State v. Kinney

4 Citing cases

  1. State v. Coleman

    10 Neb. App. 337 (Neb. Ct. App. 2001)   Cited 10 times
    Noting "several general rules from factually similar cases help guide our analysis"

    [2,3] Both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. State v. Kinney, 6 Neb. App. 102, 572 N.W.2d 383 (1997). Under both Constitutions, limited investigatory stops are permissible only upon a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that the person is, was, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.

  2. U.S. v. Adler

    8:08CR354 (D. Neb. Mar. 30, 2009)

    The statute requiring a signal before turning has been enforced in situations that involve either failing to signal at all at or between intersections or failing to signal 100 feet before a lane change or a movement from a direct course while moving. See, e.g., United States v. Burtton , 2008 WL 2705492, *2 (D. Neb. July 9, 2008) (failure to signal a turn); United States v. Dortch , 2008 WL 3485162, *2 (D. Neb. Aug. 7, 2008) (failure to signal a turn); United States v. 2004 SilverChevrolet Minivan , 2007 WL 1797644, *3 (D. Neb. June 20, 2007) (failure to signal lane change within 100 feet); United States v.Robledo , 185 Fed. App'x 556, 557 (8th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion) (failure to signal turn within 100 feet of moving back into lane after passing); State v. Dupre , 2006 WL 2987000, *1 (Neb.App. Oct. 17, 2006) (failure to signal while merging into another lane); State v. Kinney , 572 N.W.2d 383, 385 (Neb.App. 1997) (failure to signal while merging into highway); State v.Chronister , 526 N.W.2d at 101 (exiting interstate highway without signaling). Without deciding whether a failure to signal 100 feet in advance of a return to the original lane after passing was a violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 6,161, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that it was objectively reasonable for an officer to have believed so. Robledo, 185 Fed. App'x at 558-59.

  3. State v. Davidson

    9 Neb. App. 9 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 2 times
    In Davidson, notwithstanding the State's urging, the evidence did not meet the requirements of the personal knowledge exception.

    The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution prohibit only unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Ranson, 245 Neb. 71, 511 N.W.2d 97 (1994); State v. Kinney, 6 Neb. App. 102, 572 N.W.2d 383 (1997). However, as noted above, if there is no valid warrant, the burden is on the State to establish that the search was conducted under circumstances substantiating the reasonableness of the search.

  4. State v. Wyatt

    6 Neb. App. 586 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 3 times

    In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court reviews the ultimate determination of probable cause de novo and reviews the findings of fact made by the trial court for clear error, giving due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by the trial court. State v. Nissen, 252 Neb. 51, 560 N.W.2d 157 (1997); State v. Kinney, 6 Neb. App. 102, 572 N.W.2d 383 (1997). While a determination of probable cause to issue a warrant must be reviewed de novo on appeal, we must continue to afford great deference to the magistrate's determination; the question is whether under the totality of the circumstances brought to the attention of the magistrate and by interpreting the affidavit in a commonsense and not a hypertechnical manner, the magistrate had a substantial basis for finding the existence of a fair probability that evidence of a crime or contraband would be found.