On appeal, the appellate court's "task is not to determine whether the evidence was 'clear and convincing,' but, rather, whether there was sufficient evidence to enable a person of reasonable caution to arrive at the circuit court's [finding of fact]." State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319, 345, 984 P.2d 78, 104 (1999). By enacting HRS § 334-161 in 2017, the legislature explicitly provided the trial courts with authority to issue an order permitting the involuntary administration of medication to a criminal defendant.
At the outset, we consider whether the Medication Order is an appealable order such that we may exercise jurisdiction over this appeal.8 The Hawaii Supreme Court has implicitly held that orders regarding the involuntary medication of a pretrial defendant and orders relating to the release or commitment of a defendant found not guilty based *200 on an insanity defense are appealable orders by exercising appellate jurisdiction over such orders. For example, in State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319 , 984 P.2d 78 (1999), the supreme court exercised appellate jurisdiction and reviewed an order authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications to a defendant found incompetent to proceed to trial. In State v. Miller, 84 Hawai'i 269 , 933 P.2d 606 (1997), the supreme court reviewed an order denying the motion of a defendant found not guilty based on an insanity defense for conditional release or discharge from custody, and in State v. Burgo, 71 Haw. 198 , 787 P.2d 221 (1990), the supreme court reviewed an order revoking the conditional discharge of a defendant found not guilty based on an insanity defense.
“When construing a statute, [this court’s] foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.” State v. McKnight, 131 Hawai'i 379 , 388, 319 P.3d 298 , 307 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319 , 327, 984 P.2d 78 , 86 (1999)). Additionally, “[t]he legislative history of a statute remains relevant ‘even when the language appeal’s clear upon perfunctory review.’”
This court has noted that “taking judicial notice of the records and files of a case may or may not be proper, depending upon the type of record at issue and the purpose for which it is considered.” State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319 , 343, 984 P.2d 78 , 102 (1999). Where a trial court seeks to take judicial notice of “its own acts or of the existence of records on file in the same case,” a number of other jurisdictions have held that judicial notice under this circumstance is proper.
"The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewable de novo." State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai‘i 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999) (citation, brackets, and ellipses omitted). We view HRS § 707–756 as a whole and construe the statute in accordance with the legislature's overall purpose to give each part a sensible and intelligent effect.
[w]here the statutes simply overlap in their application, effect will be given to both if possible, as "repeal by implication is disfavored." State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319, 330, 984 P.2d 78, 89 (1999) (quoting State v. Vallesteros, 84 Hawai'i 295, 303, 933 P.2d 623[632], 640 (1997); State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai'i 8, 19 n. 16, 904 P.2d 893, 904 n. 16 (1995) (further citations omitted)). Petitioner argues (3) that "[t]here is an irreconcilable conflict between HRS § 706-668 and HRS § 706-606.5. The two statutes are not even on the same subject matter.
With regard to Lagat's argument that "the Legislature did not intend to use HRS [§] 708-836.5 in the manner in which the state used it," we note that this court has long recognized that, "[w]hen construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself." State v. Kotis, 91 Haw. 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86, reconsideration denied, 91 Haw. 319, 984 P.2d 78 (1999). The construction of a statute is a question of law which the appellate court reviews de novo. . . . Departure from the literal construction of a statute is justified only when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and the literal construction is clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute.
And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.State v. Kotis, 91 Haw. 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999) (quotation and internal citation marks omitted). Thus, the use of "may" in the plain language of the statute demonstrates that the sentencing court is given discretion to sentence the defendant to a prison term.
"'[T]he interpretation of a statute . . . is a question of law reviewable de novo.'" State v. Kotis, 91 Haw. 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999) (quoting Arceo, 84 Haw. at 10, 928 P.2d at 852 (quoting State v. Camara, 81 Haw. 324, 329, 916 P.2d 1225, 1230 (1996) (citations omitted))). D. Motion for Mistrial
See also . . . United States v. Am. Tel. Tel. Co., 83 F.R.D. 323 (D. D.C. 1979) (judicial notice of court records should be limited to the fact of their existence rather than the truth of the matters contained in the court records). . . .State v. Kotis, 91 Haw. 319, 342, 984 P.2d 78, 101 (1999) (quoting Gottsch v. Bank of Stapleton, 458 N.W.2d 443, 455-56 (Neb. 1990)) (emphases in original) (brackets in original) (some ellipsis points added and some in original). Accordingly, insofar as the circuit court intended to rely on the two documents for the truth of the assertions contained therein, they were not proper subjects of judicial notice.