Opinion
No. COA12–554.
2012-11-6
STATE Of North Carolina v. Carlus Dwight LANGSTON.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General K.D. Sturgis, for the State. William D. Spence for Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 9 December 2011 by Judge Paul L. Jones in Duplin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 October 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General K.D. Sturgis, for the State. William D. Spence for Defendant.
STEPHENS, Judge.
Procedural History and Evidence
Following a trial at the 5 December 2011 criminal session of superior court in Duplin County, a jury found defendant Carlus Dwight Langston guilty of second-degree murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant within the presumptive range to an active term of 150—189 months in prison. Defendant appeals.
The evidence at trial tended to show the following: In April 2010, Defendant lived with his girlfriend, Beverly Knowles (“Knowles”) and her son, D., an eighth grader. On the evening of 26 April 2010, Defendant pushed D., who reported the incident to his mother. This led to an argument between Defendant and Knowles, during which D. retreated to his room. D. heard continued yelling, shuffling, and the sound of a drawer opening. He then heard his mother's voice with “a lot of fear in it.” D. heard a pop, his mother coughing, a second pop, and finally, the sound of something falling. D. locked his door as he heard someone leave the home and drive away. After a few moments, D. went into his mother's bedroom and found her lying on the bed covered in blood. D. called 911.
An initial is used to protect the identity of this minor.
Officer Chris Thigpen of the Beulaville Police Department was one of the officers who responded to the call. Upon entering the home, Thigpen saw two live .380 caliber bullets in the hallway and found Knowles' body in her bedroom. Thigpen noted that Knowles appeared to have been shot in the neck and upper left arm and that a lit cigarette remained between the index and middle fingers of her right hand. Subsequently, a Lorcin .380 caliber handgun was discovered in the closed drawer of a dresser/television stand in the bedroom. Two spent .380 caliber bullets were found on the floor of the bedroom near a duffle bag containing Defendant's personal belongings, including a box for a Lorcin .380 handgun.
Defendant turned himself in at the sheriff's department. When questioned by law enforcement officers about Knowles' death, Defendant contended that he had gone to the bedroom and gotten into bed after telling Knowles he had not pushed D. Defendant claimed that Knowles had entered the bedroom, removed the handgun from its drawer, pointed it at Defendant, and told him, “Don't you ever put your hands on my son again.” Defendant asserted that he had grabbed the handgun, a struggle ensued, and the gun fired twice. Defendant stated that Knowles fell onto the bed and that he could not recall what happened next.
John Leonard Almeida, M.D., a pathologist, testified as an expert witness. Almeida testified, inter alia, that the skin around Knowles' wounds showed no stippling, a pattern of powder left after a gun is fired from a distance of less than 18 inches from the body. Almeida also stated that Knowles had no injuries to her hands. Based on these findings, the trajectory of the bullets that passed though Knowles' body, and the location of her wounds, Almeida opined that Knowles had not shot herself and stated that the wounds were not consistent with Knowles holding a gun in her right hand (as Defendant had suggested in his statement to police).
Defendant presented no evidence at trial. At the close of all evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss the charge of first-degree murder for which he had been indicted. The trial court denied the motion and instructed the jury on first-degree murder, second-degree murder, and voluntary manslaughter.
Discussion
Defendant makes three arguments on appeal: that the trial court (1) erred in allowing Almeida to testify as an expert that Knowles' wounds were not consistent with a self-inflicted gunshot wounds nor with wounds inflicted while she held the gun in her right hand; (2) committed plain error in instructing the jury on flight; and (3) erred in failing to instruct the jury on accident. We find no error as to issues 1 and 2 and no prejudicial error as to issue 3.
Expert Testimony
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing Almeida to opine that Knowles' wounds were not self-inflicted and could not have been caused by Knowles holding the gun in her right hand. We disagree.
On appeal, Defendant couches his entire argument in terms of plain error. However, our review of the record on appeal reveals that Defendant objected at trial to the question: “And the body, in your experience, would this [the gunshot wounds Knowles suffered]—would be likely to be caused by an individual holding the gun in their right hand?” The basis of the objection was that the issue was outside of Almeida's area of expertise. The trial court first sustained the objection. However, when the State asked the more general question, “In your experience in performing autopsies, is it—and the wounds that you observed in this case—is it—is this consistent with a self-inflicted gunshot wound[,]” Defendant made no objection. The State then rephrased its original question about Knowles holding the gun in her right hand, asking “In the location of the wounds on the body, are they consistent with the decedent holding a weapon in the right hand?” Defendant objected on the same basis as before, and this time, the court overruled the objection and permitted Almeida to answer.
A “trial judge is afforded wide latitude of discretion when making a determination about the admissibility of expert testimony.” State v. Bullard, 312 N.C. 129, 140, 322 S.E.2d 370, 376 (1984). Accordingly, “[t]he trial court's decision regarding what expert testimony to admit will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Alderson, 173 N.C.App. 344, 350, 618 S.E.2d 844, 848 (2005). However, where a trial court's decision is challenged as being “based on an incorrect reading and interpretation of the rule governing admissibility of expert testimony, the standard of review on appeal is de novo.” Cornett v. Watauga Surgical Grp., P.A., 194 N.C.App. 490, 493, 669 S.E.2d 805, 807 (2008).
Where a defendant fails to object to admission of certain evidence, we review only for plain error. State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 197, 531 S.E.2d 428, 451 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1130, 148 L.Ed.2d 797 (2001). “To prevail on plain error review, [a] defendant must show that (i) a different result probably would have been reached but for the error or (ii) the error was so fundamental as to result in a miscarriage of justice or denial of a fair trial.” Id. Accordingly, we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion regarding Almeida's expertise and qualifications to offer an opinion about whether Knowles's wounds were consistent with her having shot herself while holding the gun in her right hand. We review for plain error admission of Almeida's opinion about whether the gunshot wound was consistent with being self-inflicted. Because the relevant case law, testimony, and analysis are so closely related on these two issues, we address them together.
“If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 702 (2011). Determination of a witness's qualifications to testify is the duty of the trial court. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 8C–1, Rule 104(a) (2011). Specifically,
the trial court must determine whether the witness is qualified as an expert in the subject area about which that individual intends to testify. Under the North Carolina Rules of Evidence, a witness may qualify as an expert by reason of knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education where such qualification serves as the basis for the expert's proffered opinion....
It is not necessary that an expert be experienced with the identical subject matter at issue or be a specialist, licensed, or even engaged in a specific profession. It is enough that the expert witness because of his expertise is in a better position to have an opinion on the subject than is the trier of fact. Whether a witness has the requisite skill to qualify as an expert in a given area is chiefly a question of fact, the determination of which is ordinarily within the exclusive province of the trial court.
Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 461–62, 597 S.E.2d 674, 688 (2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Further, regarding the specific question of whether a fatal injury was self-inflicted, our Supreme Court has explicitly held that
[e]vidence from which the jury may infer that the death in question was not a self-inflicted event is entirely competent....
Admissibility of expert medical opinion is no longer strictly viewed through the narrow focus provided by the technical and vague concepts of invasion of the jury's province and the answer of an ultimate issue; rather, admissibility is evaluated primarily according to whether or not the witness because of his expertise is in a better position to have an opinion on the subject than is the trier of fact. Applying similar standards of admission, a majority of jurisdictions have held that the subject of self-inflicted wounds is not one of such common experience that laymen may not be assisted by the opinion of a doctor, who has special knowledge regarding anatomy and injuries to the human body.
State v. Hunt, 305 N.C. 238, 245–46, 287 S.E.2d 818, 822–23 (1982) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
Here, Almeida was offered by the State, and stipulated to by Defendant, as an expert witness in pathology. Alemida testified that, as a forensic pathologist conducting autopsies for the Office of the State Medical Examiner, he carefully examines bodies to obtain information about a wide variety of topics, including the decedent's general health, diseases, injuries, and possible causes of death. Just prior to the challenged testimony, Almeida testified about the two gunshot wounds Knowles suffered. Alemida testified, without objection, that two shots were fired from the left of Knowles' body, each from a distance greater than 18 inches based on the lack of stippling of Knowles' skin. One shot entered the left side of Knowles' neck. The other shot entered Knowles' left shoulder, traveled virtually straight through her chest, exited the left side of her chest, and then passed through her right arm. In sum, Alemida's testimony was that the gun which fired the two shots must have been held more than 18 inches away from and aimed directly toward the left side of Knowles' body and that one of the shots was fired as her right arm was held against her right side, such that the bullet passed left to right through both her chest and right arm. Alemida's opinion about whether Knowles could have fired the two shots herself and specifically whether she could have done so while holding the gun in her right hand was based upon the autopsy and his observation of entrance and exit wounds, bullet trajectories, and the absence of stippling.
As noted supra, at trial, Defendant asserted that the opinion that the wounds were inconsistent with Knowles firing the gun with her right hand fell outside Almeida's area of expertise. We firmly disagree. A pathologist conducting autopsies for the Office of the State Medical Examiner is precisely and specifically qualified to examine gunshot wounds and opine about their likely causes, including the location and manner in which the gun was likely fired. Accordingly, we see no error in admission of Almeida's opinion that the wounds were not consistent with Knowles firing a gun held in her right hand.
On appeal, Defendant makes a different assertion: that Almeida's expert opinions were admitted erroneously because “the jury was in just as good a position as Dr. Almeida to decide whether or not [Knowles] was holding the gun when it was fired and whether or not her wounds were self-inflicted.” We find this assertion meritless. As noted in Hunt, whether a wound is consistent with being self-inflicted is a proper matter for expert opinion, particularly where, as here, that opinion is based upon autopsy examination of the paths of bullets through the body and stippling patterns on the skin. Id. Again, we see no error, let alone plain error in this testimony. Accordingly, these arguments are overruled.
II. Jury Instruction on Flight
Defendant next argues that the trial court committed plain error in instructing the jury on flight. Specifically, Defendant contends that the evidence at trial did not reasonably support the theory that he fled after killing Knowles. We disagree.
A jury may consider evidence of a defendant's flight after the commission of a crime as evidence of his guilt. State v. King, 343 N.C. 29, 38, 468 S.E.2d 232, 238 (1996). However,
a trial court may not instruct a jury on [the] defendant's flight unless there is some evidence in the record reasonably supporting the theory that defendant fled after commission of the crime charged. Mere evidence that defendant left the scene of the crime is not enough to support an instruction on flight. There must also be some evidence that [the] defendant took steps to avoid apprehension.
State v. Anthony, 354 N.C. 372, 425, 555 S.E.2d 557, 590–91 (2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 930, 153 L.Ed.2d 791 (2002). In numerous cases, the appellate courts of this State have held that, where a defendant leaves the scene of a shooting without rendering constitutes instruction objection. S.E.2d 596 “hurriedly aid or assistance to the victim, such action more than merely departing the scene, and thus an on flight is warranted, even over a defendant's objection. See, e.g., State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 119, 552 S.E.2D 596, 626 (2001) (holding that where the defendant left the scene of the murder without providing medical assistance to the victim[,]” which action the defendant explained as a need to “clear his head” before turning himself in to police shortly thereafter, the evidence supported an instruction on flight); State v. Beck, 346 N.C. 750, 758, 487 S.E.2d 751, 757 (1997) (holding evidence sufficient to support instruction on flight where the defendant shot the victim, left the scene without rendering any assistance to the victim, and had a cab driver avoid his residence after seeing police cars nearby); State v. Reeves, 343 N.C. 111, 113, 468 S.E.2d 53, 55 (1996) (holding that “evidence tending to show that [the] defendant, after shooting the victim, ran from the scene of the crime, got in a car waiting nearby, and drove away .... is sufficient evidence of flight to warrant the instruction”).
Here, all of the evidence showed that, after Knowles was shot, Defendant left the home without rendering assistance to her and drove to a vacant house “to get [his] head together” before eventually turning himself in. We see no meaningful distinction between this evidence and that in Lloyd, supra, and conclude that it was sufficient to warrant an instruction on flight. Thus, Defendant has failed to show any error, let alone plain error, by the trial court. Accordingly, this argument is overruled.
III. Refusal to Instruct Jury on Accident
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on accident. We disagree.
North Carolina General Statute § 15A–1231(a)
provides for conferences on jury instructions and states that any party may tender written instructions. Where a specifically requested jury instruction is proper and supported by the evidence, the trial court must give the instruction, at least in substance. Requested special instructions, however, should be submitted in writing to the trial judge at or before the jury instruction conference. Thus, where ... the defendant fails to submit his request for instructions in writing, the trial court's ruling denying requested instructions is not error....
State v. Starr, ––– N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 703 S.E.2d 876, 880–81 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted), modified as to other issues and affirmed,365 N.C. 314, 718 S.E.2d 362 (2011). Accordingly, we review only for plain error in such situations. State v. Vincent, 195 N.C.App. 761, 764, 673 S .E.2d 874, 876 (2009).
A “trial court need only give the jury instructions supported by a reasonable view of the evidence.” State v. White, 77 N.C.App. 45, 52, 334 S.E.2d 786, 792,cert. denied, 315 N.C. 189, 337 S.E.2d 864 (1985). “The defense of accident [negating the mens rea element of homicide] is triggered in factual situations where a defendant, without premeditation, intent, or culpable negligence, commits acts which bring about the death of another.” State v. Lytton, 319 N.C. 422, 425–26, 355 S.E.2d 485, 487 (1987).
Here, although the trial court did not instruct on accident, it permitted Defendant to argue accident to the jury during his closing argument. Further, the only evidence which could possibly be construed as suggesting the shooting was an accident was Defendant's post-arrest statement:
At that point I asked another question, “What hand did she have the gun in?” And [Defendant's] response was, “It's in the right hand, I think, man.... When she—when she—when she pulled—I said [inaudible]. She said—she said, “Don't you put your hand on my son.” And it went POW, a pause, and then POW.... And it [inaudible] and she kept holding it....
At that point I asked the question of Defendant, “So you believe the gun went off twice as she turned with the gun in her hand?” [Defendant] stated, “Yeah, we were struggling for the gun [inaudible] struggling for it.”
In this ambiguous statement, Defendant never specifically said the shooting was an accident nor did he explain with any clarity how the shooting allegedly occurred. In light of the undisputed evidence that (1) Knowles' son heard her voice shift from angry to fearful, (2) Knowles was discovered lying dead on her bed holding a lit cigarette in her right hand, (3) Knowles was killed by a gunshot fired from more than 18 inches away from her body which passed through her torso and right arm in a straight line from left to right, and (4) that gunshot wound was not consistent with being self-inflicted, we do not believe that the jury would have returned a different verdict had it been instructed on accident. We conclude that Defendant has failed to show prejudice, and thus failed to establish plain error. Accordingly, this argument is overruled.
NO ERROR IN PART; NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN PART. Judges GEER and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).