In addition, the state's production of one uncertain eyewitness and hearsay statements at trial to establish that Davis aided and abetted the attempted murder of K.W. at Lake Calhoun in 2010 did not conform to its offer of proof and was "simply too incomplete." State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102, 106 (Minn. 1979) (quotation omitted). Because the erroneous admission of the other-crimes evidence was not harmless, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
In its memorandum, the district court concluded that biographical information cannot be suppressed, even when the information is obtained after an unlawful search, seizure, and interrogation. In support of its conclusion, the district court cited State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn. 1977); State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102 (Minn. 1979); and State v. Hale, 453 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1990).
In fact, the State successfully prosecuted three persons for these crimes. The State first tried and convicted Link. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed her conviction in State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102 (Minn. 1979). The State next prosecuted Olson.
See also State v. Olson, 291 N.W.2d 203 (Minn. 1980); State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102 (Minn. 1979). Black, along with Dale Olson and Jean Link, was convicted of the brutal killings of Lueberta Davis and her two infant children.
See State v. Greenleaf, 591 N.W.2d 488, 497 (Minn.1999) (noting that routine booking statements do not require Miranda warnings); State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102, 107 (Minn.1979) (stating that biographical questions do not require Miranda warnings); State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn.1977) (explaining that routine booking questions relating to name, address, or other similar matters do not require a Miranda warning). Given that Bobo failed to allege facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, the postconviction court did not err when it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective. We therefore affirm the court's summary denial of Bobo's second postconviction petition.
See State v. Greenleaf, 591 N.W.2d 488, 497 (Minn. 1999) (noting that routine booking statements do not require Miranda warnings); State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102, 107 (Minn. 1979) (stating that biographical questions do not require Miranda warnings); State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn. 1977) (explaining that routine booking questions relating to name, address, or other similar matters do not require a Miranda warning). Given that Bobo failed to allege facts that, if proven by a fair preponderance of the evidence, would satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, the postconviction court did not err when it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing on his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective. We therefore affirm the court's summary denial of Bobo's second postconviction petition.
The purpose of review for harmless error is to relieve the courts and the public of the needless expense of retrying cases "in which the result would be the same after the error had been corrected." Philip J. Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 Minn. L.Rev. 519, 519 (1969); see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759-60 (1946); State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102, 106 (Minn. 1979) ("[I]f there is ever to be finality in the criminal justice system, a harmless error doctrine is essential."). R.J.E. argues that reviewing trials on stipulated facts for harmless error fails to satisfy the philosophical justification of the harmless error rule, which presumes that a contested trial has occurred.
Such questions and comments are more analogous to routine booking questions and statements which do not require Miranda warnings. See State v. Widell, 258 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Minn. 1977) (holding that " Miranda warnings need not be given before asking routine booking questions"); State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102, 107 (Minn. 1979) (holding that "[b]iographical questions are not proscribed by Miranda"). Second, and more importantly, the statement Greenleaf now seeks to suppress was obtained only after Greenleaf requested to speak with Carlton County police, and only after he was given another Miranda warning and waived his rights.
The harmless error standard of review applies to the admissibility of the Spreigl evidence. State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102, 106 (Minn. 1979). (a) Evidence of other crimes may not be received unless there has been notice as required by State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 496, 139 N.W.2d 167, 173. (Applicable to all cases tried after December 17, 1965).
It was, the State continues to urge, a natural response to a spontaneous question which had nothing to do with investigating criminal activity. State v. Link, 289 N.W.2d 102 (Minn. 1979) (innocuous biographical questions). See, also, State v. Lamb, supra at 502, 330 N.W.2d at 466 (citing Com. v. Shepherd, 269 Pa. Super. 291, 409 A.2d 894 (1979)): "`Where there is no expectation of an admission and the police conduct is not an attempt to obtain an admission, there is no interrogation.'"