Opinion
Docket No. 28751.
Filed October 24, 2003.
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Darla S. Williamson, District Judge.
Order of the district court granting motion to suppress evidence, reversed and case remanded.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. Jorgensen argued.
James K. Ball, Boise, for respondent.
The state appeals from the district court's order granting Benjamin Reed LaMay's motion to suppress evidence discovered in the search of a backpack which was in the hotel room where he was found by police. LaMay had been removed to the hallway outside the room and was arrested in the hallway, but the backpack remained within the hotel room. The district court granted suppression of the evidence, finding that the backpack was not within LaMay's "immediate control" at the time of his arrest. We reverse and remand.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Shortly after midnight, Boise City police officers were running the license plate numbers of vehicles parked at the Plaza Suite Hotel. One of the vehicles belonged to LaMay, and a warrants check showed that he had two outstanding misdemeanor warrants. The officers spoke with employees of the hotel and determined that a Joseph LaMay had rented a room at the hotel.
Three officers went to the room and knocked after hearing voices in the room. Joseph LaMay (who was later determined to be Benjamin LaMay's brother) answered the door. The officers testified that at this point they could smell marijuana smoke. Joseph eventually allowed the officers to enter the room. Upon entry into the room they observed drug paraphernalia in plain view on a table, and a knife on the breakfast bar. Officer Holtry put the knife in a drawer. There were seven people in the room. The officers testified that no one was free to leave. The officers believed LaMay was one of the males present in the room because of the vehicle in the parking lot registered to him, and the fact that Joseph had rented a room at the hotel.
The officers asked for everyone's name and identification. All, except LaMay, gave the officers physical identification. LaMay was lying near the edge of the far bed located about fifteen feet from the hallway. LaMay had his left arm down to the side of the bed. The officers could not see what was below his left arm. LaMay told the officers that his name was Jake Tuttle. The officers believed that the individual giving the name of Tuttle was being untruthful. In order to control the situation, the officers had all occupants except Joseph go into the hallway so they could continue their investigation into the presence of controlled substances, and into the correct identification of Tuttle. The officers left the door to the hotel room open. Once Joseph was taken into the bathroom for questioning, Officer Carter looked around the room to make sure there were no other persons in the room. Carter saw a backpack on the floor about ten inches from where LaMay's hand had been hanging off the bed.
In the hallway, LaMay gave his correct name to Officer Holtry, at which time Holtry placed LaMay under arrest on the warrants, handcuffed him, and required him to remain seated in the hallway with the rest of the persons from the room. Officer Gailey guarded LaMay and the other suspects in the hallway. Gailey asked LaMay whether there was marijuana in the room. LaMay replied that there was some in a jar under the pillow of his bed. Holtry then entered the room and retrieved the jar with marijuana in it. Carter told Holtry about the backpack and, upon learning that LaMay had been arrested, Carter seized the backpack. Holtry and Gailey unzipped the backpack and found that it contained U.S. currency, cocaine, and LaMay's driver's license. Approximately one to two minutes had elapsed from the time all occupants had been removed from the room and the searching of the backpack. The location of LaMay's arrest was approximately fifteen feet from where he had been lying on the bed.
As a result of these events, LaMay was charged with possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, I.C. § 37-2732(a), felony possession of marijuana, I.C. § 37-2732(c), and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, I.C. § 37-2734A. LaMay brought a motion to suppress the items discovered in the search of the backpack. The district court granted suppression of the evidence, finding that the backpack was not within LaMay's "immediate control." The state filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that the area of initial contact is subject to search incident to an arrest even if the officers move the suspect to a different location, and arrest him there. The district court denied the state's motion to reconsider. The state appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On review of a decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence, this Court employs a bifurcated standard of review. We defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 400, 958 P.2d 22, 26 (Ct.App. 1998). However, we exercise free review over the application of constitutional standards to those facts. Id.
III. SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
The state appeals the district court's order suppressing the evidence obtained from the search of the backpack, arguing that the backpack was within LaMay's "immediate control" at the beginning of the encounter with law enforcement officers and therefore it falls within the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. LaMay does not contest that the backpack was within his "immediate control" as he lay on the bed. However, LaMay argues that the "immediate control" factor applies at the time of formal arrest.
A warrantless search by law enforcement officers is presumptively unreasonable unless it comes within certain special and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Cox, 136 Idaho 858, 862, 41 P.3d 744, 748 (Ct.App. 2002). Exceptions to the warrant requirement must be "jealously and carefully drawn." State v. Foster, 127 Idaho 723, 730, 905 P.2d 1032, 1039 (Ct.App. 1995) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)). A search incident to arrest is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 215, 677 P.2d 522, 528 (Ct.App. 1984). A search incident to arrest may extend only to "the arrestee's person and the area `within his immediate control,' — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Foster, 127 Idaho at 728, 905 P.2d at 1037 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). The purpose of the exception is two-fold: (1) to prevent the arrestee from gaining access to dangerous weapons which might pose a threat to the safety of the police and other persons; and (2) to thwart any attempt by an arrestee to destroy evidence. State v. Calegar, 104 Idaho 526, 529, 661 P.2d 311, 314 (1983); State v. Bowman, 134 Idaho 176, 179, 997 P.2d 637, 640 (Ct.App. 2000). A search incident to arrest may include containers within the arrestee's immediate control. State v. Heinen, 114 Idaho 656, 658, 759 P.2d 947, 949 (Ct.App. 1988).
The state advances New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), in support of its contention that the scope of the area to be searched is not limited by the formalities of arrest, i.e., the exact place and time of arrest. In Belton, a car was stopped for speeding. The officer smelled marijuana and saw an envelope marked "Supergold" on the floor of the car. The officer associated such an envelope with marijuana. He arrested all four men in the vehicle, and proceeded to conduct a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle. On the back seat he found a jacket, and the jacket contained cocaine. The jacket belonged to Belton, who was charged with possession of a controlled substance.
Belton created a bright-line rule regarding automobile searches incident to an arrest. A principle underlying Belton is that a search incident to an arrest can encompass an area where the arrestee was not located at the time of the formal arrest, and this is not unreasonable. In Belton cases, the defendant will be arrested outside the vehicle, but a search of the vehicle's interior is still reasonable. The United States Supreme Court has held that this is not an unreasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment. This principle is persuasive. A search incident to arrest is not tied to the formalities of the arrest. Idaho courts have recognized this principle in many ways: (1) by applying the Belton rule regarding automobile searches incident to an arrest; (2) by approving searches after the passage of time following the arrest; (3) by approving searches of items not in the possession of the arrestee at the time of the arrest; (4) by approving searches which occur before the formal arrest, where probable cause existed at the time of the search; (5) by validating searches incident to an unlawful arrest through a finding of probable cause to arrest for another crime arising from the same set of operative facts; and (6) by approving searches of the interior of a vehicle pursuant to the arrest of the driver, where probable cause to arrest did not arise until the driver was outside of and far away from the vehicle. These cases illustrate that the formalities of an arrest do not necessarily determine the search which may be reasonably performed incident to that arrest.
State v. Champagne, 137 Idaho 677, 52 P.3d 321 (Ct.App. 2002) (holding that where officer stopped vehicle, allowed defendant to enter a grocery store to shop, and arrested the defendant upon her return to the vehicle, a search incident to arrest of the vehicle's interior was lawful); State v. Heinen, 114 Idaho 656, 759 P.2d 947 (Ct.App. 1988) (holding that a second search of a briefcase which took place at the police station, rather than at the location of the arrest, was lawful).
State v. Bowman, 134 Idaho 176, 997 P.2d 637 (Ct.App. 2000) (holding that a search incident to arrest of defendant could include a search of the jacket the defendant had taken off and given to his girlfriend during the contact with police officers).
State v. Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463, 988 P.2d 689 (1999); State v. Cox, 136 Idaho 858, 41 P.3d 744 (Ct.App. 2002); State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho 298, 688 P.2d 1203 (Ct.App. 1984); see also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980) (stating "Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner's person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa.").
State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 922 P.2d 1059 (1996); Hernandez v. State, 132 Idaho 352, 972 P.2d 730 (Ct.App. 1998).
State v. Champagne, 137 Idaho 677, 52 P.3d 321 (Ct.App. 2002).
However, the case before us has a unique posture. Here the officers encountered LaMay upon entry into the hotel room, moved him to the hallway, and arrested him in the hallway. Arguably, application of the Bowman factors at the place of the arrest would determine that the backpack was not subject to a search incident to the arrest. Bowman, 134 Idaho at 179-80, 997 P.2d at 640-41 ( citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH SEIZURE § 6.3(c), at 306-07 (3d ed. 1996)). The state argues that the warrants for LaMay provide probable cause for arrest upon the initial contact with police officers. We reject this argument. A judicial determination of probable cause focuses on the information and facts which the officers possessed. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996); United States v. Prim, 698 F.2d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 1983); State v. Julian, 129 Idaho 133, 136, 922 P.2d 1059, 1062 (1996); State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 874, 11 P.3d 489, 493 (Ct.App. 2000). The officers were not in possession of the fact that Jake Tuttle was LaMay, at the time of the initial contact. The officers had a suspicion, but not enough information to create probable cause to arrest on the outstanding warrants. The state asserts that State v. Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463, 988 P.2d 689 (1999), allows for an outstanding warrant to justify probable cause; more accurately, that facts not within the knowledge of the officers can sustain probable cause. In Schwarz, the officers knew who they had in custody, but were told that there was no warrant for Schwarz. The state misreads Schwarz. The standards utilized in Schwarz clearly require the court to look only at the facts which the officers possessed. Facts not within the knowledge of the officers are not relevant.
However, the officers had probable cause to arrest LaMay upon entering the hotel room, because there was drug paraphernalia, a water pipe in plain view on a table, and the smell of marijuana in the air. Possession of drug paraphernalia, a violation of Idaho Code § 37-2734A, was one of the counts brought against LaMay, and the charging document indicates that "a glass water pipe and water bong" were the basis for the charge. If the officers had arrested LaMay pursuant to the drug paraphernalia, they could have searched the backpack as a search incident to that arrest. However, the officers did not perform that search. The officers, investigating further into the true identity of Jake Tuttle, and for their own protection, removed LaMay and the others to the hallway outside the room. We note that LaMay's own unlawful act, giving a false name to a police officer, contributed to this sequence of events. See I.C. § 18-5413(2).
The facts of this case are similar to United States v. Han, 74 F.3d 537 (4th Cir. 1996). In Han, officers were given entry to a residence. In the living room, officers found Han, the individual they were looking for, seated on a couch, with a travel bag next to his feet. An officer asked if he could move the bag for safety purposes, and Han agreed to allow this. The bag was placed out of Han's reach. The officer left momentarily. Upon returning, the officer sat next to Han and asked to search the bag. Han eventually agreed. Inside the bag the officer found heroin and Han's driver's license. The Fourth Circuit found that probable cause to arrest Han for conspiracy to distribute heroin existed at the initial contact, based on the facts known to the officers. Because the arrest was based on valid probable cause, the court determined that the search which occurred prior to the arrest was also valid. Han, 74 F.3d at 541. However, Han further argued that the search was not incident to his arrest, because the bag had been removed from his immediate control, and the officers had alleviated their safety concerns. The court reiterated the holding that officers may separate individuals from containers in order to alleviate safety concerns. Han, 74 F.3d at 542. The court emphasized that a search incident to an arrest continues to be justified even after the likelihood of danger or destruction of evidence has been eliminated. However, the delay between the elimination of the danger and performance of the search must be reasonable. Id. at 543. The court applied these standards and explained its holding as follows:
Han's bag unquestionably was in his immediate control at the beginning of the encounter; the delay lasted just a few minutes instead of an hour and a half; and the search occurred at the scene of the arrest, not at the police station. More important, the delay in this case was objectively reasonable. Although Special Agent Orton already had sufficient evidence to arrest Han and search the bag, he chose to confirm his information by speaking with Bennett. He may have caused minimal additionally infringement on Han's rights by waiting a few minutes to conduct a search that would have been justified had he performed it immediately. But the degree to which his conversation with Bennett reduced the likelihood of arresting the wrong individual outweighed that marginal infringement. To deem this search unreasonable would encourage officers either (1) to proceed more hastily than necessary, risking unnecessary infringement on rights, or (2) to allow the dangerous condition to continue during their deliberate investigation. Either result would violate the basic purpose of the search-incident-to-arrest exception — to deter interference with suspects' Fourth Amendment rights while ensuring officers' safety. Thus we hold that when a container is within the immediate control of a suspect at the beginning of an encounter with law enforcement officers; and when the officers search the container at the scene of the arrest; the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a reasonable delay, such as the one in this case, between the elimination of danger and the search.
Id. at 543
In contrast with Han, the facts of this case have the officers moving the people, rather than any container, in an effort to secure the safety of the room's occupants and the officers. Based on the number of people present, the officers chose to move the people to an area with no containers — the hallway, where LaMay was placed under arrest. As in Han, probable cause to arrest LaMay existed upon the initial contact with police based on the drug paraphernalia and the smell of marijuana.
We note that in this case the officers did not know about the presence of the backpack until after LaMay had been moved. This does not change the inquiry. A search incident to an arrest allows a search of the area within the immediate control of an arrestee, without regard to whether or not any containers within that area are known to the officers prior to the arrest.
Because probable cause existed to arrest LaMay at the time of the initial contact, the decision to move the persons, rather than any containers, as in Han, should not change the determination of the reasonableness of the search incident to LaMay's arrest. Applying the principle that the formalities of arrest do not necessarily determine whether a search incident to an arrest is reasonable or not, we hold that when a container is in the immediate control of a suspect at the beginning of an encounter with law enforcement officers and the officers have probable cause to arrest the suspect, but the officers move the suspect away from the container prior to his arrest, a search of the container incident to the suspect's arrest is not unreasonable, as long as the distance and delay are not unreasonable.
We caution that our holding should not be interpreted as sanctioning law enforcement procedures directed at placing an arrestee in a location which would provide officers with a more advantageous search incident to an arrest. Such conduct by police officers may make a search unreasonable, and require suppression of evidence.
IV. IDAHO CONSTITUTION
LaMay asks that if we find the search at issue to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, that we read the Idaho Constitution as providing greater protection of individual rights. We are not persuaded to do so. The language of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution are nearly identical. Under both constitutions, the guiding principle is the reasonableness of the search. The constitution used to perform the analysis should not change the result. LaMay has not shown any reason to find this search unreasonable under the Idaho Constitution, and we decline to do so.
V. CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that the formalities of arrest are not the determining factors for determining the reasonableness of a search incident to arrest, we further conclude that the search of LaMay's backpack was reasonable irrespective of the fact that the backpack was out of LaMay's reach at the time the formal arrest occurred. Accordingly, the order of the district court granting LaMay's motion to suppress is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
Judge PERRY and Judge Pro Tem MEEHL CONCUR.