State v. Kormos

10 Citing cases

  1. Roberts v. Mike's Trucking, Ltd.

    9 N.E.3d 483 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014)   Cited 6 times

    In a de novo review, this court independently reviews the record without giving deference to the trial court's decision. State v. Kormos, 2012-Ohio-3128, 974 N.E.2d 725, ¶ 13. A. Attorney Fees and Punitive Damages Law

  2. State v. Sims

    2021 Ohio 2334 (Ohio Ct. App. 2021)

    State v. Kormos, 2012-Ohio-3128, 974 N.E.2d 725, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.). It is clear from the record that there was insufficient evidence presented to raise the issue of self-defense under either the statute as it previously existed or as amended under H.B. 228.

  3. State v. Irvin

    2020 Ohio 4847 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 13 times

    This is a legal issue that we review de novo. State v. Kormos , 2012-Ohio-3128, 974 N.E.2d 725, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.). {¶ 20} Irvin asserts that the following statutory language compels the conclusion that he was entitled to the benefit of the H.B. 228 changes:

  4. State v. Gloff

    2020 Ohio 3143 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020)   Cited 11 times

    However, the precise issue before this court is whether the trial court erred in failing to apply the H.B. 228 amendment to R.C. 2901.05, which is a strict legal issue that we review de novo. State v. Kormos , 12th Dist. Clermont, 2012-Ohio-3128, 974 N.E.2d 725, ¶ 13. {¶18} It is well settled that a statute is presumed to apply prospectively unless expressly declared to be retroactive.

  5. State v. Bishop

    2019 Ohio 592 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 2 times

    In a de novo review, this court independently reviews the record without giving deference to the trial court's decision. State v. Kormos , 12th Dist. Clermont, 2012-Ohio-3128, 974 N.E.2d 725, ¶ 13. The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute.

  6. Carver v. Carver

    2015 Ohio 3941 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015)

    This statutory interpretation is a matter of law and therefore will be reviewed de novo. State v. Kormos, 2012-Ohio-3128, 974 N.E.2d 725, ¶ 13. We look to the plain language of the statute to determine the intent of the General Assembly.

  7. State v. Shalash

    2015 Ohio 3836 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 9 times

    {¶ 22} The primary goal of statutory construction is to determine the General Assembly's intent. State v. Kormos, 12th Dist., 2012-Ohio-3128, 974 N.E.2d 725, ¶ 14. The first step in determining legislative intent is to look at the language of the statute.

  8. State v. Lambert

    997 N.E.2d 201 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013)

    This court recently held in Cincinnati v. Nicholson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C–120332, 2013-Ohio-708, 2013 WL 782621, ¶ 11, that “the plain language of Ohio Admin.Code 3701–53–04(B) requires a dry gas control test before a subject's first breath sample and after the subject's second breath sample, but not in between the two samples.” In reaching this conclusion, this court agreed with the reasoning of the Twelfth Appellate District that “there is a single ‘subject test’ that is comprised of two different breath samples.”Nicholson at ¶ 10, relying on State v. Kormos, 2012-Ohio-3128, 974 N.E.2d 725, ¶ 16 (12th Dist.). {¶ 17} Lambert nevertheless argues that Nicholson is distinguishable because the court in that case did not have the benefit of the Intoxilyzer 8000 manual published by the ODH, which uses labels such as “subject test one,” “subject test two,” and “second subject test.”

  9. State v. Consolo

    994 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 1 times

    {¶ 32} Other appellate courts that have considered this issue have reached the same conclusion. In State v. Kormos, 2012-Ohio-3128, 974 N.E.2d 725, the court of appeals reasoned: {¶ 33} [I]t is quite clear that a “subject test” is synonymous with running the Intoxilyzer 8000 on a single “subject,” i.e., “individual” under law enforcement's control.

  10. City of Cincinnati v. Nicholson

    2013 Ohio 708 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013)

    Provident Bank at 106. {¶10} Faced with the same issue and the same type of "Subject Test Report" form, in State v. Kormos, 2012-Ohio-3128, 974 N.E.2d 725, ¶ 16, (12th Dist), the Twelfth Appellate District determined that the plain language of Ohio Admin.Code 3701-53-04(B) required a dry gas control before "Subject Test 1" and after "Subject Test 2," as those terms were used on the "Subject Test Form," but that no test was required in between them. The Kormos court relied on the definition of "subject" found in Webster's dictionary, i.e., "one that is placed under the authority, dominion, control, or influence of someone or something * * * an individual whose reactions or responses are studied."