State v. Lamme

203 Citing cases

  1. State v. Geisler

    222 Conn. 672 (Conn. 1992)   Cited 466 times
    In Geisler, this factor was accompanied by a citation to State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 579 A.2d 484 (1990), in which we stated that "[t]he adoption of federal constitutional precedents that appropriately illuminate open textured provisions in our own organic document in no way compromises our obligation independently to construe the provisions of our state constitution."

    Stolberg v. Davidson, 454 U.S. 958, 102 S.Ct. 496, 70 L.Ed.2d 374 (1981) ("Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution."); (2) holdings and dicta of this court, and the Appellate Court; see, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Sup. 394, 448-49, 515 A.2d 134 (1986) (trial court used strict scrutiny to analyze sex discrimination claim based on the equal protection clause of the state constitution, relying, in part, on dicta from the Connecticut Supreme Court regarding what standard would be used once Connecticut's equal rights amendment was adopted); (3) federal precedent; see, e.g., State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990) ("The adoption of federal constitutional precedents that appropriately illuminate open textured provisions in our own organic document in no way compromises our obligation independently to construe the provisions of our state constitution."); (4) sister state decisions or sibling approach; see, e.g., State v. Gethers, 197 Conn. 369, 386-87, 497 A.2d 408 (1985); Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, supra, 58-59; (5) the historical approach, including the historical constitutional setting and the debates of the framers; see, e.g., State v. Lamme, supra, 178-80; Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, supra, 60-62; Palka v. Walker, 124 Conn. 121, 126, 198 A. 265 (1938); and (6) economic/sociological considerations.

  2. State v. Mikolinski

    56 Conn. App. 252 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999)   Cited 6 times

    This court did note, however, that if it were "to consider the defendant's claims pursuant to article first, § 9, one of our state constitutional provisions that guarantees due process of law, we would be guided by our Supreme Court's holding that a brief investigatory detention, even without probable cause, passes state constitutional muster." Id., citing State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990). Article first, § 9, has generally been characterized as guaranteeing due process of law.

  3. State v. Peeler

    321 Conn. 375 (Conn. 2016)   Cited 25 times
    Stating courts should evaluate whether overruling precedent would "cause a significant reordering of individual conduct, including risk shifting arrangements such as insurance policies"

    . More recently, in State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 179–80, 579 A.2d 484 (1990), and again in State v. Ross, 230 Conn. 183, 249, 646 A.2d 1318 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1165, 115 S.Ct. 1133, 130 L.Ed.2d 1095 (1995), we rejected the state's argument that our state constitution confers the authority to determine what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment solely on the legislature.1 Our purpose in part I of Santiago, then, was merely to trace in greater detail than we previously had the origins and contours of our state constitutional freedoms from cruel and unusual punishment.

  4. State v. Thorne

    1999 Ct. Sup. 11513 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999)

    Our Supreme Court has clearly rejected the proposition that an investigatory detention cannot take place in the absence of a finding of "probable cause" that a crime has been, or is likely to be, committed. State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 185. 579 A.2d 484 (1990) `"[T]he principles of fundamental fairness that are the hallmark of due process permit a brief [i]nvestigatory detention, even in the absence of probable cause, if the police have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

  5. Anthony A. v. Comm'r of Corr.

    339 Conn. 290 (Conn. 2021)   Cited 4 times
    In Anthony A, the Connecticut Supreme Court considered only the section's procedural protections for an inmate sex offender classification in the context of a habeas petition.

    We previously have held that this provision is the criminal due process clause of our state constitution and that it provides no greater protections than those available under the federal constitution. See, e.g., State v. Jenkins , 298 Conn. 209, 259 n.39, 3 A.3d 806 (2010) ("the defendant's reliance on [article first, § 9 ] is, in essence, superfluous, because, in the search and seizure context, [that section] is our criminal due process provision that does not provide protections greater than those afforded by either the fourth amendment [to the federal constitution] or its coordinate specific state constitutional provision, article first, § 7"); State v. Mikolinski , 256 Conn. 543, 555, 775 A.2d 274 (2001) ("[w]e have generally characterized article first, § 9, as one of our state constitutional provisions guaranteeing due process of law" (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Lamme , 216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990) (because article first, § 9, affords no greater rights than federal constitution, "the principles underlying constitutionally permissible Terry stops ... define when [investigative] detentions are ‘clearly warranted by law’ under article first, § 9" (footnote added)).Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

  6. State v. Anderson

    319 Conn. 288 (Conn. 2015)   Cited 14 times
    In Anderson, the trial court imposed a $100,000 bond on an indigent insanity acquittee, Francis Anderson, who had been charged with repeatedly assaulting staff and other patients at the Whiting Forensic Division of Connecticut Valley Hospital (Whiting), where he had been confined; the trial court had imposed that bond to protect other patients and staff at Whiting by incarcerating Anderson.

    As we noted in Ayala, the statutory declaration of rights “had constitutional overtones even though it was statutory in form. State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 179, 579 A.2d 484 (1990) ; see also C. Collier, [‘The Connecticut Declaration of Rights Before the Constitution of 1818: A Victim of Revolutionary Redefinition,’ 15 Conn. L.Rev. 87, 94 (1982)]....” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ayala, supra, 222 Conn. at 350, 610 A.2d 1162.

  7. State v. Santiago

    318 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2015)   Cited 97 times
    Holding that the death penalty no longer comported with contemporary standards of decency and violated the state constitutional ban on excessive and disproportion punishment and its prospective abolition applied to capital sentences already imposed

    Those due process protections take as their hallmark principles of fundamental fairness rooted in our state's unique common law, statutory, and constitutional traditions. See State v. Ross, supra, 230 Conn. at 246–47, 646 A.2d 1318 ; State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 178–79, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990). Although neither provision of the state constitution expressly references cruel or unusual punishments, it is settled constitutional doctrine that both of our due process clauses prohibit governmental infliction of cruel and unusual punishments.

  8. State v. Jenkins

    298 Conn. 209 (Conn. 2010)   Cited 62 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that protections provided under the Connecticut constitution are coextensive with those provided by the Fourth Amendment because "[o]ur own constitutional language, precedents and history do not support a ready departure from the federal case law in this area, particularly because the recent United States Supreme Court decisions do not represent a sea change from prior Connecticut precedent"

    We agree with the state that the defendant's reliance on this section is, in essence, superfluous, because, in the search and seizure context, article first, § 9, is our criminal due process provision that does not provide protections greater than those afforded by either the fourth amendment or its coordinate specific state constitutional provision, article first, § 7. See State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990) (article first, § 9, does not preclude Terry stops or other detentions not founded upon probable cause); see also State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 669 n. 1, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992) ( Borden, J., dissenting) ("Article first, § 7, is, of course, our state counterpart to the federal fourth amendment. Article first, § 9 . . . is our criminal due process clause, and has not generally been regarded as adding significantly to search and seizure analysis."

  9. State v. Mikolinski

    256 Conn. 543 (Conn. 2001)   Cited 22 times
    Applying reasonableness balancing test in holding that suspicionless sobriety checkpoints operated pursuant to neutral criteria are per- missible under article first, §§ 7 and 9, of state constitution

    It is true that "[a]pplications of Terry principles in the context of motor vehicle stops are . . . embodied in our state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Torres, 230 Conn. 372, 382-83, 645 A.2d 529 (1994) (reasonable articulable suspicion standard); State v. Lamme, [ 216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990)] (principles of Terry define when detention is clearly warranted by law under article first, § 9, of state constitution); State v. Dukes, [ 209 Conn. 98, 122, 547 A.2d 10 (1988)] (state constitution permits police to require occupants to step out of lawfully stopped motor vehicle); State v. Anderson, [ 24 Conn. App. 438, 441, 589 A.2d 374, cert. denied, 219 Conn. 903, 593 A.2d 130 (1991)] (state and federal constitutions permit brief investigatory stops based on reasonable and articulable suspicion)." State v. Wilkins, supra, 240 Conn. 508-509. None of the foregoing cases, however, involved stops made pursuant to neutral criteria.

  10. Ramos v. Vernon

    254 Conn. 799 (Conn. 2000)   Cited 108 times
    Holding that minor and his mother had standing to challenge town ordinance that imposed curfew on minors and corresponding penalties for minors’ parents

    "Article first, §§ 7 and 9 of our state constitution permit a police officer in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner to detain an individual for investigative purposes even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. State v. Mitchell, [ 204 Conn. 187, 195, 527 A.2d 1168, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 927, 108 S.Ct. 293, 98 L.Ed.2d 252 (1987)]; State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990). State v. Oquendo, [supra, 223 Conn. 654].