State v. Lingrel

4 Citing cases

  1. Smith v. Campbell

    781 F. Supp. 521 (M.D. Tenn. 1991)   Cited 6 times

    1961); State v. Bell, 690 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1985); Wilson v. State, 452 S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1969). Courts have often exercised this discretion in favor of the State by permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence out-of-time or to reopen its case. See, e.g., Colbaugh v. State, 188 Tenn. 103, 216 S.W.2d 741, 743 (1948); Martin v. State, 157 Tenn. 383, 8 S.W.2d 479, 480 (1928); State v. Lingrel, 692 S.W.2d 41, 44-45 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1985); Johnson v. State, 4 Tenn.Cr.App. 154, 469 S.W.2d 529, 530 (1971). The fact that courts have exercised their discretion to permit the untimely introduction of evidence does not, in itself, render the trial court's decision in this case arbitrary or unjust.

  2. Collins v. Arnold

    No. M2004-02513-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2007)   Cited 18 times
    Holding Section 324A applicable "regarding liability under a duty that is voluntarily assumed" and that the trial court erred in refusing to give jury instruction based on Section 324A

    A summary conclusion is clearly inadequate." Tennessee Law of Evidence, ยง 6.09[6][d] (citing State v. Lingrel, 692 S.W.2d 41(Tenn.Crim.App. 1985)). With regard to the regard to the required analysis, "[t]wo criteria are especially relevant in determining whether the probative value of a conviction on the issue of credibility outweighs its unfair prejudicial effect upon the substantive issues: (1) the impeaching conviction's relevance as to credibility; and (2) the impeaching conviction's similarity to the offense charged."

  3. State v. Lawson

    C.C.A. No. 01C01-9607-CR-00320 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 1997)   Cited 7 times

    The general rule is that a witness may refer to notes to refresh her recollection. State v. Lingrel, 692 S.W.2d 41 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1985). The trial court has wide discretionary authority over the propriety, scope, manner and control of the examination of witnesses.

  4. State v. Scott

    735 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)   Cited 143 times

    The evidence clearly establishes that the appellant sexually penetrated the victim, who was less than thirteen (13) years of age, against her will. See State v. Howard, 617 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981), [victim eleven years of age]; State v. Fears, 659 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983), [victim five years of age]; State v. Hardin, 691 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985), [victim eleven years of age]; State v. Lingrel, 692 S.W.2d 41, 44 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985), [victim four years of age]. This issue is without merit.