Opinion
No. 3-524 / 02-1461
Filed August 27, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van Marel and Thomas R. Hronek, District Associate Judges.
Kwashie appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence of his intoxication. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, Appellate Defender, and Patricia Reynolds, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen H. Holmes, County Attorney, and Mary Howell Sirna and James Scheetz, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
An Ames police officer stopped Mawuli Yao Kwashie's car early one morning after observing him quickly back out of a parking spot. A chemical test revealed a breath alcohol concentration of .18. Kwashie was charged with operating while intoxicated, first offense. See Iowa Code § 321J.2 (2001).
Kwashie moved to suppress the evidence of his intoxication on the ground that the officer's stop of his vehicle violated constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV, Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. The district court denied the motion, reasoning in part that "the officer had probable cause to stop and arrest the defendant for the unsafe starting of a stopped vehicle." Following a trial on the minutes of testimony, the court found Kwashie guilty as charged and imposed sentence.
On appeal, Kwashie asks us to revisit the district court's suppression ruling. Reviewing the record de novo, we agree that the officer had probable cause to stop Kwashie's vehicle based on the traffic violation he observed. See Iowa Code § 321.313 (stating "[n]o person shall start a vehicle which is stopped, standing, or parked unless and until such movement can be made with reasonable safety."). See also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 95 (1996); State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 1996). Accordingly, we affirm the suppression ruling.
Kwashie also argues the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was afoot. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968); State v. Kreps, 650 N.W.2d 636, 641 (Iowa 2002). As we have found that the officer met the higher probable cause standard, we need not address this issue.