Opinion
No. COA10-809
Filed 1 March 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 15 March 2010 by Judge Richard D. Boner in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 February 2011.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Associate Attorney General Eryn E. Linkous, for the State. J. Edward Yeager, Jr. for defendant appellant.
Mecklenburg County Nos. 09 CRS 17717-18.
Defendant Paul Justin Lasane appeals from judgments revoking his probation and activating his suspended sentences. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously concluded that he willfully absconded supervision. After careful consideration of Defendant's challenge to the trial court's judgments in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's judgments should be affirmed.
I. Factual Background
On 25 April 2006, Defendant entered pleas of guilty to two counts of felonious breaking or entering and two counts of felonious larceny in Vance County Superior Court. Based upon Defendant's guilty pleas, Judge R. Allen Baddour entered two judgments, in each of which he consolidated a breaking or entering conviction with a larceny conviction, sentencing Defendant to two consecutive terms of imprisonment, each consisting of a minimum of nine months and a maximum term of eleven months in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Correction. However, Judge Baddour suspended both of the active sentences imposed upon Defendant and placed him upon consecutive periods of 36 months of supervised probation, six months of which was to consist of intensive probation, subject to the usual terms and conditions of probation and the special terms and conditions of probation involving submission to warrantless searches for stolen goods, controlled substances, contraband, and weapons; the use and possession of controlled substances; and submission of a breath, blood, or urine sample for drug testing purposes.
After the imposition of judgment, Defendant's probation was transferred to Mecklenburg County. On or about 24 February 2009, Defendant's probation officer filed a violation report alleging that Defendant had violated the terms and conditions of his probation, which required him to "obtain prior approval from [his probation officer for] any change in address" by "abscond[ing] supervision. . . . [so that] his where abouts [sic] are currently unknown."
A probation violation hearing was held before the trial court on 15 March 2010. After Defendant admitted having violated the terms and conditions of his probation, the trial court entered judgments revoking Defendant's probation and activating his suspended sentences. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's judgments.
II. Legal Analysis
"Probation is an act of grace by the State to one convicted of a crime." State v. Freeman, 47 N.C. App. 171, 175, 266 S.E.2d 723, 725, disc. review denied, 301 N.C. 99, 273 S.E.2d 304 (1980). "All that is required in revoking a suspended sentence is evidence which reasonably satisfies the judge in the use of his sound discretion that a condition of probation has been willfully violated." State v. Monroe, 83 N.C. App. 143, 145, 349 S.E.2d 315, 317 (1986) (citing State v. Hewett, 270 N.C. 348, 353, 154 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1967), reversed on other grounds, 415 F. 2d 1316 (4th Cir. Ct. 1969)), cert. denied, 322 N.C. 484, 370 S.E.2d 232 (1988). This Court will not reverse a trial judge's decision to revoke a defendant's probation absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Tennant, 141 N.C. App. 524, 526, 540 S.E.2d 807, 808 (2000). An abuse of discretion occurs only "`where the court's ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.'" State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 673, 617 S.E.2d 1, 19 (2005) (quoting State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988)), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1073, 164 L. Ed. 2d 523, 126 S. Ct. 1773 (2006).
At the violation hearing held before the trial court, Defendant admitted violating the terms and conditions of his probation by absconding supervision. According to Defendant's probation officer, Defendant's sister and niece did not know Defendant's whereabouts. In addition, the probation officer stated Defendant was away from the area for over a year. Although Defendant argues he had no choice but to leave his sister's home and that the record contains nothing tending to contradict Defendant's claim, Defendant fails to explain why he did not contact his probation officer at the time of his departure. As a result, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking defendant's probation, State v. Tozzi, 84 N.C. App. 517, 522, 353 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1987) (holding that the defendant "failed to show why he was unable to first notify his probation officer that he wanted to move to Raleigh" and that the fact that he "could have requested permission to move to Raleigh, but chose to do otherwise," permitted the trial court to determine that Defendant violated the terms and conditions of his probation without lawful excuse), and that the trial court's judgments revoking Defendant's probation and activating his suspended sentences should be, and hereby are, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Judges STEPHENS and BEASLEY concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).