State v. Koenig

9 Citing cases

  1. Tucker v. Connecticut Ins. Placement Facility

    473 A.2d 1210 (Conn. 1984)   Cited 14 times
    In Tucker, our Supreme Court construed General Statutes § 49-73d, which requires an insurance company to notify the town clerk, and to demand of the town clerk, in writing, a statement indicating the amount of all liens filed pursuant to General Statutes §§ 49-73a and 49-73b before paying any fire insurance proceeds.

    "The word `deliver' includes a handing over for the purpose of taking even though both acts do not occur simultaneously. State v. Koenig, 120 Conn. 39, 43 [ 178 A. 923 (1935)]." Zarillo v. Peck, 33 Conn. Sup. 676, 678, 366 A.2d 1165, cert. denied, 171 Conn. 731, 357 A.2d 515 (1976).

  2. Tucker v. Connecticut Ins. Placement Facility

    462 A.2d 400 (Conn. App. Ct. 1983)

    Section 49-73d requires that the city respond within twenty days of receipt of notification by delivering the necessary statement in person or by registered or certified mail. "The word `deliver' includes a handing over for the purpose of taking even though both acts do not occur simultaneously. State v. Koenig, 120 Conn. 39, 43 [ 178 A. 923 (1935)]." Zarillo v. Peck, 33 Conn. Sup. 676, 678, 366 A.2d 1165 (1976).

  3. Koval v. Liquor Control Commission

    175 A.2d 358 (Conn. 1961)   Cited 7 times

    We are of the opinion that the defendant abused its discretion in revoking the plaintiff's permit for the reason it stated and that its action should be reversed. This case is clearly distinguishable from Rose v. Liquor Control Commission, 124 Conn. 689, 199 A. 925, and State v. Koenig, 120 Conn. 39, 178 A. 923, on which the defendant relies to support its position. In Rose, the beer had been sold and served by the bartender to the minor girl who was found drinking it on the premises, and he had been arrested and convicted for the offense.

  4. State v. Graves

    42 N.W.2d 153 (Wis. 1950)   Cited 3 times

    In such cases it is held that the seller has "furnished" the beverage to the minor. See State v. Koenig (1935), 120 Conn. 39, 178 A. 923, 925; Walton v. State (1878), 62 Ala. 197, 200; and Page v. State (1887), 84 Ala. 446, 4 So. 697, 698, which deal with the point in the present case. The fundamental purpose of sec. 66.054(9) (b), Stats., is plain — to protect minors from obtaining fermented malt beverages — and language was used covering every transaction with a minor consistent with such purpose.

  5. State v. Lougiotis

    34 A.2d 777 (Conn. 1943)   Cited 10 times

    The beer was drunk by the sailor and Egan. The jury could conclude on this evidence that there had been a delivery to Egan. State v. Koenig, 120 Conn. 39, 44, 178 A. 923. The defendant made no claim in his brief that the liquor alleged to have been sold to be consumed off the premises, as set up in the second and third counts, was sold by the waiter rather than the permittee, and it is therefore not discussed. Witnesses testified to the reputation of the place as one where liquor was kept for sale contrary to law, as well as to numerous specific violations. There was ample evidence to sustain a conviction of the defendant on all four counts.

  6. Dylag v. Brennan

    22 A.2d 635 (Conn. 1941)   Cited 6 times
    In Dylag v. Brennan, 128 Conn. 304, 306, 22 A.2d 635, the plaintiff moved to open the decision of the liquor control commission revoking his license.

    The testimony of the inspector, that on the evening of August 17th he had seen liquor sold to intoxicated persons on the premises, was not controverted. This is sufficient to support the conclusion of the commission that the permittee was an unsuitable person to have a permit, and there exists no basis for the plaintiff's claim that it acted illegally or without evidence. State v. Koenig, 120 Conn. 39, 44, 178 A. 923; Bonardelli v. Liquor Control Commission, 127 Conn. 708, 16 A.2d 357.

  7. Zarillo v. Peck

    33 Conn. Supp. 676 (Conn. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 33 times
    In Zarillo, et al. v. John Peck, et al., 33 Conn.Sup. 676, 677 (1976) (negligence action) the court noted that "the return did not conform with the statutory requirement (referring to § 52-593a) that the deputy sheriff who made service endorse thereon the date of delivery of the writ to him.

    The word "deliver" includes a handing over for the purpose of taking even though both acts do not occur simultaneously. State v. Koenig, 120 Conn. 39, 43. Although delivery by mail is not mentioned in the extension statute, such delivery is not precluded. The fact that the extension statute becomes operative only where the process has been delivered before the running of the statute of limitations, and the fact that the serving officer is required to attest to the date of delivery suggest that the purpose of the statute is to ensure that the process is received on time by the officer. The word "personally" means in a personal manner; Webster, Third New International Dictionary; in person.

  8. State v. Koval

    184 A.2d 560 (Conn. App. Ct. 1962)   Cited 2 times

    § 30-1 (2). It is well established under this statute that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required that the liquor or beer contained more than one-half of one percent of alcohol by volume. State v. Levy, 103 Conn. 138, 146; State v. Boucher, 119 Conn. 436, 439; State v. Koenig, 120 Conn. 39, 42. Proof of this fact may be established by a certified copy of a chemical analysis by a state or United States government chemist, or it may be established from other evidence, or from both expert and other evidence. § 30-109; State v. Levy, supra; State v. Boucher, supra; State v. Koenig, supra.

  9. Caruso v. Zoning Board of Appeals

    1996 Ct. Sup. 1319 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996)

    The word `deliver' includes a handing over for the purpose of taking even though both acts do not occur simultaneously. State v. Koenig, 120 Conn. 39, 43. Although delivery by mail is not mentioned in the extension statute, such delivery is not precluded. The fact that the extension statute becomes operative only where the process has been delivered before the running of the statute of limitations, and the fact that the serving officer is required to attest to the date of delivery suggest that the purpose of the statute is to ensure that the process is received on time by the officer. The word `personally' means in a personal manner; Webster, Third New International Dictionary; in person.