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State v. Lewis

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One
Feb 2, 2009
148 Wn. App. 1028 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)

Opinion

No. 60448-1-I.

February 2, 2009.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 07-1-03587-3, Jeffrey M. Ramsdell, J., entered August 17, 2007.


Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.


UNPUBLISHED OPINION


Appellant Anthony Lewis seeks reversal of his conviction for residential burglary on the basis that the trial court should have suppressed several photographs and evidence that a stolen computer was found in his car. Lewis deliberately allowed the evidence to come in because he wanted the jury to believe the police were acting illegally when they searched his car. Any error was invited and review is precluded. The conviction is affirmed.

On a March evening in 2007, a woman called 911 to report that someone had broken into her home. When police arrived, they saw a man run out the back door. The homeowner reported that she was missing cash and a laptop computer. Investigating officers found an older Buick that "appeared to be out of place" near the home. Police determined that the car belonged to Lewis.

Deputy Tobin Corlis testified that the front driver's side window of the car was open and that the driver's seat, the door panel, and the rear seat were wet from the rain. Behind the front driver's seat, Deputy Corlis noticed a Toshiba laptop with the mouse attached. Deputy Corlis testified that the laptop also appeared wet from the rain. Deputy Jesse Williams took pictures of the laptop from outside the car to show the homeowner. The homeowner's son, who arrived to interpret for his mother, looked at the photographs and confirmed that the laptop was his. Before impounding the car, Deputy Corlis testified that he opened the car door and rolled up the window to prevent further damage from the rain.

The next day, police received a search warrant for the car. While searching the car, police took additional photographs and placed the laptop in evidence. The officers noticed that the laptop had a sticker on it with the name and address of the burglarized home.

Shortly thereafter, Lewis called and left his telephone number with the towing company that impounded the car. A detective called Lewis back at the number he had left and asked him how his car had ended up near the burglarized home. Lewis told the detective that his car had been stolen and denied any knowledge of the laptop computer. The detective arranged to interview Lewis the next morning.

When Lewis arrived the next morning, detectives asked him about his car getting stolen. Initially Lewis told the detectives that he had tried to report the car stolen, but that the police refused to take a report. He then changed his story, saying that he had loaned the car to some friends. Eventually Lewis confessed to breaking into the home and taking the laptop.

The State charged Lewis with one count of residential burglary. Before trial, the court held a CrR 3.5 hearing to determine the admissibility of Lewis' confession. During the hearing, Lewis complained that his lawyer was refusing to ask a witness some questions that Lewis considered critical. The court ultimately determined that Lewis' statements to the police during the interview were admissible. Defense counsel did not request a suppression hearing.

After the 3.5 hearing, Lewis asked the court to allow him to represent himself with the assistance of standby counsel. He explained that he felt compelled to represent himself because his attorney had provided ineffective assistance of counsel. After an extensive colloquy, the court granted Lewis' request. Eventually the court also granted defense counsel's motion to withdraw as standby counsel due to a breakdown in communication. The court appointed a new attorney as standby counsel and continued the trial date so that Lewis would have time to prepare.

Prior to trial, Lewis filed an unsuccessful motion for dismissal under CrR 8.3 alleging governmental misconduct. Aside from making repeated requests for a dismissal under CrR 8.3, which the court continued to deny, Lewis never asked the court to suppress evidence found in his car.

After trial, the jury found Lewis guilty as charged. Lewis filed a post-trial motion for arrest of judgment and/or a new trial. The trial court denied the motion, finding that "all of the issues and arguments presented in Defendant's motion were exhaustively explored and addressed at trial." Lewis appeals.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Lewis did not file a motion to suppress below. But on appeal, he claims the trial court erred when it failed to suppress evidence found during the search of his vehicle. This claim is barred by the invited error doctrine because the record is clear that Lewis made a deliberate strategic choice to allow the evidence to be admitted for his own purposes.

The doctrine of invited error prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal. State v. Wakefield, 130 Wn.2d 464, 475, 925 P.2d 183 (1996). The invited error doctrine is an important aspect of our appellate process that was crafted to prevent the injustice of a party benefiting from an error that he caused or should have prevented. City of Seattle v. Patu, 147 Wn.2d 717, 720, 58 P.3d 273 (2002).

According to Lewis, the trial court should have suppressed the laptop computer found behind his front seat and two photographs taken of his car before it was impounded. During trial, the State offered the laptop computer as evidence. When the court asked Lewis whether he had any objection to the laptop being offered, Lewis said, "No problem, Your Honor." The next day, Lewis told the court that the State was withholding several newly provided photographs from the night of the burglary. The State explained that it was not aware of these additional photographs until two days before when one of the officers testified about them. The State told the court that it provided Lewis with copies of the photos as soon as it received them. Lewis claimed he did not receive all of the photographs.

Lewis repeatedly asserted that the photographs demonstrated that there had been an illegal search and seizure of his car before it was impounded. He claimed the photographs showed that his car door had been opened and that the front seat and laptop had been moved. The court asked Lewis what he wanted the court to do about the photographs and asked if he wanted them excluded:

MR. LEWIS: And there's also the photographs of the car where there's a door open and an illegal search and seizure with the seat pressed forward and the laptop that the officer said in his report that he photographed outside of the vehicle, but it's clearly shown that there's a door open which confers to the officer's testimony yesterday that he illegally opened Mr. Lewis' door and rolled up a window where it's clearly visible that a window is not rolled up and the seat's pushed forward. And if you were to take the photographs and align them, you can see that the laptop has been moved.

THE COURT: What would you like me to do about the photographs? Do you want me to exclude them because they were late?

MR. LEWIS: No. They're going to be admitted in order for the jury to understand as well.

The court then engaged Lewis in a lengthy discussion regarding the photographs and whether they actually did or did not show that the computer or the cord had been moved. Although the State explained that it did not intend to offer the photographs, Lewis said repeatedly that he wanted them admitted and used as evidence. The court, therefore, deemed them admissible.

When Lewis again raised the issue of the photographs and their late disclosure, the court explained that it probably would have excluded them if Lewis had objected. Again, Lewis said that his concern was not with excluding the photographs:

THE COURT: Hang on. Let me finish. I would have excluded them because they were late disclosed. But you saw some value to your defense in those photographs. So, whether or not the State requested them too late is really a moot issue because if you had wanted me to exclude them, I probably would have.

MR. LEWIS: No. It's not the problem of whether or not to exclude them or — it's basically that goes back to prosecutorial mismanagement of this case.

THE COURT: So 8.3 you want a dismissal under?

MR. LEWIS: Yes.

THE COURT: I think we've been through that already, too. I don't see anything that [the prosecutor] has done that's inappropriate. She may have not noticed that she didn't have photographs that perhaps were otherwise available. But I don't think there's any misconduct or mismanagement on her part.

Because Lewis invited use of the photographs and did not object to the State's use of the laptop, he may not complain now that admission of them was error.

Statement of Additional Grounds

In a statement of additional grounds for review, Lewis attaches various trial court pleadings and documents without stating any reason why this court should review them. An appellant seeking review of a criminal case "may file a pro se statement of additional grounds for review to identify and discuss those matters which the defendant/appellant believes have not been adequately addressed by the brief filed by the defendant/appellant's counsel." RAP 10.10(a). Reference to the record and citation to authorities are not necessary or required, but the appellate court will not consider the appellant's statement of additional grounds for review "if it does not inform the court of the nature and occurrence of alleged errors." RAP 10.10(c).

Lewis' statement of additional grounds for review consists solely of attachments prefaced by a request to "Please see attached." The attachments include his motion for arrest of judgment and/or a new trial, a memorandum he submitted in support of that motion, the order denying the motion, his sentencing memorandum, and a motion for dismissal under CrR 8.3. He also attaches declarations and trial court exhibits. Attaching documents, without more, is not an effective way to raise additional grounds for review. Because Lewis has failed to inform this court of the nature and occurrence of errors allegedly committed by the trial court, we will not consider his statement of additional grounds for review.

Affirmed.


Summaries of

State v. Lewis

The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One
Feb 2, 2009
148 Wn. App. 1028 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)
Case details for

State v. Lewis

Case Details

Full title:THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. ANTHONY EUGENE LEWIS, Appellant

Court:The Court of Appeals of Washington, Division One

Date published: Feb 2, 2009

Citations

148 Wn. App. 1028 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)
148 Wash. App. 1028