5 were not met and harassment as therein defined was not proven by clear and convincing evidence. Schermer, citing State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai‘i 319, 341-42, 984 P.2d 78, 100-01 (1999), also argued that while the district court could take judicial notice of the existence of documents filed in the previous cases, it could not take judicial notice of the truth of the facts in those documents. He conceded, however, that he would be collaterally estopped from relitigating the facts or issues in Case 639.
Accordingly, we examine the court's ruling for plain error. See State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319, 341, 984 P.2d 78, 100 (1999) (citing Hawai'i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 103(a)(1) and (d) (1993)). See also Hawai'i Family Court Rules Rule 61.
" HRE Rule 201(f)."A trial court's sua sponte decision to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact constitutes an exercise of its discretion," State v. Kotis , 91 Hawai‘i 319, 328–29, 984 P.2d 78, 87–88 (1999). In Kotis , the defendant argued that the trial court erred when it took judicial notice of records and files of the case.
However, inasmuch as the plaintiffs failed to move for a Rule 56(0 continuance, the circuit court was not presented with an opportunity to pass on the issue. Cf. State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319, 340, 984 P.2d 78, 99 (1999) (holding that the defendant "had the opportunity to raise the issue [(now challenged on appeal)] . . . in the circuit court, but he did not do so. Inasmuch as he is the party alleging error, it was his burden to raise the issue, and any ambiguity in the circuit court's d i n g may therefore be attributed to him").
See In re Wai'ola O Moloka'i, Inc., 103 Hawai'i 401, 425, 83 P.3d 664, 668 (2004) ("If an administrative rule's language is unambiguous, and its literal application is neither inconsistent with the policies of the statute the rule implements nor produces an absurd or unjust result, courts enforce the rule's plain meaning." (Citation omitted.)); see also State v. Kotis, 91 Hawai'i 319, 331, 984 P.2d 78, 90 (1999) ("Administrative rules, like statutes, have the force and effect of law." (Citations omitted.)).
"'Substantial evidence' . . . is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion." Doe, 84 Hawai'i at 46, 928 P.2d at 888 (quoting State v. Wallace, 80 Haw. 382, 391-92, 910 P.2d 695, 704-05 (1996)); see also State v. Kotis, 91 Haw. 319, 328, 984 P.2d 78, 87 (1999). In re Jane Doe, Born on June 16, 1994, 101 Haw. 220, 227, 65 P.3d 167, 174 (2003).
Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law to be reviewed de novo under the right/wrong standard. Flor v. Holguin, 94 Haw. 70, 77, 9 P.3d 382, 389 (2000) (quoting State v. Kotis, 91 Haw. 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999)) (some citations omitted). Our statutory construction is guided by the following well established principles:
" HRS § 1-16 (1993). State v. Rauch, 94 Haw. 315, 322-23, 13 P.3d 324, 331-32 (2000) (quoting State v. Kotis, 91 Haw. 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999) (ellipsis points in original). III.
HRS § 1-15(2) (1993). State v. Kotis, 91 Haw. 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999) (citations omitted) (some ellipsis points added and some in original). III.
" HRS § 1-16 (1993). State v. Kotis, 91 Haw. 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999) (quoting State v. Dudoit, 90 Haw. 262, 266, 978 P.2d 700, 704 (1999) (quoting State v. Stocker, 90 Haw. 85, 90-91, 976 P.2d 399, 404-05 (1999) (quoting Ho v. Leftwich, 88 Haw. 251, 256-57, 965 P.2d 793, 798-99 (1998) (quoting Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Sullivan, 87 Haw. 217, 229-30, 953 P.2d 1315, 1327-28 (1998))))) (some ellipsis points and brackets added and some in original). III.