{¶13} The Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the results of a polygraph examination can only be admitted at trial if the parties stipulate in writing to its admissibility, and if the trial court, in its discretion, is satisfied that the polygraph examiner is qualified and that the test was conducted properly. State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St.2d 123, 132, 372 N.E.2d 1318 (1978); State v. Knight, 140 Ohio App.3d 797, 807; 749 N.E.2d 761 (1st Dist.2000). Not only are polygraph results inadmissible absent satisfying certain conditions, but the refusal or offer to undergo a polygraph test is also inadmissible.
To survive a vagueness challenge, a statute must have the following attributes: (1) fair warning of what is prohibited so that the ordinary citizen may behave accordingly; (2) terms that preclude arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory enforcement; and (3) a definition that ensures that fundamental constitutional freedoms will not be unreasonably impinged or inhibited. See State v. Anderson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 171, 566 N.E.2d 1224, 1226; State v. Knight (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 797, 810, 749 N.E.2d 761, 771. See State v. Tanner (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 1, 3, 472 N.E.2d 689, 691; State v. Knight, supra, at 810, 749 N.E.2d at 771.
3 A.3d 458, 462 (N.J. App. Div. 2022) (one who commits bribery intends to "influence matters in connection with an official duty"); State v. Hogervorst , 90 N.M. 580, 566 P.2d 828, 830 (1977) (affirmed bribery conviction identifying the crime as "the payment of money to the [public official] with the intent to influence the [public official] in carrying out his duties"); People v. Dioguardi , 8 N.Y.2d 260, 203 N.Y.S.2d 870, 168 N.E.2d 683, 692 (1960) ("the essence of bribery is the voluntary giving of something of value to influence the performance of official duty" (citation omitted)); State v. Greer , 238 N.C. 325, 77 S.E.2d 917, 920 (1953) (bribery is intended "to influence the recipient's action as a public officer or official ... in the performance of any official duty required of him"); State v. La Flame , 30 N.D. 489, 152 N.W. 810, 812 (1915) ("The scope ... of bribery is as broad as the duties of the officer who accepts the bribe." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); State v. Knight , 140 Ohio App.3d 797, 749 N.E.2d 761, 766 (2000) (conviction for bribery of public servant requires proof of intent to influence the public servant with respect to the discharge of official duty); Allen v. State , 63 Okla.Crim. 16, 72 P.2d 516, 519 (1937) (criminal intent in bribery is the intent "to influence corruptly an official in the discharge of his duty"); State v. Coffey , 157 Or. 457, 72 P.2d 35, 37 (1937) (bribery statute "prohibits judicial, legislative, and executive officers from receiving moneys, valuables, etc., which are intended to influence them in the discharge of their duties");
{¶ 44} Regardless, the fact that the legislature has not criminalized all sexual conduct between a doctor and patient, or between others in positions of authority and those they directly control or supervise, does not mean that fact-finders may not consider the defendant's status when determining whether the coercion employed was sufficient to prevent resistance by a person of ordinary resolution. For instance, in State v. Knight (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 797, and State v. Walker (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 445, police officers were convicted of sexual battery because they used their positions as police officers to coerce the victims into submitting to sexual conduct. And if a doctor refused to write a prescription for a patient unless the patient submitted to sexual conduct, then we would not say that the jury would have to ignore the fact that he was a doctor when he tried to coerce his patient in this manner.
See R.C. 2921.02 and 102.03(E). Appellee cites State v. Knight (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 797, 749 N.E.2d 761, in which a police officer threatened to arrest a woman, and then forced her to have sexual intercourse with him in exchange for merely giving her a traffic citation rather than arresting her. The officer was convicted of accepting a bribe, based on the court's conclusion that the defendant had accepted sexual favors, which were treated as a commodity having value.
It is well settled under Ohio law that “all legislative enactments must be afforded a strong presumption of constitutionality.” State v. Knight (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 797, 810, 749 N.E.2d 761;see also State v. Anderson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 566 N.E.2d 1224. In order for a court to declare a statute or ordinance unconstitutional, it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the measure is incompatible with a particular constitutional provision.
{¶ 10} Under Ohio law, "all legislative enactments must be afforded a strong presumption of constitutionality." State v. Knight (2000), 140 Ohio App.3d 797, 810, 749 N.E.2d 761; see, also, State v. Anderson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 168, 566 N.E.2d 1224. In order for a court to declare a statute unconstitutional, it must appear beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is incompatible with a particular constitutional provision.