Opinion
A22-0850
02-14-2023
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Russell Floyd Lindquist, Appellant.
Dakota County District Court File No. 19HA-CR-20-142.
Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and Frisch, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Louise Dovre Bjorkman, Judge
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. Appellant Russell Lindquist waived his right to a jury trial on charges of wrongfully obtaining medical assistance, wrongfully obtaining supplemental nutritional assistance, and perjury. The following day, before the district court began receiving evidence, Lindquist asked to withdraw his jury-trial waiver. The district court denied the request and conducted a bench trial. The court convicted and sentenced Lindquist for all three offenses.
2. Lindquist now challenges his convictions and sentences, arguing that the denial of his request to withdraw his jury-trial waiver is structural error. The state concedes that the district court erred by denying the request and that Lindquist is entitled to a new trial. We agree.
3. A defendant "may withdraw the waiver of a jury trial any time before trial begins." Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 1(3). "Trial begins when jeopardy attaches." Id. cmt. In a bench trial, that occurs when the court swears in witnesses and begins to hear evidence. State v. Caswell, 551 N.W.2d 252, 254-55 (Minn.App. 1996) (citing Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975)). Refusal to accept a timely withdrawal of a jurytrial waiver is reversible error, not subject to a harmless-error analysis. State v. Jesmer, 196 N.W.2d 924, 925 (1972) (reversing and remanding without discussion of prejudice); see also Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986) (stating that when the jury-trial right "is altogether denied, the State cannot contend that the deprivation was harmless because the evidence established the defendant's guilt; the error in such a case is that the wrong entity judged the defendant guilty"). Because Lindquist timely asked to withdraw his jury-trial waiver, we reverse his convictions and remand for a new trial.
4. Lindquist also argues that the district court erred by entering a conviction and sentence for perjury because it is a lesser offense included in the others-a point the state also concedes. And in a pro se supplemental brief, Lindquist asserts 16 other errors, arguing that they entitle him to a new trial. Because we reverse all of Lindquist's convictions and remand for a new trial, we need not address these other issues.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Lindquist's convictions are reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.