” “The purpose of the particularity requirement is to prevent general searches.” State v. Light, 2013–NMCA–075, ¶ 22, 306 P.3d 534; see also Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 404 (10th Cir.1985) (stating that “[t]he particularity requirement ensures that a search is confined in scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific crime for which there is demonstrated probable cause”). There must be a sufficient nexus between the evidence law enforcement is looking for and the particular place being searched.

831 F.2d at 545. Courts also have applied what has been called a "notice" test, which Powers claims invalidates searches when "the officers are on notice that the personal property being searched belongs to a non-resident of the property for which they obtained the warrant." See, e.g. , State v. Gilstrap , 235 Ariz. 296, 298, 332 P.3d 43, 45 (Ariz. 2014) ("This test allows police to search an item that may contain the object of a premises warrant unless they are put on notice that the item belongs to a non-resident."); State v. Light , 306 P.3d 534, 541 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) ("Defendant encourages us to adopt the `notice' approach that prohibits officers from searching the personal property of visitors on the premises to be searched if the officers knew or should have known that the personal property belonged to the visitor."). See also State v. Nabarro , 55 Haw. 583, 588, 525 P.2d 573, 577 (Haw. 1974) ("[W]ithout notice of some sort of the ownership of a belonging, the police are entitled to assume that all objects within premises lawfully subject to search under a warrant are part of those premises for the purpose of executing the warrant."). Powers did not expressly raise the notice test in the Court of Criminal Appeals before that court issued its opinion.

Id. at 1244 ; see also State v. Wills , 524 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) ; State v. Light , 306 P.3d 534, 542 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013). Brown does not land on any particular test for Fourth Amendment purposes, but asserts the search in this case fails under any of the above tests.

Based on the district court's findings, there was no indication that the officers knew who owned the cell phones found in the vehicle, or why all of the cell phones were found on the floorboard of the front passenger seat. Burrows's girlfriend, who had been sitting in the front passenger seat, told the officers that whatever was found in the vehicle belonged to her. No other occupant of the vehicle claimed ownership of any of the items found inside, and the cell phones were not taken from the possession of any of the occupants. Cf. State v. Light, 2013-NMCA-075, ¶¶ 43-45, 306 P.3d 534 (explaining that in situations involving automobile searches, drivers and passengers possess a reduced expectation of privacy in property they transport in vehicles, as opposed to the search of a building in which the personal property of a person not subject to the search warrant has been stored on premises that are open to the public). {14} Defendant claims that she opposed the validity of the affidavit because the language used in the affidavit was boilerplate language, though she never specified what part of the affidavit she considered boilerplate language.

See State v. Vandenberg, 2003-NMSC-030, ¶ 17, 134 N.M. 566, 81 P.3d 19. "While deferring to the district court with respect to factual findings and indulging in all reasonable inferences in support of that court's decision, we nonetheless review the constitutional question of the reasonableness of a search and seizure de novo." State v. Light, 2013-NMCA-075, ¶ 19, 306 P.3d 534 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {15} To justify a protective pat-down, the officer "must have a sufficient degree of articulable suspicion that the person being frisked is both armed and presently dangerous."

We defer to the district court with respect to factual findings and indulge all reasonable inferences that support the court's decision; we also review the constitutional question of the reasonableness of a seizure de novo. State v. Light, 2013-NMCA-075, ¶ 19, 306 P.3d 534. B. The State Did Not Raise Reasonable Suspicion for an Investigatory Seizure

We therefore affirm. {2} This Court's proposed disposition explained that while there appeared to be a viable basis for challenging the search of Defendant's purse, see State v. Light, 2013-NMCA-075, ¶ 42, 306 P.3d 534 (holding the search of the defendant's purse was "not supported by probable cause because the State failed to prove that the seizure of that individual item was supported by probable cause and it failed to establish a connection between the purse and the reason for the warrant" where the defendant was not subject to the search warrant, but was on the premises at the time the warrant was executed), without further development of the facts and an examination of the search warrant and supporting affidavit—neither of which were introduced below—we could not conclude that Defendant had made a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. [CN 3-4] See State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶ 22, 136 N.M. 533, 101 P.3d 799 ("[W]e have held when the record does not contain all the facts necessary for a full determination of the issue, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is more properly brought through a habeas corpus petition[.

However, "[w]hile deferring to the district court with respect to factual findings and indulging in all reasonable inferences in support of that court's decision, we nonetheless review the constitutional question of . . . reasonableness . . . de novo." State v. Light, 2013-NMCA-075, ¶ 19, 306 P.3d 534 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). B. Scope of the Search Warrant

" "The purpose of the particularity requirement is to prevent general searches." State v. Light, 2013-NMCA-075, ¶ 22, 306 P.3d 534; see also Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 404 (10th Cir. 1985) (stating that "[t]he particularity requirement ensures that a search is confined in scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific crime for which there is demonstrated probable cause"). There must be a sufficient nexus between the evidence law enforcement is looking for and the particular place being searched.