Opinion
No. 16-KP-0234
12-16-2016
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. ROGERS LACAZE
ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF ORLEANS CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
On March 3, 1995, Rogers LaCaze killed 17-year-old Cuong Vu, 24-year-old Ha Vu, and 25 year-old Officer Ronald A. Williams II. A jury found LaCaze guilty as charged of three counts of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death. LaCaze's conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court, State v. LaCaze, 99-0584 (La. 1/25/02), 824 So.2d 1063, and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari the same year. Lacaze v. Louisiana., 537 U.S. 865, 123 S.Ct. 263, 154 L.Ed.2d 110 (2002). However, it is only now, 14 years after the finality of LaCaze's conviction and sentence, that this Court is called upon to examine his initial post-conviction application.
Among other issues addressed in the per curiam, LaCaze has attempted to re-litigate the penalty phase of this trial. As noted in my additional concurrences in State v. Blank, 04-0204 (La. 4/11/07), 955 So.2d 90; State v. Cosey, 15-1456 (La. 6/17/16), 194 So.3d 602; State v. Tyler, 13-0913 (La. 11/6/15), 181 So.3d 678, 683, cert. denied, (U.S. Dec. 12, 2016); and State v. Lee, 14-2374 (La. 9/18/15), 181 So.3d 631, I remain troubled that capital post-conviction proceedings have devolved into an interminable re-litigation of the guilt and penalty phases. Collateral capital review does not function as a second bite at the proverbial apple, and this protracted and inappropriate utilization of the post-conviction process disproportionately saps resources from an already depleted indigent defense budget and deprives the family of the victims of closure and justice.
Relatedly, as I noted in my additional concurrence to State v Chester, 15-2123 (La 12/16/16), ___So.3d___, I do not necessarily disagree with the concept advanced by United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer that the interminable delays in the execution of a death sentence may at some point constitute cruelty towards the convicted. Justice Breyer recently noted as follows:
Henry Sireci, the petitioner, was tried, convicted of murder, and first sentenced to death in 1976. He has lived in prison under threat of execution for 40 years. When he was first sentenced to death, the Berlin Wall stood firmly in place. Saigon had just fallen. Few Americans knew of the personal computer or the Internet. And over half of all Americans now alive had not yet been born. . . Forty years is more time than an average person could expect to live his entire life when America constitutionally forbade the 'inflict[ion]' of 'cruel and unusual punishments.' Amdt. 8; see 5 Dictionary of American History 104 (S. Kutler ed., 3d ed. 2003). This Court, speaking of a period of four weeks, not 40 years, once said that a prisoner's uncertainty before execution is 'one of the most horrible feelings to which he can be subjected.' In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172, 10 S.Ct. 384, 33 L.Ed. 835 (1890). I should hope that this kind of delay would arise only on the rarest of occasions. But in the ever diminishing universe of actual executions, I fear that delays of this kind have become more common.Sireci v. Florida, No. 16-5247 (decided 12/12/16) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citation omitted) (italics in original).
It is time for justice to be served for these three horrific murders that occurred so many years ago.