case, the district court cited a number of factors that it considered in fashioning defendant's sentence. The district court cited defendant's criminal record, defendant's age, the opportunity to rehabilitate the defendant, protection of the community, the nature of the offense, and the impact on the victim. After discussing these factors the district court announced that defendant was not a candidate for probation or a deferred judgment. The district court then immediately pronounced judgment and sentence and ordered that the sentences would run consecutively.
We determine that the sentencing factors discussed by the district court were part of an overall sentencing plan. The district court engaged in a general discussion of the factors which it was mindful of in sentencing; this discussion was not tied directly to denial of probation or deferred judgment. Cf. State v. Uthe, 542 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Iowa 1996) (district court gave reasons for refusal to grant probation but not for imposition of consecutive sentences); State v. Delaney, 526 N.W.2d 170, 178 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994) (district court tied cited factors directly to denial of probation but did not give reasons for imposition of consecutive sentences). Here, the district court systematically discussed factors considered in sentencing, and followed that with a pronouncement that probation or deferred judgment was not appropriate, and followed that by pronouncing the terms of incarceration for each offense, and followed that by pronouncing that the sentences would run consecutively. This method of sentencing by the district court clearly indicates that the sentencing factors it considered were part of an overall sentencing plan. Therefore, we consider all these factors in determining whether the district court provided sufficient reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Iowa 1989). We conclude that the district court provided sufficient reasons for imposing consecutive sentences.