State v. Kotis

31 Citing cases

  1. Uyeda v. Schermer

    439 P.3d 115 (Haw. 2019)   Cited 23 times

    5 were not met and harassment as therein defined was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. Schermer, citing State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai‘i 319, 341-42, 984 P.2d 78, 100-01 (1999), also argued that while the district court could take judicial notice of the existence of documents filed in the previous cases, it could not take judicial notice of the truth of the facts in those documents. He conceded, however, that he would be collaterally estopped from relitigating the facts or issues in Case 639.

  2. State v. Abdon

    137 Haw. 19 (Haw. 2016)   Cited 15 times
    Stating that, because Hawaii law requires the jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether a prosecution is timely, the jury must also determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the statute of limitations was tolled

    This court has noted that “taking judicial notice of the records and files of a case may or may not be proper, depending upon the type of record at issue and the purpose for which it is considered.” State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319 , 343, 984 P.2d 78 , 102 (1999). Where a trial court seeks to take judicial notice of “its own acts or of the existence of records on file in the same case,” a number of other jurisdictions have held that judicial notice under this circumstance is proper.

  3. Kaleikini v. Thielen

    124 Haw. 1 (Haw. 2010)   Cited 38 times
    Holding that the denial of a request for a contested case hearing "constituted a 'final decision and order'" qualifying for judicial review under Chapter 91

    To understand the context of the instant appeal, including the ICA's reasoning, we took judicial notice of a separate, but closely related appeal, i.e., Kaleikini v. Thielen, No. 29675. See State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319, 341 n. 25, 984 P.2d 78, 100 n. 25 (1999) (stating that "an appellate court may, in its discretion, take judicial notice of files or records of a case on appeal") (citations and original brackets omitted). We recognize, however, that, although "a [c]ourt may take judicial notice of each document in the [c]ourt's file, it may . . . take judicial notice of [only] the truth of facts asserted in documents[,] such as orders, judgments[,] and findings of fact [(FOFs)] and conclusions of law [(COLs)] because of the principles of collateral estoppel, res judicata, and the law of the case."

  4. Williamson v. HAWAI`I Paroling Auth

    97 Haw. 183 (Haw. 2001)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that “the procedural protections are adequate to safeguard prisoners' rights and ensure that the HPA does not arbitrarily set minimum sentences”

    HRS § 1-16 (1993). State v. Valentine, 93 Haw. 199, 204-05, 998 P.2d 479, 484-85 (2000) (quoting State v. Kotis, 91 Haw. 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999)) (some citations omitted) (some alterations in original). B. Neither the plain language nor the legislative history of HRS Chapters 353 and 706 prohibits the HPA from setting a prisoner's minimum term of imprisonment at a period equal to his or her maximum sentence.

  5. State v. Ruben

    NO. CAAP-18-0000623 (Haw. Ct. App. Jun. 21, 2019)

    Additionally, "[f]actual allegations, conclusions, and findings, whether authored by the court, by the parties or their attorneys, or by third persons, should not be noticed to prove the truth of the matters asserted, even though the material happens to be contained in court records." Addison M. Bowman, Hawaii Rules of Evidence Manual § 201-5[4] (2016-2017 ed.) (citing Ditto v. McCurdy, 98 Hawai'i 123, 130, 44 P.3d 274, 281 (2002); State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319, 342, 984 P.2d 78, 101 (1999) (mental health experts' affidavits contained in circuit court file in same case did not qualify for judicial notice)). As the supreme court has recently reiterated, "'[a] distinction must be carefully drawn between taking judicial notice of the existence of documents in the Court file as opposed to the truth of the facts asserted in those documents.'"

  6. Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys.

    707 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013)   Cited 299 times   2 Legal Analyses
    Holding that "the statute unambiguously limits employment discrimination claims to Title I. A public employee may not bring a Title II claim against his or her employer, at least when the defendant employer employs fifteen or more employees."

    But as a general rule, duly promulgated state regulations have the force of law for these purposes as do statutes. See, e.g., State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319, 331, 984 P.2d 78, 90 (1999) (Under Hawaii law, “[a]dministrative rules, like statutes, have the force and effect of law.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Rivera, 12 N.Y.3d 602, 608, 911 N.E.2d 817, 820, 883 N.Y.S.2d 755, 758 (2009) (under New York law, “[a] duly promulgated regulation ... has the force of law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

  7. State v. Nakanelua

    345 P.3d 155 (Haw. 2015)

    Moreover, under HAR § 12–42–71 (effective 1981–2014), which governs the selection and certification of an arbitration panel during an HRS § 89–11 impasse, "[i]f either the public employer or exclusive bargaining representative fails to select an arbitrator within three days after the filing of the arbitration notification, the board shall select an arbitrator from the register of arbitrators." See State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai‘i 319, 331, 984 P.2d 78, 90 (1999) ("Administrative rules, like statutes, have the force and effect of law.") (citing State v. Kirn, 70 Haw. 206, 208, 767 P.2d 1238, 1239–40 (1989) ). In addition to the HLRB's express powers, it is also "well established that an administrative agency's authority includes those implied powers that are reasonably necessary to carry out the powers expressly granted."

  8. State v. Nakanelua

    CASE NO. CE-10-726 (Haw. Jan. 21, 2015)

    Moreover, under HAR § 12-42-71 (effective 1981-2014), which governs the selection and certification of an arbitration panel during an HRS § 89-11 impasse, "[i]f either the public employer or exclusive bargaining representative fails to select an arbitrator within three days after the filing of the arbitration notification, the board shall select an arbitrator from the register of arbitrators." See State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319, 331, 984 P.2d 78, 90 (1999) ("Administrative rules, like statutes, have the force and effect of law.") (citing State v. Kirn, 70 Haw. 206, 208, 767 P.2d 1238, 1239-40 (1989)). In addition to the HLRB's express powers, it is also "well established that an administrative agency's authority includes those implied powers that are reasonably necessary to carry out the powers expressly granted."

  9. State v. Nakanelua

    CASE NO. CE-10-726 (Haw. Jan. 21, 2015)

    Moreover, under HAR § 12-42-71 (effective 1981-2014), which governs the selection and certification of an arbitration panel during an HRS § 89-11 impasse, "[i]f either the public employer or exclusive bargaining representative fails to select an arbitrator within three days after the filing of the arbitration notification, the board shall select an arbitrator from the register of arbitrators." See State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319, 331, 984 P.2d 78, 90 (1999) ("Administrative rules, like statutes, have the force and effect of law.") (citing State v. Kirn, 70 Haw. 206, 208, 767 P.2d 1238, 1239-40 (1989)). In addition to the HLRB's express powers, it is also "well established that an administrative agency's authority includes those implied powers that are reasonably necessary to carry out the powers expressly granted."

  10. State v. Nakanelua

    345 P.3d 155 (Haw. 2015)

    Moreover, under HAR § 12–42–71 (effective 1981–2014), which governs the selection and certification of an arbitration panel during an HRS § 89–11 impasse, “[i]f either the public employer or exclusive bargaining representative fails to select an arbitrator within three days after the filing of the arbitration notification, the board shall select an arbitrator from the register of arbitrators.” See State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai‘i 319, 331, 984 P.2d 78, 90 (1999) (“Administrative rules, like statutes, have the force and effect of law.”) (citing State v. Kirn, 70 Haw. 206, 208, 767 P.2d 1238, 1239–40 (1989)). In addition to the HLRB's express powers, it is also “well established that an administrative agency's authority includes those implied powers that are reasonably necessary to carry out the powers expressly granted.” Morgan v. Planning Dep't, Cnty. of Kauai, 104 Hawai‘i 173, 184, 86 P.3d 982, 993 (2004).