We answer questions of constitutional law "by exercising our own independent constitutional judgment based on the facts of the case." State v. Trainor, 83 Haw. 250, 255, 925 P.2d 818, 823 (1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Lee, 83 Haw. 267, 273, 925 P.2d 1091, 1097 (1996) (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Thus, we review questions of constitutional law under the "right/wrong" standard.
The "unavailability" paradigm has alternatively been referred to as the "rule of necessity." See State v. Lee, 83 Hawai'i 267, 275, 925 P.2d 1091, 1100 (1996) ("First, in conformance with the Framers' preference for face to face confrontation, the [confrontation clause] establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case (including cases where prior cross-examination has occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant.") (Citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. 2531.)
Crosby v. State Dep't of Budget Fin., 76 Haw. 332, 341, 876 P.2d 1300, 1309 (1994) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 n. 10, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 1692 n. 10, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983)), cert. denied 513 U.S. 1081, 115 S.Ct. 731, 130 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995).State v. Lee, 83 Haw. 267, 273, 925 P.2d 1091, 1097 (1996). Whether the prosecution has made a showing that a statement bears "adequate indicia of reliability" — for the purposes of satisfying the confrontation clauses of the United States and Hawaii Constitutions — is, under one of two available modes of analysis, a question of law, involving a determination whether the statement falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception."
Findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Lee, 83 Haw. 267, 273, 925 P.2d 1091, ___ (Haw. 1996); State v. Ganal, 81 Haw. 358, 368, 917 P.2d 370, 380 (1996); Tachibana v. State, 79 Haw. 226, 231, 900 P.2d 1293, 1298 (1995). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, despite evidence to support the finding, the appellate court is left "with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
We answer questions of constitutional law "'by exercising our own independent constitutional judgment based on the facts of the case.'" State v. Trainor, 83 Haw. 250, 255, 925 P.2d 818, 823 (1996) (quoting State v. Lee, 83 Haw. 267, 273, 925 P.2d 1091, 1097 (1996)). Thus, we review questions of constitutional law under the "right/wrong" standard.
We answer questions of constitutional law "by exercising our own independent judgment based on the facts of the case." State v. Trainor, 83 Haw. 250, 255, 925 P.2d 818, 823 (1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Lee, 83 Haw. 267, 273, 925 P.2d 1091, 1097 (1996) (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Thus, we review questions of constitutional law under the "right/wrong" standard.
We review questions of constitutional law "by exercising our own independent constitutional judgment based on the facts of the case." State v. Rogan, 91 Haw. 405, 411, 984 P.2d 1231, 1237 (1999) (quoting State v. Arceo, 84 Haw. 1, 11, 928 P.2d 843, 853 (1996) (quoting State v. Trainor, 83 Haw. 250, 255, 925 P.2d 818, 823 (1996), and State v. Lee, 83 Haw. 267, 273, 925 P.2d 1091, 1097 (1996)). Accordingly, we review questions of constitutional law de novo under the "right/wrong" standard.
. . . We answer questions of constitutional law "by exercising our own independent constitutional judgment based on the facts of the case." State v. Trainor, 83 Haw. 250, 255, 925 P.2d 818, 823 (1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Lee, 83 Haw. 267, 273, 925 P.2d 1091, 1097 (1996) (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Thus, we review questions of constitutional law under the "right/wrong" standard.
If only the judge is permitted to decide the relevant and material facts, the judge would decide the applicable constitutional law, find the relevant and material facts, apply the relevant constitutional law to the relevant and material facts, and decide the constitutional law question without the involvement of the jury. In State v. Lee, 83 Hawai'i 267, 925 P.2d 1091 (1996), a jury found the defendant guilty of attempted murder in the second degree. On appeal, the Hawai'i Supreme Court concluded, in relevant part, as follows:
In cases in which "a ‘key’ or ‘crucial’ witness' testimony is involved" and in which "the consequences of a conviction based on the absent witness' testimony are grave," "[c]onfrontation [c]lause concerns are heightened and courts insist on more diligent efforts by the prosecution ...." Id. ; see also United States v. Lynch , supra, 499 F.2d at 1023–24 (holding that government's efforts to find sole eyewitness to murder were not "as vigorous" as they would have been in absence of witness' prior testimony, even though witness was served with subpoena and detectives interrogated her grandmother and went to apartment at which she allegedly could be found multiple times); Brooks v. United States , supra, 39 A.3d at 884 ("[t]he government's obligation to take steps to produce the witness ha[s] to correspond to the importance of the witness and the potential prejudice to the defendant if she [does] not testify"); State v. Lee , 83 Haw. 267, 279–80, 925 P.2d 1091 (1996) (state's "lackluster efforts" to find crucial witnesses to murder were insufficient to establish their unavailability under confrontation clause because, among other things, state failed to search for their "driver's license or motor vehicle registration" or show "any follow-up" after visit to one witness' last known address); State v. Maben , 132 N.J. 487, 503–504, 626 A.2d 63 (1993) (The state's "minimal search" efforts were insufficient to establish the unavailability of the child sexual assault victim because "[t]he [s]tate [neither] asked the post office whether the family had left a forwarding address, nor [asked] neighbors for the names of family members who might know of the family's location.