State v. Kitsap County Bank

23 Citing cases

  1. Kellogg v. Murphy

    349 Mo. 1165 (Mo. 1942)   Cited 34 times
    In Kellogg v. Murphy, 349 Mo. 1165, 164 S.W.2d 285, the author of the opinion in German Evangelical Bethel Church of Concordia v. Reith, supra, pointed out the legal effects of "rules of presumption or prima facie evidence" ("purely procedural" and not resting "on a fact basis having substantial probative value") and said: "On the other hand, if the basic facts underlying the presumption (alone or with other evidence) are strong enough to support the required inference, independent of the presumption, the case does not fall before controverting evidence," citing many Missouri cases. (Italics ours.)

    Murphy v. Doniphan Tel. Co., 347 Mo. 372, 147 S.W.2d 616; Section 9423 (h) (4), R.S. 1939; Laws 1941, p. 571. (4) Both the appellants in this case are employing units within the meaning of the Unemployment Compensation Law. Sec. 9423 (g), R.S. 1939; Murphy v. Hurlbut Undertaking Embalming Co., 346 Mo. 405, 142 S.W.2d 449. (5) The appellants are an employer as defined in Section 9423 of the Unemployment Compensation Law. Sec. 9423, R.S. 1939; Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 39 S.W. 486; Brown v. Citizens State Bank, 345 Mo. 480, 134 S.W.2d 116; New Haven Metal Heating Supply Co. v. Danaher, 21 A.2d 383; Unemployment Comp. Comm. v. City Ice Co., 216 N.C. 6, 3 S.E.2d 290; Gibson Products Co. v. Murphy, 186 Okla. 714, 100 P.2d 453; Maine Unemployment Comp. Comm. v. Androscoggin, 16 A.2d 252; State of Washington v. Kitsap County Bank, 117 P.2d 228; Vol. VI, Commerce Clearing House, p. 50,594, sec. 8100; Carmichael v. Southern Coal Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 57 Sup. Ct. 868, 81 L.Ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R. 1327; Unemployment Comp. Comm. v. J.M. Willis Barber Beauty Shop and Reynolds Building Barber Shop, 219 N.C. 709, 15 S.E.2d 4; Milrose Co., Inc., v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 126 N.J.L. 441, 19 A.2d 892; Witherspoon Oil Co. v. State of Texas; Vol. VI, Commerce Clearing House, p. 46,558, sec. 8079; Mississippi Unemployment Comp. Comm. v. Avent, 4 So.2d 296; Vol. IV, Commerce Clearing House, p. 27,506, sec. 8045; Vol. II, Commerce Clearing House, p. 9019, sec. 1311.

  2. In re Pacific Coast Adjustment Co.

    147 P.2d 820 (Wash. 1944)   Cited 2 times

    The part in italics may be disparately stated as (1) owned directly or indirectly by the same interests; (2) controlled (by legally enforcible means) directly or indirectly by the same interest; (3) controlled (otherwise) directly or indirectly by the same interests. This case is governed by State v. Kitsap County Bank, 10 Wn.2d 520, 117 P.2d 228. In that case, Mr. F.E. Langer owned a majority of the stock in the Kitsap County Bank and in the First National Bank of Poulsbo, which together employed eight or more persons for twenty weeks during the year 1940. No other affirmative facts appeared.

  3. In re Tacoma Auto Freight Depot

    142 P.2d 485 (Wash. 1943)   Cited 3 times

    On the question of control, "directly or indirectly by the same interests," it is urged that, in order to be regarded as an employing unit, each corporation must have not only the power of control over the others, but also the actual control, as the power of control and control mean the same thing. They negative this by pointing out that Anita Jones and Edna Potter might at any time have removed their husbands as directors of the Tacoma Auto Freight Depot and the Interurban Auto Freight Company and discharged John H. Potter as manager. It was said by this court in State v. Kitsap County Bank, 10 Wn.2d 520, 117 P.2d 228, that, in view of the necessity for an established administrative policy, it would seem that the power of control and control as used in the definition of employer should be held to mean the same thing. But this was not necessary in deciding the questions presented, nor did we so hold or decide.

  4. Warren Brok. Co. v. Miss. U.C. Comm

    13 So. 2d 227 (Miss. 1943)   Cited 4 times
    In Warren Brokerage Co. v. Mississippi Unemployment Compensation Commission, 194 Miss. 855, 13 So.2d 227, 228, the Supreme Court of Mississippi said: "To support its position appellant relies on Independent Gasoline Co. v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 190 Ga. 613, 10 S.E.2d 58, and Benner-Coryell Lbr. Co. v. Indiana Unemployment Compensation Board, 218 Ind. 20, 29 N.E.2d 776. These two cases represent the minority view and seem to stand alone."

    Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 510-513, 57 S.Ct. 868, 872-874, 81 L.Ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R. 1327; United States v. Whyel (Pa.), 19 F.2d 260; Revenue Act of 1918, Sec. 240(b) (40 Stat. 1082); Unemployment Compensation Law, Secs. 19(h) (1), 19 (h) (4). For authorities directly in point see: Benner-Coryell Lumber Co., Inc., v. Indiana Unemployment Compensation Board, 29 N.E.2d 776; Florida Industrial Commission et al. v. Gary-Lockhart Drug Stores, Inc., et al., 143 Fla. 293, 196 So. 845; Gibson Products Co., Inc., et al. v. Murphy, 186 Okla. 714, 100 P.2d 453; Independent Gasoline Co., Inc., v. Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 190 Ga. 613, 10 S.E.2d 58, Cert. denied 61 S.Ct. 175; Maine Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Androscoggin, Junior, Inc., 137 Me. 154, 16 A.2d 252; New Haven Metal Heating Supply Co. v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 213, 21 A.2d 383; State of North Carolina ex rel. Unemployment Compensation Commission v. J.M. Willis Barber and Beauty Shop et al., 219 N.C. 709, 15 S.E.2d 4; State of Washington v. Kitsap County Bank, 110 Wn. Dec. 489, 117 P.2d 228; Unemployment Compensation Commission v. City Ice Coal Co. et al., 216 N.C. 6, 3 S.E.2d 290. The Supreme Courts of Georgia and Indiana have held the "common control" provisions of the unemployment compensation laws of those states invalid in two cases involving corporations as employing units.

  5. Grant Co. Fire Prot. Dist. v. Moses Lake

    145 Wn. 2d 702 (Wash. 2002)   Cited 20 times
    In Grant County Fire Protection District No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 145 Wash.2d 702, 735, 42 P.3d 394 (2002) (Grant County I), rev'd in part by Grant County Fire Protection District No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 150 Wash.2d 791, 812, 83 P.3d 419 (2004) (Grant County II), however, we also recognized that article I, section 12 differed from and was more protective than the federal equal protection clause and required a very different analysis in certain situations.

    What I believe the majority has failed to effectuate, however, is the principle that "`[e]very presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative act, and . . . in matters of classification, the legislature has a very broad discretion.'" Campbell v. State, 12 Wn.2d 459, 469, 122 P.2d 458 (1942) (quoting State v. Kitsap County Bank, 10 Wn.2d 520, 523, 117 P.2d 228 (1941)); see also Huse, 187 Wn. at 80. In this regard, the majority has not sufficiently considered the particular nature of the laws at issue.

  6. In re Whitesel

    111 Wn. 2d 621 (Wash. 1988)   Cited 45 times
    Holding that inmates do not have the right to an attorney during the Board's minimum term redetermination

    Petersen v. State, 100 Wn.2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983); Yakima Cy. Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n v. Board of Comm'rs, 92 Wn.2d 831, 836, 601 P.2d 936 (1979), appeal dismissed, 446 U.S. 979 (1980).State v. Persinger, 62 Wn.2d 362, 368, 382 P.2d 497 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 187 (1964); State v. Kitsap Cy. Bank, 10 Wn.2d 520, 527, 117 P.2d 228 (1941).Petersen, at 444-45.

  7. Childers v. Childers

    89 Wn. 2d 592 (Wash. 1978)   Cited 120 times
    Applying rational relationship test

    The crucial determination is whether there are reasonable and justifiable grounds giving rise to the classification. State v. Persinger, supra; State v. Kitsap County Bank, 10 Wn.2d 520, 117 P.2d 228 (1941). Finally, in making this determination, it is recognized that the legislature has a wide range of discretion in defining the classifications and that such enactments are presumptively valid.

  8. Sparkman McLean v. Govan Inv. Trust

    78 Wn. 2d 584 (Wash. 1970)   Cited 29 times
    Fixing a maximum rate of interest

    The crucial determination is whether there are reasonable and justifiable grounds giving rise to the classification. State v. Persinger, supra; State v. Kitsap County Bank, 10 Wn.2d 520, 117 P.2d 228 (1941). Finally, in making this determination, it is recognized that the legislature has a wide range of discretion in defining the classifications and that such enactments are presumptively valid.

  9. State v. Persinger

    62 Wn. 2d 362 (Wash. 1963)   Cited 62 times
    In Persinger we reasoned that RCW 10.46.010, which provided for a right to speedy trial, was designed to protect persons charged with crimes and did not apply to a habitual criminal proceeding because such a proceeding is not a crime.

    Classifications which have some reasonable basis do not offend against either the equal protection clause or the privileges and immunities clause merely because they result in some inequality. State v. Kitsap Cy. Bank, 10 Wn.2d 520, 117 P.2d 228 (1941); Elkins v. Schaaf, 4 Wn.2d 12, 102 P.2d 230 (1940). It is recognized that classifications must be made and that in making them, dividing lines must be drawn some place.

  10. Di Re v. Central Livestock Order Buying Co.

    246 Minn. 279 (Minn. 1956)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that, in the absence of fraud or other wrongful purpose, a subsidiary must be treated as a legal entity separate and apart from the parent

    In discussing the "majority control" provisions contained in the various state unemployment compensation acts in 1 CCH, Unemployment Ins. Rep. Fed. par. 1311, it is stated at p. 2175: Ned's Auto Supply Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm. 313 Mich. 66, 20 N.W.2d 813; Godsol v. Unemployment Comp. Comm. 302 Mich. 652, 5 N.W.2d 519, 142 A.L.R. 910; State v. Kitsap County Bank, 10 Wn.2d 520, 117 P.2d 228; State v. Dallas Liquor Warehouse No. 4, 147 Tex. 495, 217 S.W.2d 654. "* * * In most states this grouping of business enterprises which are commonly owned or controlled is for the single purpose of determining whether each separate enterprise may be treated as a subject employer."