State v. Kotis

71 Citing cases

  1. State v. Gonzalez

    NO. CAAP-18-0000616 (Haw. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2019)

    On appeal, the appellate court's "task is not to determine whether the evidence was 'clear and convincing,' but, rather, whether there was sufficient evidence to enable a person of reasonable caution to arrive at the circuit court's [finding of fact]." State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319, 345, 984 P.2d 78, 104 (1999). By enacting HRS § 334-161 in 2017, the legislature explicitly provided the trial courts with authority to issue an order permitting the involuntary administration of medication to a criminal defendant.

  2. State v. Lawrence

    139 Haw. 192 (Haw. Ct. App. 2016)   Cited 1 times
    Finding jurisdiction under HRS § 641-11 over a judgment of acquittal and order of commitment in part because "to construe [the statute] to preclude an appeal under the circumstances of case” would be "anomalous" (citing State v. Burgo, 71 Haw. 198 , 202, 787 P.2d 221 , 223 (1990))

    At the outset, we consider whether the Medication Order is an appealable order such that we may exercise jurisdiction over this appeal.8 The Hawaii Supreme Court has implicitly held that orders regarding the involuntary medication of a pretrial defendant and orders relating to the release or commitment of a defendant found not guilty based *200 on an insanity defense are appealable orders by exercising appellate jurisdiction over such orders. For example, in State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319 , 984 P.2d 78 (1999), the supreme court exercised appellate jurisdiction and reviewed an order authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medications to a defendant found incompetent to proceed to trial. In State v. Miller, 84 Hawai'i 269 , 933 P.2d 606 (1997), the supreme court reviewed an order denying the motion of a defendant found not guilty based on an insanity defense for conditional release or discharge from custody, and in State v. Burgo, 71 Haw. 198 , 787 P.2d 221 (1990), the supreme court reviewed an order revoking the conditional discharge of a defendant found not guilty based on an insanity defense.

  3. State v. Nicol

    140 Haw. 482 (Haw. 2017)   Cited 62 times
    Holding that HRS § 641-11 authorizes a defendant to appeal in a criminal case from a circuit court order dismissing the case without prejudice

    “When construing a statute, [this court’s] foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself.” State v. McKnight, 131 Hawai'i 379 , 388, 319 P.3d 298 , 307 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319 , 327, 984 P.2d 78 , 86 (1999)). Additionally, “[t]he legislative history of a statute remains relevant ‘even when the language appeal’s clear upon perfunctory review.’”

  4. State v. Abdon

    137 Haw. 19 (Haw. 2016)   Cited 15 times
    Stating that, because Hawaii law requires the jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether a prosecution is timely, the jury must also determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the statute of limitations was tolled

    This court has noted that “taking judicial notice of the records and files of a case may or may not be proper, depending upon the type of record at issue and the purpose for which it is considered.” State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319 , 343, 984 P.2d 78 , 102 (1999). Where a trial court seeks to take judicial notice of “its own acts or of the existence of records on file in the same case,” a number of other jurisdictions have held that judicial notice under this circumstance is proper.

  5. State v. McKnight

    131 Haw. 379 (Haw. 2013)   Cited 26 times
    Holding that an error by the issuing judge resulting in conflicting dates on the face of the warrant did not render a search warrant invalid

    "The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewable de novo." State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai‘i 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999) (citation, brackets, and ellipses omitted). We view HRS § 707–756 as a whole and construe the statute in accordance with the legislature's overall purpose to give each part a sensible and intelligent effect.

  6. State v. Kamana'o

    118 Haw. 210 (Haw. 2008)   Cited 32 times
    Concluding that the court's imposition of a mandatory minimum term does not constitute double punishment

    [w]here the statutes simply overlap in their application, effect will be given to both if possible, as "repeal by implication is disfavored." State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319, 330, 984 P.2d 78, 89 (1999) (quoting State v. Vallesteros, 84 Hawai'i 295, 303, 933 P.2d 623[632], 640 (1997); State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawai'i 8, 19 n. 16, 904 P.2d 893, 904 n. 16 (1995) (further citations omitted)). Petitioner argues (3) that "[t]here is an irreconcilable conflict between HRS § 706-668 and HRS § 706-606.5. The two statutes are not even on the same subject matter.

  7. State v. Lagat

    97 Haw. 492 (Haw. 2002)   Cited 25 times
    Holding that it was transparent from the record that no unfair surprise nor resulting prejudice ensued from the prosecution's failure to list in the indictment the charge of assault, which was the alleged predicate offense for UEMV, and the jury instructions on assault were not erroneous

    With regard to Lagat's argument that "the Legislature did not intend to use HRS [§] 708-836.5 in the manner in which the state used it," we note that this court has long recognized that, "[w]hen construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself." State v. Kotis, 91 Haw. 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86, reconsideration denied, 91 Haw. 319, 984 P.2d 78 (1999). The construction of a statute is a question of law which the appellate court reviews de novo. . . . Departure from the literal construction of a statute is justified only when such construction would produce an absurd and unjust result and the literal construction is clearly inconsistent with the purposes and policies of the statute.

  8. State v. Savitz

    97 Haw. 440 (Haw. 2002)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that the legislature could have drafted a statute to include a limitation on the court’s discretion and noting that "[t]he fact that it did not do so manifests its intent that it chose not to do so"

    And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.State v. Kotis, 91 Haw. 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999) (quotation and internal citation marks omitted). Thus, the use of "may" in the plain language of the statute demonstrates that the sentencing court is given discretion to sentence the defendant to a prison term.

  9. State v. Klinge

    92 Haw. 577 (Haw. 2000)   Cited 74 times
    Holding that strength of the evidence weighed against the defendant where the defendant's case hinged on his own testimony and the State's case was supported by photographs and independent witnesses

    "'[T]he interpretation of a statute . . . is a question of law reviewable de novo.'" State v. Kotis, 91 Haw. 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999) (quoting Arceo, 84 Haw. at 10, 928 P.2d at 852 (quoting State v. Camara, 81 Haw. 324, 329, 916 P.2d 1225, 1230 (1996) (citations omitted))). D. Motion for Mistrial

  10. State v. Gella

    92 Haw. 135 (Haw. 1999)   Cited 11 times
    In Gella, the Hawai`i Supreme Court found Gella's statement to be voluntary under the totality of the circumstances where Gella feared he would be beaten, felt dizzy and in pain, and had not slept for four days prior to his arrest.

    See also . . . United States v. Am. Tel. Tel. Co., 83 F.R.D. 323 (D. D.C. 1979) (judicial notice of court records should be limited to the fact of their existence rather than the truth of the matters contained in the court records). . . .State v. Kotis, 91 Haw. 319, 342, 984 P.2d 78, 101 (1999) (quoting Gottsch v. Bank of Stapleton, 458 N.W.2d 443, 455-56 (Neb. 1990)) (emphases in original) (brackets in original) (some ellipsis points added and some in original). Accordingly, insofar as the circuit court intended to rely on the two documents for the truth of the assertions contained therein, they were not proper subjects of judicial notice.