"An amendment to an information at trial may prejudice a defendant by leaving him without adequate time to prepare a defense to a new charge." State v. Jones, 26 Wn. App. 1, 6, 612 P.2d 404, review denied, 94 Wn.2d 1013 (1980); see also State v. LaPierre, 71 Wn.2d 385, 428 P.2d 579 (1967). In cases addressing an amendment to an information which resulted in a different charge, the facts show that a continuance was granted, State v. Lutman, 26 Wn. App. 766, 614 P.2d 224 (1980); or the facts specifically note that a continuance was not requested. State v. Gosser, 33 Wn. App. 428, 435, 656 P.2d 514 (1982); State v. Brown, 74 Wn.2d 799, 801, 447 P.2d 82 (1968).
The typical remedy for a defendant who is misled or surprised by the amendment of the information is to move for a continuance to secure time to prepare a defense to the amended information. State v. LaPierre, 71 Wn.2d 385, 388, 428 P.2d 579 (1967). Due to our decision to remand this case for a new trial, there is no need to determine whether defendant was prejudiced by the amended information.
No search under the constitutional interdiction takes place when items having evidentiary value are outside a building and in plain view, nor if they are in plain sight inside a building to which access has been lawfully gained. See State v. LaPierre, 71 Wn.2d 385, 428 P.2d 579 (1967), and cases cited therein. See also 47 Am. Jur., Search and Seizure § 20 (1943).
If defendant was misled or surprised by the amendment of the information she was entitled to move for a continuance to secure time to prepare her defense. State v. LaPierre, 71 Wn.2d 385, 428 P.2d 579 (1967). The fact that she did not do so is persuasive of a lack of surprise and prejudice.
[1] No search under the constitutional interdiction takes place when items having evidentiary value are outside a building and in plain view, nor if they are in plain sight inside a building to which access has been lawfully gained. See State v. LaPierre, 71 Wn.2d 385, 428 P.2d 579 (1967), and cases cited therein. See also 47 Am. Jur., Search and Seizure § 20 (1943).
The requirement cannot be found in Washington case law prior to Coolidge. See State v. Miller, 121 Wash. 153, 209 P. 9 (1922); see also State v. LaPierre, 71 Wn.2d 385, 428 P.2d 579 (1967). After Coolidge, Washington courts began to require inadvertent discovery under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement.
An amendment to the information on the day of trial may prejudice a defendant by leaving him without adequate time to prepare a defense to the new charge. State v. LaPierre, 71 Wn.2d 385, 428 P.2d 579 (1967); State v. Purdom, 106 Wn.2d 745, 725 P.2d 622 (1986). However, such an amendment may be allowed where the amendment merely specifies a different way of committing the original crime and no other prejudice is demonstrated. Gosser, 33 Wn. App. at 435 ("Where the principal element in the new charge is inherent in the previous charge and no other prejudice is demonstrated, it is not an abuse of discretion to allow amendment on the day of trial."); see also State v. Mahmood, 45 Wn. App. 200, 724 P.2d 1021 (1986) (permitting a midtrial amendment that added a new theory of criminal liability).
An amendment to an information at trial may prejudice a defendant by leaving him without adequate time to prepare a defense to a new charge. See State v. LaPierre, 71 Wn.2d 385, 428 P.2d 579 (1967). Because the trial court declared a mistrial almost immediately after granting the State's motion to amend, Jones and his counsel had ample opportunity to prepare his defense to the new charge.
State v. Manly, supra; State v. Martin, 73 Wn.2d 616, 440 P.2d 429 (1968). State v. LaPierre, 71 Wn.2d 385, 428 P.2d 579 (1967). His intrusion into a constitutionally protected area did not occur until he (and the other officers) entered the garage and seized the safe.
(Italics ours.) In State v. LaPierre, 71 Wn.2d 385, 386, 428 P.2d 579 (1967), the defendant appealed from a municipal court conviction on a charge of shoplifting. She first contended that she had been denied her constitutional right to a jury trial in municipal court. Her contention was disposed of with the holding that: