The larger parcel test has been applied by Washington and other courts in eminent domain cases involving the question whether land constitutes a single tract for purposes of determining damages and offsetting benefits. State v. McDonald, 98 Wn.2d 521, 656 P.2d 1043 (1983); Idaho W. Ry. v. Coey, 73 Wn. 291, 295, 131 P. 810 (1913); Sultan Water Power Co. v. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 31 Wn. 558, 561, 72 P. 114 (1903); State v. Lacey, 8 Wn. App. 542, 507 P.2d 1206 (1973), aff'd, 84 Wn.2d 33, 524 P.2d 1351 (1974). Under the larger parcel test, three elements are required to establish a single tract: unity of ownership; unity of use; and contiguity.

Seattle v. Wald, supra; Sultan Water Power Co. v. Weyerhauser Timber Co., supra. A slight concession was allowed in State ex rel. Biddle v. Superior Court, 44 Wn. 108, 87 P. 40 (1906), where an entire farm was considered a single tract, despite the interruption of physical contiguity by a public road running through the farm. The test established by these early cases was considered by the Court of Appeals in State v. Lacey, 8 Wn. App. 542, 507 P.2d 1206 (1973), aff'd, 84 Wn.2d 33, 524 P.2d 1351 (1974). The Court of Appeals discussion of the test was affirmed without comment by this court.

The test has three elements: unity of ownership, unity of use, and contiguity. State v. Lacey, 8 Wn. App. 542, 546, 507 P.2d 1206 (1973). Significantly, for our discussion, the determination is for the jury unless reasonable minds could not differ.

If the element of compulsion is based upon purely economic reasons, the sale is generally considered voluntary ... Where, however, a seller or buyer is forced to act under a decree, execution or something more than mere inability to maintain the property, the element of compulsion is based upon legal, not economic, factors ...Felton v. Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Seattle, 101 Wn.2d 416, 422, 679 P.2d 928, 931 (1984)(quoting State v. Lacey, 8 Wash.App. 542, 549, 507 P.2d 1206 (1973)). The sale of the property here was compulsory pursuant to the bankruptcy court's orders and so was involuntary.

If the element of compulsion is based upon purely economic reasons, the sale is generally considered voluntary... Where, however, a seller or buyer is forced to act under a decree, execution or something more than mere inability to maintain the property, the element of compulsion is based upon legal, not economic factors... Felton v. Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Seattle , 101 Wash.2d 416, 422, 679 P.2d 928 (1984) (quoting State v. Lacey , 8 Wash. App. 542, 549, 507 P.2d 1206 (1973) ). In Felton , the Washington Supreme Court held that a nonjudicial foreclosure was a voluntary sale because the homeowner consented to legal process upon signing the deed of trust.

[A forced sale is] a transaction in which there is an element of compulsion on the part of either the seller or the buyer. If the element of compulsion is based upon purely economic reasons, the sale is generally considered voluntary.... Where, however, a seller or buyer is forced to act under a decree, execution or something more than mere inability to maintain the property, the element of compulsion is based upon legal, not economic factors.... Felton v. Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Seattle, 101 Wash.2d 416, 422, 679 P.2d 928 (1984) (quoting State v. Lacey, 8 Wash.App. 542, 549, 507 P.2d 1206 (1973)). In Felton, the court concluded that a nonjudicial trustee's sale was a voluntary sale because the debtors indirectly consented to the sale through the power of sale granted the trustee in the loan documents.Id. at 422–23, 679 P.2d 928.

A forced sale is generally a transaction in which there is an element of compulsion on the part of either the seller or the buyer. If the element of compulsion is based upon purely economic reasons, the sale is generally considered voluntary . . . Where, however, a seller or buyer is forced to act under a decree, execution or something more than mere inability to maintain the property, the element of compulsion is based upon legal, not economic, factors. . .State v. Lacey, 8 Wn. App. 542, 549, 507 P.2d 1206 (1973) (holding that a rigid per se rule as to the forced or voluntary nature of a probate sale of property that was being condemned could not be established, and that courts must proceed on a case-by-case basis). There appears to be only one Washington case which discusses whether or not the term "forced sale" applies to a sale conducted pursuant to a power of sale, and that application is merely dicta.

Judgment and a decree of appropriation was entered August 2, 1972, and on August 22, 1972, the State appealed from the judgment entered on the verdict and from the denial of its motion for new trial entered following the adverse jury verdict. Judgment on the verdict was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on March 16, 1973 ( State v. Lacey, 8 Wn. App. 542, 507 P.2d 1206 (1973)), and the cause remanded to Superior Court to determine reasonable attorneys' fees. On July 12, 1973, the State paid into the registry of the court $238,400, the difference between the $345,000 damage award and the $106,600 already deposited into court on January 29, 1971.

Where, however, a seller or buyer is forced to act under a decree, execution or something more than mere inability to maintain the property, the element of compulsion is based upon legal, not economic, factors." Felton v. Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Seattle, 101 Wash.2d 416, 422, 679 P.2d 928 (1984) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Lacey, 8 Wash. App. 542, 549, 507 P.2d 1206 (1973) ). "Impoundment under Wash. Rev. Code § 46.55 is not a consensual consumer transaction."

However, the State contends that as to the land upon which the feed mill is located, there is a lack of unity of ownership; thus, Evans could not claim damages to the feed mill. State v. Lacey, 8 Wn. App. 542, 507 P.2d 1206 (1973). We agree with the authority cited by the State that before one may maintain a claim for compensation in an eminent domain proceeding, one must have an enforceable interest, State v. J.R. Leasing Co., 1 Wn. App. 944, 466 P.2d 185 (1970), and the proper procedure is to determine as a preliminary question whether a condemnee has any legal rights or claim in the property for which he seeks damages.