The position that restitution does not necessarily require "netting" all costs against any benefits received is consistent with prior case law. In State v. Larson, 393 N.W.2d 238 (Minn.App. 1986), five brass bushings, four of which were new, were taken from a taconite company and sold to an iron and metal company. Upon conviction, Larson was ordered to pay restitution of $34,681 to the taconite company.
Rather, work release is referred to as a "privilege." See, e.g., State v. Bachmann, 521 N.W.2d 886, 887 (Minn.App. 1994); State v. Larson, 393 N.W.2d 238, 243 (Minn.App. 1986); State v. Wilwert, 317 N.W.2d 346, 347 (Minn. 1982).
However, just because appellant offered a plausible alternative explanation, the district court, as fact-finder, was not required to accept that explanation. State v. Larson, 393 N.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Minn. App. 1986). Appellant also argues that Minnesota caselaw makes "clear that such weak indicia of recent drug use are insufficient to justify the expansion of the traffic stop."
In addressing Hirman's argument that he did not "directly cause" the loss, we are guided by Minnesota caselaw addressing the issue of restitution in receiving-stolen-property cases. In State v. Larson, this court affirmed a restitution award for losses sustained by a taconite company when large metal bushings were stolen. 393 N.W.2d 238, 243 (Minn. App. 1986). There, the bushings were new when stolen, but were damaged when recovered.
Even if a party offers a plausible alternative explanation of what occurred, the trier of fact is not compelled to accept that explanation. State v. Larson, 393 N.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Minn. App. 1986). Furthermore, "[i]t is well-established that a conviction can rest upon the testimony of a single credible witness."
That a party offers a plausible alternative explanation of what occurred does not compel the trier of fact to accept that explanation. State v. Larson, 393 N.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Minn. App. 1986). Winter also asserts that the ULJ's finding that his testimony about some events was not credible is inconsistent with the ULJ's finding credible Winter's testimony about the Brooks visit.
When an alternative plausible explanation of what occurred is presented, the fact finder is free to accept or reject that explanation. State v. Larson, 393 N.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Minn. App. 1986). The record reflects that the evidence was sufficient to support all the district court's conclusions.
And the fact that a party offers a plausible alternative explanation of what occurred does not compel the trier of fact to accept his explanation. State v. Larson, 393 N.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Minn.App. 1986); see also State v. Steinbuch, 514 N.W.2d 793, 800 (Minn. 1994) (concluding that a jury is free to question a party's credibility, and is under no obligation to believe a party's version of events).
Moreover, although a party offers a reasonable explanation of what occurred, that does not compel the trier of fact to accept this explanation. See State v. Larson, 393 N.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Minn.App. 1986). Therefore, because the record reasonably supports the district court's findings of fact, the findings are not clearly erroneous.
The fact that a party offers a plausible alternative explanation of what occurred does not compel the trier of fact to accept his explanation. State v. Larson, 393 N.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Minn.App. 1986). Based upon a thorough review of the record, it is clear each witness was given ample opportunity to testify to the relevant issues at trial.