Opinion
ID#: 0103008804-PN-01-03-1512R1, ID#: 0106005195-IN-01-07-0592R1
March 8, 2002
ORDER
On November 8, 2001 Defendant pleaded guilty to Forgery Second Degree and Theft Misdemeanor. After declaring that Defendant is a habitual offender, the court sentenced Defendant to two years in prison for the Forgery Second Degree under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a), the habitual offender sentencing statute. On the Theft misdemeanor, the court sentenced Defendant to one year in prison followed by six months at supervision Level III.
On December 17, 2001 Defendant filed a motion for modification of sentence, which the court denied by order dated January 23, 2002.
On February 22, 2002 Defendant filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief. In actuality, the motion is to correct an illegal sentence. Primarily, Defendant complains that the six months of Level III probation is excessive because it allegedly exceeds the one year maximum for a class A misdemeanor. At first blush, Defendant's position seems to make sense. Under the general sentencing statute, 11 Del. C. § 4206(a), the sentence for a class A misdemeanor may include up to one year incarceration at Level V.
Under 11 Del. C. § 4204(l), however, whenever a court imposes more than one year of incarceration, the court must include as part of its sentence not less than six months of probation "to facilitate the transition of the individual back into society." Section 4204(l) states: "6-month transition period required by this subsection may, at the discretion of the court, be in addition to the maximum sentence of imprisonment established by the statute." Accordingly, Defendant received a sentence totaling more than one year imprisonment and the court tacked on a six month transition period after he completes his sentence, which is consistent with 11 Del. C. § 4204(l). Technically, the § 4202(l) transition probation should have been added to the felony's sentence, rather than the misdemeanor. The court will modify the sentence order to address that technicality.
In closing, the court makes two further clarifications. First, in its December 17, 2001 order, the court incorrectly referred to Defendant's sentence for Theft misdemeanor as "mandatory imprisonment." The provisions of the habitual offender statute do not apply to sentences for misdemeanors and, accordingly, the one year sentence imposed for the Theft misdemeanor is not mandatory. Second the court again observes that the sentence imposed by the court and the court's approach to Defendant's motions take into account the terms of Defendant's plea agreement and his terrible record. While the court may have mischaracterized its sentence order slightly in its January 23, 2002 order, it stands by the point that Defendant could have been sentenced to prison for the rest of his life on November 8, 2001. Instead of imposing a life sentence, the court sentenced Defendant to three years in prison, two of which are mandatory, followed by six months of Level III probation. That sentence, is appropriate and the court does not expect to entertain a continuing series of challenges to it and requests for modification.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's second motion filed after sentencing is DENIED, except that the one year Level V sentence imposed for IN-01-07-0592R1 is not mandatory and the six month, Level III transition probation is imposed in connection with the other charge, PN-01-03-1512R1.
IT IS SO ORDERED.