When a party waits until the last minute to file a motion, that party runs the risk of having insufficient time to file its brief if the motion is denied, which is what occurred in this case. Failure of a party to timely take any step in the appellate process (other than filing a notice of appeal or cross-appeal) is not jurisdictional, but may be grounds for such action or sanction as the district court deems appropriate, including dismissal of the appeal. I.R.C.P. 83(s); State v. Langdon, 117 Idaho 115, 117, 785 P.2d 679, 681 (Ct. App. 1990). The district court is granted the discretion, by I.R.C.P. 83(s), to take action when a party fails to timely take any step in the appellate process.

We observe, in this regard, that other jurisdictions have held that a defendant is not under any obligation to act affirmatively to protect the right to a speedy trial in a trial de novo. See, e.g., City of Elkhart v. Bollacker (Kan. 1988), 757 P.2d 311, 314; and Hicks v. People (Colo. 1961), 364 P.2d 877, 879-80. The State also relies on State v. Langdon (Idaho App. 1990), 785 P.2d 679, in support of its argument, but Langdon is inapplicable to the issue before us. There, the defendant's appeal from a magistrate court to the district court was dismissed because he failed to file a brief in support of his appeal within the allotted time; the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that dismissal could be an appropriate discretionary sanction under the applicable procedural rule for failure to file a timely brief. Langdon, 785 P.2d at 680-81.

In light of the district court's factual findings demonstrating Simmons's lack of diligence, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Simmons's intermediate appeal. See State v. Langdon, 117 Idaho 115, 117, 785 P.2d 679, 681 (Ct. App. 1990) (noting that sanctions for failing to diligently prosecute an appeal from the magistrate division are discretionary and may include dismissal of the appeal for failing to timely file an appellate brief). IV.

Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). Here, Bettwieser argues that the district court ignored applicable legal standards and erroneously relied on State v. Langdon, 117 Idaho 115, 785 P.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1990) in dismissing the appeal. The district court's reliance on Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(m) and Langdon was not erroneous, as those sources grant the district court the power to dismiss an appeal sua sponte if a party fails to act timely; but Bettwieser is correct that Langdon did not address whether a motion to modify tolls deadlines set by an order establishing appellate procedure.

We have previously held that dismissal is an appropriate sanction for failure to file a timely appellate brief under Rule 83(s). See State v. Langdon, 117 Idaho 115, 117, 785 P.2d 679, 681 (Ct. App. 1990); Duff v. Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc., 103 Idaho 432, 436, 649 P.2d 391, 395 (Ct. App. 1982), aff'd 105 Idaho 123, 666 P.2d 650 (1983). Thus, it could not be considered a clear or manifest abuse of discretion for the district court to treat dismissal as an appropriate sanction for John's failure to timely submit his opening brief nearly nine months after it was due.

(Emphasis added.) Thus, it is clear the sanctions for failing to diligently prosecute an appeal from the magistrate division are discretionary with the district court; an exercise of sound judicial discretion will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Langdon, 117 Idaho 115, 117, 785 P.2d 679, 681 (Ct. App. 1990); Duff v. Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc., 103 Idaho 432, 436, 649 P.2d 391, 395 (Ct. App. 1982). When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.

31-32, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 281 (2003) (involving the sua sponte reclassification/reassignment of a case within the local court system); Tidwell v. Tidwell, 251 Ga. App. 863, 864, 554 S.E.2d 822, 823 (2001) ( sua sponte entry of summary judgment); Huminski v. LaVoie, 173 Vt. 517, 519-20, 787 A.2d 489, 492-93 (2001) ( sua sponte dismissal of complaint); Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Burns, 672 So. 2d 834 (Fla.App. 1996) ( sua sponte transfer of case based on forum non conveniens); King v. Mosher, 137 N.H. 453, 456-57, 629 A.2d 788, 790-91 (1993) ( sua sponte dismissal of complaint); Osborn v. Emporium Videos, 848 F.2d 237 (Wyo. 1993) ( sua sponte dismissal of complaint); Soebbing v. Carpet Barn, Inc., 109 Nev. 78, 83-84, 847 F.2d 731, 735-36 (1993) ( sua sponte entry of summary judgment); People v. Dolan, 585 N.Y.S.2d 549, 184 A.D.2d 892 (1992) ( sua sponte dismissal of indictment); Rubins v. Plummer, 813 F.2d 778, 779-80 (Colo.App. 1991) ( sua sponte dismissal of complaint); State v. Langdon, 117 Idaho 115, 785 F.2d 679 (1990) ( sua sponte dismissal of appeal); Around the World Importing, Inc. v. Mercantile Trust Co. National Ass'n, 717 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Mo.App. 1989) ( sua sponte dismissal of complaint); Gall v. Scroggy, 725 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Ky.App. 1987) ( sua sponte dismissal of complaint). Indeed, the circuit court under review in Barrett v. Guaranty Bank Trust Co., 123 Ill. App. 2d 326, 260 N.E.2d 94 (1970), appeared to understand that proceeding sua sponte still required notice and hearing, even though the Mason court relied on Barrett as precedent demonstrating the validity of the summary dismissal of meritless claims.