Opinion
No. 1-964 / 01-0578.
Filed March 13, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Osceola County, PATRICK M. CARR, Judge.
Tyrone Lindsay appeals his conviction and sentence for vehicular homicide. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa Wilson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert Hansen, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings .
Tyrone Lindsay appeals his conviction and sentence for vehicular homicide, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(1) (1999). He claims the trial court erroneously admitted irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence. He also claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
Lindsay was charged with this offense following Rodney Rozell-Cantando's death in a one-car accident in rural Osceola County on September 17, 2000. Rozell-Cantando was a passenger in the car Lindsay was driving at the time of the accident. Subsequent tests indicated Lindsay's blood alcohol content was .160.
The State's case included witnesses familiar with both the place and amount of Lindsay's alcohol consumption prior to the accident. Other witnesses testified concerning their observations of Lindsay's behavior and driving before the accident. Over Lindsay's relevancy and undue prejudice objections, Deputy Sheriff Donald Gude testified to the facts surrounding Lindsay's arrest on September 28, 2000. He testified that Lindsay's wife first told officers Lindsay was not at home, but they found Lindsay hiding in a closet.
Lindsay denied responsibility for Rozell-Cantando's death. He testified that the accident happened when he swerved to avoid a collision with an animal that ran in front of his car causing him to lose control.
A jury found Lindsay guilty of vehicular homicide. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five years. Lindsay was also ordered to pay victim restitution of $150,000 to Rozell-Cantando's estate.
On appeal, Lindsay argues the district court's ruling on Gude's testimony necessitates reversal and a new trial. Lindsay also claims he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel citing counsel's failure to request a jury instruction on superseding or intervening cause. He also cites counsel's failure to fully advise him of the advantages of a plea agreement offered by the State. Lastly, Lindsay claims his counsel should have challenged the constitutionality of the restitution provision of his sentence.
II. Evidentiary Issue .
We generally review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Rodriguez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Iowa 2001) (citations omitted). We will not interfere unless the trial court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. Id. (citations omitted).
Lindsay argues Gude's testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding his arrest was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. We disagree.
Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.401 provides that evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable than it would be without the evidence. Evidence of flight or concealment is relevant because it is probative of consciousness of guilt. See State v. Crawley, 633 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Iowa 2001). Because Lindsay was hiding from officers when they arrived to arrest him, we believe evidence of this fact was relevant proof of Lindsay's guilty knowledge. The district court properly concluded Gude's testimony was relevant.
Relevant evidence may, however, be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. Unfair prejudice is defined as "an undue tendency to suggest decisions on an improper basis, commonly though not necessarily, an emotional one." State v. Castaneda, 621 N.W.2d 435, 440 (Iowa 2001) (finding evidence of defendant's prior sexual conduct was unfairly prejudicial); see State v. Most, 578 N.W.2d 250, 254 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (evidence of prior sex crimes unfairly prejudicial); State v. Alderman, 578 N.W.2d 255, 258 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (evidence defendant was a violent person unfairly prejudicial); but see State v. Brown, 569 N.W.2d 113, 117 (Iowa 1997) (evidence defendant possessed firearms not unfairly prejudicial). Unlike evidence of a prior sex crime, or violent propensities, evidence that Lindsay was hiding in a closet when arrested is not likely to influence the jury's emotions. Moreover, the probative value of Lindsay's consciousness of guilt was substantial in view of his denials of intoxication. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Gude's testimony, and we therefore affirm on this issue.
III. Ineffective Assistance .
Lindsay claims he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel on the following grounds: (1) failing to request a jury instruction on intervening and superseding causation; (2) failing to argue the imposition of $150,000 in restitution violated his right to due process and was an excessive fine; and (3) failing to adequately explain the plea offer.
Our review of an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is de novo. State v. Bergmann, 600 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 1999). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) the attorney failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted to the extent it denied defendant a fair trial. State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Iowa 1998).
In proving the first prong, the defendant faces a strong presumption the performance of counsel falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 735, 739 (Iowa 1995). We will not second guess reasonable trial strategy. State v. Wissing, 528 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Iowa 1995). The second prong is satisfied if a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Davis v. State, 520 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994).
A. Jury Instruction.
Lindsay claims he received ineffective assistance because his trial counsel did not request a jury instruction on his theory of defense, that there was an intervening and superseding cause for the accident, which was an animal running across the road. Ordinarily, the district court must instruct on a defendant's theory of defense provided the defendant makes a timely request, the requested theory of defense instruction is supported by the evidence, and the requested instruction is a correct statement of the law. State v. McFarland, 598 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999).
A defendant may be criminally responsible for a victim's death if the defendant's conduct is a proximate cause of the death. State v. Shortridge, 555 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); State v. Cunningham, 463 N.W.2d 887, 889 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). A defendant can be relieved of criminal responsibility if an intervening act breaks the chain of causal connection between the defendant's actions and the victim's death. State v. Garcia, 616 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 2000). However, for an intervening act to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility, the intervening act must be the s ole proximate cause of death. Id. (citing Wissing, 528 N.W.2d at 565) (emphasis in original).
Thus, in order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, Lindsay must show that an animal running across the road was the sole proximate cause of Rozell-Cantando's death. See State v. Mott, 635 N.W.2d 301, 302-03 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001). Even if Lindsay had swerved onto the right shoulder to avoid an animal, the evidence showed he overcompensated by going across the highway and into the left ditch. Furthermore, the evidence showed Lindsay had not applied his brakes prior to going into the ditch. We conclude Lindsay's counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on intervening and superseding cause.
B. Restitution.
Because Lindsay's actions resulted in the death of another, under section 910.3B(1), he was required to pay $150,000 in restitution to the victim's estate. Lindsay contends he received ineffective assistance because his trial counsel did not argue the restitution award violated his right to due process, or was an excessive fine.
On his due process claim, Lindsay asserts that the criminal sanction in section 910.3B should be subject to the same scrutiny as an award of punitive damages in a civil action. We determine that cases dealing with punitive damages in a civil context do not offer any guidance with respect to the constitutionality of the criminal sanction here. The criminal sanction in section 910.3B is akin to a fine, not the award of damages in a civil case. See State v. Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d 541, 549 (Iowa 2000). Furthermore, section 910.3B does not violate substantive due process because there is a reasonable fit between the government interests and the means through which the legislature has chosen to accomplish them. State v. Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d 515, 520 (Iowa 2000).
Lindsay also contends he received ineffective assistance because his trial counsel failed to argue the restitution award under section 910.3B violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the state and federal constitutions. This argument was previously rejected as well. Izzolena, 609 N.W.2d at 551; Artzer, 609 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 2000); Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d at 519. Because Lindsay's due process and excessive fines claims have already been rejected, he has not shown counsel acted incompetently by failing to raise them here.
C. Plea Offer.
Finally, Lindsay claims his trial counsel failed to adequately explain the plea offer to him. He asserts that if the plea offer had been adequately explained, he would have accepted it. We determine the record is inadequate to address this claim, and we preserve it for possible postconviction proceedings.
We affirm Lindsay's conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED.