Opinion
A24-0182
08-19-2024
State of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Clifford Robert Letourneau, III, Respondent.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Kelsey A. Hopps, Assistant County Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota; and Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for appellant) Anders J. Erickson, Johnson Erickson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
Crow Wing County District Court File No. 18-CR-23-783.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Kelsey A. Hopps, Assistant County Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota; and Travis J. Smith, Special Assistant County Attorney, Slayton, Minnesota (for appellant)
Anders J. Erickson, Johnson Erickson Criminal Defense, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Wheelock, Presiding Judge; Harris, Judge; and Klaphake, Judge.[*]
WHEELOCK, Judge
In this pretrial appeal, appellant State of Minnesota challenges the district court's order granting respondent Clifford Robert Letourneau's motion to dismiss a charge of first-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d) (2022). We reverse and remand.
FACTS
The state charged Letourneau by amended complaint with first-degree criminal sexual conduct involving sexual penetration and the use of force as defined in Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 3(1) (2022), in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d). For count I, the only count at issue on appeal, the complaint alleged that Letourneau "did unlawfully and wrongfully engage in sexual penetration with K.L. and used force by the infliction of bodily harm." The complaint described the criminal sexual conduct and noted that, after Letourneau inserted his penis into K.L.'s vagina without her consent, she began to cry and her vagina ripped and started to bleed.
The state also charged Letourneau with two other counts involving a different victim: third-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(b) (2022), and incest in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.365 (2022). Those charges are not at issue in this appeal.
Letourneau filed a motion to dismiss, requesting that the district court dismiss count I for lack of probable cause and arguing that "there is no indication defendant used force or caused any bodily harm." The state opposed the motion, arguing that the complaint contained sufficient allegations that Letourneau used force and inflicted bodily harm.
Following a contested omnibus hearing, the district court issued its December 2023 order and requested supplemental briefing on Letourneau's motion to dismiss count I. The district court explained that it had identified an issue of statutory interpretation about whether Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d), requires that the actor use force to accomplish the specific act of penetration. The district court also indicated that it was inclined to conclude that the statute required that force be used to accomplish penetration and dismiss count I on that basis, but it requested supplemental briefing to afford both parties "a full and fair opportunity to argue their positions."
For his supplemental briefing, Letourneau submitted a letter through counsel stating that he "agree[d] with the logic as outlined in [the district court's] order." The state responded that Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d), unlike Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(c) (2022), does not have a specific requirement that the actor use force to accomplish the act of penetration and that the allegations of physical injury to K.L.-specifically, that her vagina ripped and bled during the penetration-were sufficient to satisfy the element of bodily harm.
In its January 2024 order, the district court granted Letourneau's motion to dismiss count I. It reasoned that
a review of the applicable law indicates that the "force" (whatever the defendant is doing that inflicts pain or injury) that is needed to make a defendant guilty of this charged crime, must be something other than the "force" (the experience of pain or injury) that the victim experiences from the penetration itself.(Emphasis omitted.)
In making this determination, the district court relied on the model criminal jury instruction applicable to the charge, which requires a jury to find that "the Defendant used force to accomplish the act [of nonconsensual penetration]." 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 12.05 (Supp. 2023). From this, the district court inferred that the complaint must allege sufficient facts for the jury to determine that force was used to accomplish the act of penetration. The district court also distinguished between section 609.342, subdivision 1(d), the subdivision under which the state charged Letourneau, and subdivision 1(c)(ii) of that statute. It determined that, because the model jury instruction for subdivision 1(c)(ii) indicates that it requires the defendant to use force "to accomplish" the nonconsensual penetration, subdivision 1(d) does as well.
This court initially questioned jurisdiction. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd. 1(1) (providing that the state may appeal as of right from "any pretrial order, including probable cause dismissal orders based on questions of law," but not from dismissals "premised solely on a factual determination"); see also State v. Gray, 987 N.W.2d 563, 566 (Minn. 2023) (providing that, "if the basis for the district court's dismissal is a construction of facts that is based on a legal conclusion, then the dismissal is not 'premised solely on a factual determination'"). We accepted jurisdiction, concluding that the dismissal in this case was not "premised solely on a factual determination" because the district court interpreted Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 3(1), to determine that the complaint does not include sufficient facts to establish probable cause.
DECISION
The state argues that the district court erred by granting Letourneau's motion to dismiss the count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct for lack of probable cause.
As a preliminary matter, we address the critical-impact requirement of Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04. Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 28.04, subdivision 2(2)(b), provides that, when appealing a pretrial order, a prosecutor must file a statement of the case "explaining how the district court's alleged error, unless reversed, will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial." See State v. Trei, 624 N.W.2d 595, 597 (Minn.App. 2001) ("When the state appeals a pretrial order under Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, a reviewing court will reverse only if the state demonstrates clearly and unequivocally that the district court erred . . . and, unless reversed, the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial."), rev. dismissed (Minn. June 22, 2001). Dismissal of a complaint satisfies the critical-impact requirement. Id. Here, the state has shown critical impact because the first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct charge at issue in this appeal is the only charge related to K.L.
A person may be charged with a crime only when there is probable cause to believe that the person is guilty-that is, when facts have been submitted to the district court showing a reasonable probability that the person committed the crime. State v. Abdus-Salam, 1 N.W.3d 871, 878 (Minn. 2024); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 2.01, subds. 1, 4. We review the factual findings underlying a probable-cause determination for clear error and the district court's application of the legal standard to those facts de novo. State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 383 (Minn. 1998).
I. Statutory Interpretation
The state argues that the district court erred by determining that Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d), requires that force be used to accomplish the act of penetration. Letourneau counters that the district court properly interpreted the statute and dismissed the charge.
Minnesota Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1 (2022), defines first-degree criminal sexual conduct with respect to an adult victim, and it provides:
A person who engages in sexual penetration with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if any of the following circumstances exists:
(a) circumstances existing at the time of the act cause the complainant to have a reasonable fear of imminent great bodily harm to the complainant or another;
(b) the actor is armed with a dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the complainant to reasonably believe it to be a dangerous weapon and uses or threatens to use the weapon or article to cause the complainant to submit;
(c) the actor causes personal injury to the complainant, and any of the following circumstances exist:
(i) the actor uses coercion to accomplish the act;
(ii) the actor uses force, as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (2); or
(iii) the actor knows or has reason to know that the complainant is mentally impaired, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless;
(d) the actor uses force as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (1); or
(e)the actor is aided or abetted by one or more accomplices within the meaning of section 609.05, and either of the following circumstances exists:
(i) the actor or an accomplice uses force or coercion to cause the complainant to submit; or
(ii) the actor or an accomplice is armed with a dangerous weapon or any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the complainant reasonably to believe it to be a dangerous weapon and uses or threatens to use the weapon or article to cause the complainant to submit.
The amended complaint charged Letourneau with violating Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d), which states: "(d) the actor uses force as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (1)." (Emphasis added.) Section 609.341, subdivision 3(1), defines "force" as "the infliction by the actor of bodily harm." Minnesota Statutes section 609.02, subdivision 7 (2022), defines "bodily harm" as "physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition."
This appeal raises an issue of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. State v. Holl, 966 N.W.2d 803, 808 (Minn. 2021). "The object of all interpretation and construction of laws is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature." Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2022); see also State v. Powers, 962 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Minn. 2021) (citing section 645.16). The first step in statutory interpretation is to "determine whether the statute's language, on its face, is ambiguous." State v. Sanschagrin, 952 N.W.2d 620, 624 (Minn. 2020) (quotation omitted). A statute's language is ambiguous if it is "subject to more than one reasonable interpretation." State v. Mauer, 741 N.W.2d 107, 111 (Minn. 2007). In determining whether statutory language is ambiguous, we construe words and phrases "according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage." Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2022). "When a statute does not define terms, we may look to the dictionary definitions of those words and apply them in the context of the statute to determine whether the phrase has a plain and unambiguous meaning." Fordyce v. State, 994 N.W.2d 893, 897 (Minn. 2023) (quotation omitted). We do not examine statutory language in isolation; rather, we read and interpret all provisions in the statute as a whole. State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. 2015). "If the legislature's intent is clearly discernable from plain and unambiguous language, statutory construction is neither necessary nor permitted and we apply the statute's plain meaning." State v. Stay, 935 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
However, if the statutory language "is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation," then it is ambiguous and we apply the canons of construction to interpret the statute's meaning. Holl, 966 N.W.2d at 808 (quotation omitted). If a statute is ambiguous, the intent of the legislature may be ascertained by considering the contemporaneous legislative history, among other things. Minn. Stat. § 645.16(7).
Here, the parties each offer a different interpretation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d). The state contends that Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d), unambiguously requires the fact-finder to determine that the actor used force only as defined by Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 3(1). Therefore, the state argues that Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d), does not require the fact-finder to also determine that the actor used that force to accomplish or to engage in the act of penetration. In contrast, Letourneau argues that the unambiguous language of the statute-"use of force"-requires that the person "uses the infliction of bodily harm" to "engage[] in sexual penetration." Thus, Letourneau contends that the statute requires the fact-finder to determine that the force was used "to accomplish the sexual penetration," making bodily harm during the penetration insufficient to establish the uses-force element. In the alternative, Letourneau argues that statute is ambiguous as to the uses-force element because the word "uses" gives rise to two reasonable interpretations.
Turning back to the language of the statute, we must first determine whether it is ambiguous. See Sanschagrin, 952 N.W.2d at 624. Based on its plain language, subdivision 1(d) requires the state to prove that "the actor uses the infliction by the actor of physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition." We agree with Letourneau's alternative argument that the statute is ambiguous because the word "uses" in subdivision 1(d) is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.
The first interpretation requires the fact-finder to determine that the actor "use[d] force" while engaging in the act of penetration. "Use" means "to employ for the accomplishment of a purpose." Black's Law Dictionary 1862 (12th ed. 2024).
Subdivision 1(d) indicates that an actor commits first-degree criminal sexual conduct if they engage in sexual penetration with another person and "the actor uses force as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (1)," which defines force as "the infliction by the actor of bodily harm." Because the statute does not further state where that force must be directed or how it must be used, and we cannot read words into the statute, it is reasonable to read the word "use" as applying to only its stated direct object-force. See Frederick Farms, Inc. v. County of Olmsted, 801 N.W.2d 167, 172 (Minn. 2011) (stating that appellate courts cannot "add words to a statute that are purposely omitted or inadvertently overlooked by the Legislature" (quotation omitted)). We can read "uses force" to mean that the actor employs force to accomplish infliction of bodily harm. Thus, it is reasonable to read subdivision 1(d) of section 609.342 as stating that an actor commits first-degree criminal sexual conduct by engaging in sexual penetration and inflicting physical pain or injury.
The second interpretation requires the fact-finder to determine that the actor "use[d] force" to accomplish the act of penetration. See State v. Rogers, 925 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2019) (stating that "the meaning of a word is informed by how it is used in the context of a statute"). Looking again to the dictionary definition, we recall that the verb "use" means "to employ for the accomplishment of a purpose." Black's Law Dictionary 1862 (12th ed. 2024). Focusing on the purpose for which the actor applies or employs the object-here, the force-we can read "uses force" to mean the actor employs force for the purpose of accomplishing the act of penetration. This reading differs from the first interpretation in terms of the purpose for which the force is used and ties the legislature's choice of the word "use" in subdivision 1(d) to the first element of the crime-sexual penetration. See Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1 ("A person who engages in sexual penetration with another person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if any of the following circumstances exists . . . ."). We conclude that this interpretation is also reasonable.
Because the statute is ambiguous, we turn to the canons of construction to discern its meaning. See Holl, 966 N.W.2d at 808. One canon provides that, when ascertaining the intent of the legislature, a court may consider "the contemporaneous legislative history." Minn. Stat. § 645.16(7). Applying this canon resolves the ambiguity.
The most recent amendment to section 609.342 reinforces the legislature's intent as to subdivision 1. In 2021, the legislature amended and reorganized Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1. As the state highlights, these amendments further clarify when the fact-finder is required to determine that the actor used force to accomplish the act of penetration, in contrast to when the fact-finder need only determine that the actor used force that inflicted bodily harm and engaged in sexual penetration. Compare Minn. Stat. § 609.342 (2020), with Minn. Stat. § 609.342 (2022). The legislature amended subdivision 1 to add the following language in subdivision 1(d): "the actor uses force as defined in section 609.341, subdivision 3, clause (1)." Notably, the legislature did not include any language indicating that force is necessary to accomplish the act defined in subdivision 1(d); however, it retained language requiring that force be used to accomplish penetration in subdivision 1(e)(i). See Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (2020) ("the actor uses force or coercion to accomplish the act"). And other portions of subdivision 1 contain language similar to subdivision 1(e). See id., subd. 1(f)(i)-(ii) ("to cause the complainant to submit"), (h)(i) ("the actor or an accomplice used force or coercion to accomplish the act") (2020). These amendments confirm our understanding that Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d) (2022), as amended in 2021, does not require the fact-finder to determine that the actor used force to accomplish the act of penetration. Undoubtedly, the legislature is capable of narrowing the requirements of a statute when it chooses, and here, it did not do so. See State v. Stevenson, 656 N.W.2d 235, 239 (Minn. 2003).
The state also challenges the district court's reliance on model jury instructions to interpret the force element of subdivision 1(d). See 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 12.05 (Supp. 2023) (identifying the third element as "the defendant used force to accomplish the act"). We share the state's concerns. Here, the district court, in both of its orders, relied heavily on the language of the model jury instructions and, at times, relied on that language over the language of the statute. We take this opportunity to emphasize that "[m]odel jury instructions are not the law and are merely an attempt to summarize the law for the convenience of the parties and the district court." State v. Pierce, 792 N.W.2d 83, 86 (Minn.App. 2010). Accordingly, the model jury instructions are "not precedential or binding" and should not be used as such. State v. Gunderson, 812 N.W.2d 156, 162 (Minn.App. 2012) (quotation omitted). Moreover, when the plain language of the statute conflicts with the instructions, the district court must depart from the instructions and rely on the plain language of the statute. See State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 15 (Minn. 2015); Pierce, 792 N.W.2d at 86 (stating that jury instructions "are not the law").
Given this history, we conclude that the word "uses" in subdivision 1(d) requires the fact-finder to determine that the actor used force as defined by Minn. Stat. § 609.341, subd. 3(1)-to inflict harm-and does not require the fact-finder to determine that force be used to accomplish the act of penetration. The state may prove first-degree criminal sexual conduct under section 609.342, subdivision 1(d), by proving that the actor used the infliction of bodily harm, regardless of whether that force was employed to accomplish the penetration or merely occurred during the act of penetration. The district court erred in construing Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d), to require that the actor used force to accomplish penetration.
We note that this conclusion is consistent with In re Welfare of D.L.K., 381 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. 1986), and State v. Williams, 3 N.W.3d 68 (Minn.App. 2024). In both cases, the appellate court concluded that, in the absence of specific language requiring it, the applicable criminal-sexual-conduct statute did not require the fact-finder to determine that the actor used force to accomplish penetration. See D.L.K., 381 N.W.2d at 438 (interpreting Minn. Stat. § 609.345(c) (1984) and stating that "the requirement of force in section 609.345(c) is satisfied when the actor inflicts bodily harm or pain or the threat thereof on another while accomplishing sexual contact"); Williams, 3 N.W.3d at 70 (interpreting Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(e)(i) (2016), and concluding that "the factfinder need not find that the infliction of bodily harm caused a victim to submit to penetration to meet the statutory definition").
II. Probable Cause
We next turn to whether, applying the correct interpretation of subdivision 1(d), the record establishes probable cause. If a defendant brings a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause, the district court "must determine whether probable cause exists to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.04, subd. 1(a). For purposes of a probable-cause determination, "[i]t is not necessary for the state to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Barker, 888 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Minn.App. 2016). A motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause should be denied when "the facts appearing in the record, including reliable hearsay, would preclude the granting of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal if proved at trial." State v. Florence, 239 N.W.2d 892, 903 (Minn. 1976). In other words, if the facts before the district court "present a fact question for the jury's determination" on each element of the crime charged, the charge will not be dismissed for lack of probable cause. See State v. Slaughter, 691 N.W.2d 70, 74-75 (Minn. 2005) (describing the test for granting a motion for a directed verdict).
The state argues that the district court erred by dismissing count I because the facts in the record established probable cause. We agree.
Reading the probable-cause standard, the first-degree criminal-sexual-conduct statute, and the statutory definition of "force" together yields the legal standard applicable to the present case. That standard is as follows: when a defendant is charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d), and brings a motion challenging probable cause, the district court should deny the motion if the facts in the record, when proved at trial, would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant engaged in sexual penetration with another person, (2) the penetration occurred without the other person's consent, and (3) the defendant caused bodily harm, which includes physical pain or injury. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342, subd. 1(d), .341, subd. 3(1), .02, subd. 7.
Here, the facts alleged in the complaint, if proved at trial, would permit a jury to reasonably conclude that those elements were met beyond a reasonable doubt. First, K.L. told investigators that Letourneau penetrated her vagina with his penis, and Letourneau admitted to engaging in sexual penetration with K.L. Second, K.L. stated that the penetration was nonconsensual, while Letourneau maintains that it was consensual. This presents a question of fact for the jury, which precludes dismissal. See Slaughter, 691 N.W.2d at 74-75. Third, the complaint alleges that when Letourneau put his penis inside K.L.'s vagina, she began to cry, her vagina tore, and she began to bleed. This physical pain and injury satisfy the third element. See Minn. Stat. §§ 609.341, subd. 3(1), .02, subd. 7.
Because the alleged facts in the record would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(d), the district court erred by dismissing count I. For these reasons, we reverse the district court's dismissal of count I and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.