It was the codefendant's belief that defendant was possibly to serve as the driver. While it is true that the conspiratorial agreement and intention to commit the unlawful act can be shown by circumstantial evidence, State v. Lamb, 348 So.2d 403, 404 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Borders v. State, 312 So.2d 247, 248 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 327 So.2d 31 (Fla. 1976), it is also settled that mere presence at the crime scene, without more, is insufficient to establish the existence of a criminal conspiracy. Honchell v. State, 257 So.2d 889, 891 (Fla. 1971); Johnson v. State, 581 So.2d 220, 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
However, direct proof of an agreement is not necessary to establish a conspiracy; the jury is free to infer from all the circumstances surrounding and accompanying the act that the common purpose to commit the crime existed. State v. Lamb, 348 So.2d 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). We have also held that it is not necessary to prove a specific conversation in which an agreement was made.
However, direct proof of an agreement is not necessary to establish a conspiracy; the jury is free to infer from all the circumstances surrounding and accompanying the act that the common purpose to commit the crime existed. State v. Lamb, 348 So.2d 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). We have also held that it is not necessary to prove a specific conversation in which an agreement was made:
This is so even if the criminal act was not intended as part of the original design or the co-conspirator did not participate in the act. A co-conspirator is not responsible, however, for an act in which he did not participate if that act is not the natural and probable outcome of the common design, but is instead an independent act of some of the party, conceived by others and outside the common purpose. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946); United States v. Sullivan, 578 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1978), United States v. Moreno, 588 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936, 99 S.Ct. 2061, 60 L.Ed.2d 666 (1979); Pope v. State, 84 Fla. 428, 94 So. 865 (1922); State v. Lamb, 348 So.2d 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Davis v. State, 275 So.2d 575 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973), cert. denied, 280 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1973). It is a question of fact, as to whether there is a conspiracy, see, e.g., McCain v. State, 390 So.2d 779 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980), pet. for rev. denied, 399 So.2d 1144 (Fla. 1981); Bass v. State, 172 So.2d 614 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965), and whether the act charged is a natural and probable consequence of that conspiracy, see United States v. Moreno, supra; United States v. Monroe, 552 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972, 97 S.Ct. 2936, 53 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1977). See, e.g., El Ranco, Inc. v. First National Bank of Nevada, 406 F.2d 1205, 1216 (9th Cir. 1969); Berry v. State, 248 Ga. 430, 283 S.E.2d 888 (Ga. 1981), citing Gore v. State, 162 Ga. 267, 134 S.E. 36 (1926); The Anarchists' Case, Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, 12 N.E. 865 (Ill. 1887); Lusk v. Mississippi, 64 Miss. 845, 2 So. 256 (1887).
However, direct proof of an agreement is not necessary to establish a conspiracy; the jury is free to infer from all the circumstances surrounding and accompanying the act that the common purpose to commit the crime existed. State v. Lamb, 348 So.2d 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). We have also held that it is not necessary to prove a specific conversation in which an agreement was made: