{6} "In order for [the] defendant to be entitled to a self-defense instruction, there must be evidence that [the] defendant was put in fear by an apparent danger of immediate bodily harm, that his [actions] resulted from that fear, and that [the] defendant acted as a reasonable person would act under those circumstances." State v. Lara, 109 N.M. 294, 297, 784 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Ct.App. 1989). Child was required to present evidence supporting every element of self-defense in order to warrant a jury instruction on this issue.
This list of purposes is not exclusive. See State v. Lara, 109 N.M. 294, 296, 784 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 109 N.M. 262, 784 P.2d 1005 (1989); but see State v. Gibson, 113 N.M. 547, 556, 828 P.2d 980, 989 (Ct.App.) (stating that if evidence of prior crimes is not admissible for a specific purpose permitted by the rules of evidence, admission of such evidence can require reversal of the conviction), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 524, 828 P.2d 957 (1992). Even if evidence of a defendant's prior acts is relevant and admissible for a purpose other than proving the defendant acted in conformity with his character, the probative value of the evidence must out-weigh its prejudicial effect to be admissible.
1991); State v. Pacheco, 110 N.M. 599, 603, 798 P.2d 200, 204 (Ct.App.1990); State v. Lara, 109 N.M. 294, 298, 784 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Ct.App.1989); State v. Roybal, 107 N.M. 309, 312–13, 756 P.2d 1204, 1207–08 (Ct.App.1988); State v. Gonzales, 105 N.M. 238, 242, 731 P.2d 381, 385 (Ct.App.
The list of allowable purposes found in the second sentence of Rule 11-404(B) is not exclusive, but is illustrative. State v. Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶ 27, 127 N.M. 207, 979 P.2d 718; see also State v. Lara, 109 N.M. 294, 296, 784 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Ct.App. 1989). Third, the proponent of the evidence is required to identify and articulate the consequential fact to which the evidence is directed before it is admitted.
We also conclude that these actions do not involve moral turpitude. See, e.g., Finley v. State, 661 So.2d 762, 765 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995) (stating that resisting a police officer, assault in the third degree, and driving under the influence "are not crimes of moral turpitude");Hall v. Hall, 402 S.E.2d 726, 727 (Ga. 1991) ("[A] misdemeanor conviction for DUI is not a crime of moral turpitude."); Lopez v. State, 990 S.W.2d 770, 778 (Tex.App. 1999, no pet.) ("A misdemeanor driving while intoxicated conviction is not an offense involving moral turpitude."); cf. State v. Lara, 109 N.M. 294, 298, 784 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Ct.App. 1989) (upholding a trial court's determination that the crime of allowing oneself to be served alcohol as a minor was not an offense involving moral turpitude). {15} The school board, in its written reasons for termination, stated that the "public scandal" caused by Kibbe's arrest "compromised [his] effectiveness as a teacher, coach and employee."
The requirements for self-defense are: (1) an appearance of immediate danger of death or great bodily harm to the defendant; (2) the defendant was in fact put in such fear and committed a particular act because of that fear; and (3) a reasonable person would have reacted in the same manner. See State v. Guerra, 2012-NMSC-014, ¶ 13, 278 P.3d 1031; see also State v. Martinez, 1981-NMSC-016, ¶ 4, 95 N.M. 421, 622 P.2d 1041; State v. Lara, 1989-NMCA-098, ¶ 7, 109 N.M. 294, 784 P.2d 1037; UJI 14-5183, overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 n.6, 275 P.3d 110. "The first two requirements, the appearance of immediate danger and actual fear, are subjective in that they focus on the perception of the defendant at the time of the incident.
We therefore conclude that the issue is not viable, and we deny the de facto motion to amend on that basis. See, e.g., State v. Sosa, 1997-NMSC-032, ¶ 23, 123 N.M. 564, 943 P.2d 1017 (holding that the reviewing court would not consider a due process claim because the defendant had not preserved the issue), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Porter, 2020-NMSC-020, ¶ 7, 476 P.3d 1201; State v. Lara, 1989-NMCA-098, ¶¶ 3, 5, 109 N.M. 294, 784 P.2d 1037 (explaining that motions to amend will be denied where issues are not viable, and illustrating where an appellant sought to advance an argument that had not been preserved), overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 n.6, 275 P.3d 110.
This is particularly true where the would-be victim responds to a defendant's aggressive behavior with a lawful use of force. This Court in State v. Lara held that a defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction where he pulled a knife on two store clerks after they chased the defendant to recover items that were stolen from the store. 1989-NMCA-098, ¶¶ 8-9, 109 N.M. 294, 784 P.2d 1037, overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo , 2012-NMSC-008, 275 P.3d 110. In Lara , we stated that a juror "could infer that [the] defendant reasonably believed that [the clerks] were intending to seize him[,]" but that no reasonable juror could have viewed the clerks' actions as unlawful, and accordingly held that a self-defense instruction was not supported by the evidence.
{2} We proposed to conclude that the evidence of the bench warrant was legitimately relevant, and did not bear solely on character or propensity because it provided the context for why the officer asked Defendant to get out of the car. See State v. Lara, 1989-NMCA-098, ¶ 4, 109 N.M. 294, 784 P.2d 1037 ("[T]he specific purposes listed in Rule 11-404(B) [NMRA] are not the exclusive purposes for which other crime evidence is admissible."), overruled on other grounds by State v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 4, 275 P.3d 110. {3} Defendant disagrees with the proposed disposition because he asserts that the testimony about the warrant served no legitimate purpose at trial and introduced evidence that Defendant had a propensity to commit crimes. [MIO 3-4] Defendant contends "[t]here was no legitimate reason for telling the jury that [Defendant] had a warrant, when the officer could have simply [testified that] he ordered [Defendant] to get out [of the car] in order to sign the citations."
In this case, Defendant would have been entitled to a self-defense instruction if there was evidence that (1) "[D]efendant was put in fear by an apparent danger of immediate bodily harm," (2) "his [actions] resulted from that fear," and (3) "[D]efendant acted as a reasonable person would act under those circumstances." State v. Lara, 1989-NMCA-098, ¶ 7, 109 N.M. 294, 784 P.2d 1037, overruled on other grounds byState v. Tollardo, 2012-NMSC-008, ¶ 37 n.6, 275 P.3d 110. This hybrid test combines both subjective and objective standards.