Opinion
No. C5-98-501.
Filed June 30, 1998.
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 95059405.
Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General, (for respondent)
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Donna J. Wolfson, Jessica Golembiewski, Assistant County Attorneys, (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Paul C. Thissen, Assistant Public Defender, (for appellant)
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Melissa LeBeau pleaded guilty in 1995 to two counts of attempted first-degree murder in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.17, 609.185(1) (1996). The district court departed from the presumptive executed sentence and stayed execution of the two concurrent 180-month sentences, placing LeBeau on probation for 15 years. Following a revocation hearing in December 1997, the court revoked probation and executed the sentences. Because we conclude that the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in revoking probation, we affirm.
FACTS
The conditions of probation for LeBeau's 1995 convictions included that she serve one year in the workhouse, complete the Genesis II program, have no unsupervised contact with her children, have a rule 25 chemical dependency evaluation, and submit to random urinalysis if the probation office deemed it appropriate.
In May 1996 LeBeau admitted that she had violated her conditions of probation by failing to make sufficient progress at Genesis II and by committing program violations at a halfway house. The district court continued probation. In June 1997, after it was alleged that LeBeau had violated probation by leaving Genesis II without having completed the program, it was agreed that LeBeau would be given another chance to complete the Genesis II program.
In November 1997, LeBeau's probation officer alleged that LeBeau had violated probation by (1) testing positive for cocaine on two occasions and positive for cocaine and alcohol on a third; (2) failing to attend three sessions of chemical dependency treatment at Chrysalis; (3) being unfavorably discharged from Genesis II; and (4) having unauthorized contact with her children. Following a hearing, the district court revoked probation and executed LeBeau's concurrent sentences.
DECISION
The district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to revoke probation, and its decision will be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Austin , 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980); State v. Theel , 532 N.W.2d 265, 266-67 (Minn.App. 1995), review denied (Minn. July 20, 1995). Before revoking probation, the court must apply a three-step analysis:
(1) designate the specific conditions that were violated; (2) find that the violation was inexcusable or intentional; and (3) find that the need for confinement outweighs the policies supporting probation. Theel , 532 N.W.2d at 267 (citing Austin , 295 N.W.2d at 250).
At the revocation hearing, LeBeau admitted that she had used cocaine in violation of her conditions of probation, had missed three counseling sessions at Chrysalis, and had been discharged from Genesis II. These probation violations came after two earlier revocation hearings had been held to address earlier violations.
Failure in court-ordered chemical dependency treatment is a well-recognized grounds for revocation of probation. E.g. State v. Moot , 398 N.W.2d 21, 23-24 (Minn.App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Feb. 13, 1987). A defendant who fails to complete treatment or make the required progress in a treatment program may be revoked even without the further violation committed by LeBeau of testing positive for drug use. See id . (probation revoked after defendant terminated from treatment program when he took a job that interfered with his treatment schedule). Probation may be revoked if the defendant shows a lack of commitment to rehabilitation or if the "seriousness of [the] violation would be denigrated if probation were not revoked." Austin , 295 N.W.2d at 251. Both factors are evident in LeBeau's activities during probation. We reject LeBeau's argument that probation revocation must be based on specific evidence of a danger to past victims. And we conclude that the record does not support LeBeau's argument that the district court, which expressed a conclusion that LeBeau's violations did not leave any choice but to revoke probation, failed to exercise its discretion. The district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking LeBeau's probation and executing the concurrent sentences.