Opinion
No. 24150-5-III.
November 16, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spokane County, No. 04-1-01805-7, Gregory D. Sypolt, J., entered April 26, 2005.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Cece Lana Glenn, Attorney at Law, Spokane, WA.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Kevin Michael Korsmo, Attorney at Law, Spokane, WA.
Andrew J. Metts III, Spokane County Pros Offc, Spokane, WA.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Kulik, J., concurred in by Sweeney, C.J., and Kato, J.
Lance Leighton was charged with first degree murder and convicted of the lesser included offense of second degree murder. On appeal, Mr. Leighton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for second degree murder and asserts the jury erred when it found insufficient evidence of self-defense. Mr. Leighton also asserts the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for an exceptional sentence below the standard range. We find that there is sufficient evidence to support Mr. Leighton's conviction and that the trial court made no error in sentencing. Thus, we affirm Mr. Leighton's conviction and sentence.
FACTS
On May 6, 2004, Lance Leighton was staying at the home of Amanda Lloyd and Gary Olive. At some point that afternoon, Katie Collins and Joe Legendre also arrived at the Olive-Lloyd house. Ms. Collins and Mr. Legendre brought alcohol. Mr. Leighton and Mr. Legendre had apparently never met before.
After consuming the alcohol, Mr. Leighton telephoned Mike Priestly and Jeff Bieber. Mr. Leighton asked the two if they wanted to purchase a small scale owned by Ms. Collins. Mr. Priestly was interested in purchasing the scale, so he and Mr. Bieber went to the Olive-Lloyd residence. Mr. Bieber had a squirt gun with him at the time that "looked like an oozie [sic]," and he appeared as though he had been "using meth for a couple days." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 264-65.
Ms. Collins got into Mr. Bieber's car to leave with Mr. Priestly and Mr. Bieber. Mr. Legendre came out of the house and began to shout at Ms. Collins, apparently upset that she was leaving. Mr. Legendre then retrieved what appeared to be a gun out of the trunk of his car. Mr. Leighton later stated that he believed the gun was a ".25 semi-automatic pistol." RP at 393.
Mr. Legendre pointed the gun at Mr. Bieber and Mr. Priestly. Mr. Leighton came out of the house and walked towards Mr. Bieber's car. Mr. Leighton thought he saw Mr. Bieber reaching for a weapon. Mr. Leighton then held a five-inch knife to Mr. Bieber's throat and started asking if Mr. Bieber was "fucking with him." RP at 120. When Mr. Bieber responded, "maybe," Mr. Leighton stabbed Mr. Bieber multiple times. RP at 122. Mr. Leighton testified that he stabbed Mr. Bieber to stop him from grabbing a gun. After he was stabbed, Mr. Bieber stepped on the accelerator and his car crashed into a tree. Paramedics found Mr. Bieber dead in his car. An autopsy confirmed that stab wounds to Mr. Bieber's face and chest caused his death.
Mr. Leighton was charged with first degree murder. At trial, Mr. Leighton asserted the defense of self-defense and further argued that he lacked premeditation or the intent to kill Mr. Bieber. The jury acquitted Mr. Leighton of first degree murder, but convicted him of the lesser included offense of second degree murder.
Mr. Leighton requested an exceptional sentence below the standard sentencing range based on evidence at trial that supported his failed defense of self-defense. Mr. Leighton also discussed his history of depression and his difficult childhood as additional factors that supported a downward sentence.
The trial court denied the request for an exceptional sentence and sentenced Mr. Leighton to the standard sentence of 274 months' incarceration. In making its decision, the court noted that it was "mindful of the fact that a self-defense claim was made," and further was aware of case law that allowed the court to consider a failed defense, but the court agreed with the jury's finding that Mr. Leighton was not acting in self-defense. RP at 699. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS 1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
This court reviews a claim of sufficiency of the evidence for whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). All reasonable inferences from the evidence are interpreted in favor of the State and most strongly against the defendant. Id. "A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom." Id.
The jury is the exclusive judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. State v. Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d 703, 709, 974 P.2d 832 (1999). As an extension of that function, a jury is permitted to discount theories that it determines are unreasonable in light of the evidence. Id.
In order to find Mr. Leighton guilty of second degree murder, the jury was required to find that (1) Mr. Leighton intended to cause the death of Mr. Bieber; (2) Mr. Leighton did, in fact, cause the death of Mr. Bieber; and (3) that this killing was not justified on the basis of self-defense. Mr. Leighton challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to both intent and the absence of self-defense.
Intent
The trial court correctly instructed the jury that a person acts with intent when acting "with the objective or purpose to accomplish a result which constitutes a crime." Clerk's Papers at 102. See also RCW 9A.08.010(1)(a). Here, the jury was charged that it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Leighton acted with the specific intent to cause the death of Mr. Bieber in order to find him guilty of second degree murder.
A jury may infer criminal intention where it is plainly indicated as a matter of logical probability. State v. Perez-Cervantes, 141 Wn.2d 468, 481, 6 P.3d 1160 (2000). There was evidence at trial that Mr. Leighton threatened Mr. Bieber with a five-inch knife and that Mr. Leighton stabbed Mr. Bieber three times. Given the size of the knife and the number of wounds inflicted, a reasonable juror could infer that Mr. Leighton stabbed Mr. Bieber with the intent of causing his death.
According to Mr. Leighton, the evidence showed that he was acting purely out of a fear for his life, and without any intention of harming Mr. Bieber. However, a jury can discount this assertion as unreasonable in light of the evidence in the case. See Bencivenga, 137 Wn.2d at 709. Additionally, there is a presumption that an actor intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his or her actions. Perez-Cervantes, 141 Wn.2d at 481. Given this presumption, along with the evidence at trial that supported the inference of intent, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Mr. Leighton acted with intent.
Self-Defense
A criminal defendant bears the initial burden of providing some evidence of self-defense. State v. Walden, 131 Wn.2d 469, 473, 932 P.2d 1237 (1997). The defendant is not required to show actual danger, but there must be some evidence to support a finding that the defendant had a reasonable apprehension of death or great bodily harm. State v. Douglas, 128 Wn. App. 555, 562, 116 P.3d 1012 (2005). "[O]nce the defendant produces some evidence, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt." Walden, 131 Wn.2d at 473.
The degree of force that may be lawfully used in self-defense is limited to what a reasonably prudent person would find necessary under the circumstances. Id. at 474. Additionally, deadly force can only be lawfully used in self-defense if the defendant reasonably believes that he or she is threatened with death or great bodily harm. Id.
Although the jury could have found Mr. Leighton's claim of self-defense credible, they were not required to do so. "Credibility determinations are within the sole province of the jury and are not subject to review." State v. Myers, 133 Wn.2d 26, 38, 941 P.2d 1102 (1997).
Moreover, Mr. Leighton's actions were only justified if they were based on an objectively reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm. In this case, the State presented evidence that Mr. Bieber was being held at gunpoint, that he was seated in his car with no actual weapon, and that he made no verbal threats of violence towards Mr. Legendre or Mr. Leighton. A reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Leighton had no reasonable fear of death or great bodily harm.
2. Exceptional sentence
Generally, a standard range sentence cannot be appealed. See RCW 9.94A.585; State v. Khanteechit, 101 Wn. App. 137, 138, 5 P.3d 727 (2000). However, there is an exception where the trial court "either refused to exercise its discretion at all or relied on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose an exceptional sentence." Id.
Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, title 9.94A RCW, some failed defenses may constitute mitigating factors that justify an exceptional sentence below the standard range. State v. Jeannotte, 133 Wn.2d 847, 851, 947 P.2d 1192 (1997). Mr. Leighton appears to argue that the trial court refused to exercise its discretion by not considering the evidence proffered by Mr. Leighton of self-defense. This assertion is not supported by the record.
Here, the trial court heard and considered extensive argument regarding this mitigating factor. The court noted that it was "mindful" of the claim of self-defense and was aware that this failed defense could be considered by the court in determining whether to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range. RP at 699. Consequently, the trial court did exercise its discretion in declining to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range. The trial court also followed all proper procedures in setting Mr. Leighton's sentence. Therefore, we are precluded from considering this issue on appeal. See State v. Cole, 117 Wn. App. 870, 881, 73 P.3d 411 (2003), review denied, 151 Wn.2d 1005 (2004).
We affirm the conviction and sentence.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
SWEENEY, C.J. and KATO, J., concur.