¶12 The purpose of CrR 3.3 is to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial. State v. Kingen, 39 Wn. App. 124, 692 P.2d 215 (1984). Despite this mandate, Anthony Flinn, a mentally-challenged defendant, was kept in jail for almost five and one-half months before his trial began, at least three weeks of which were probably unnecessary.
State v. Kingen, 39 Wn.App. 124, 127, 692 P.2d 215 (1984). Nevertheless, "[t]he constitutional right to a speedy trial does not mandate trial within 60 days." State v. Torres, 111 Wn.App. 323, 330, 44 P.3d 903 (2002).
The purpose of this rule is to protect the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial and to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration before trial. State v. Kingen, 39 Wn.App. 124, 127, 692 P.2d 215 (1984).
The purpose of this rule is to protect the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial and to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration before trial. State v. Kingen, 39 Wash.App. 124, 127, 692 P.2d 215 (1984). But the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not mandate a trial within 60 days.
The purpose of this rule is to protect the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial and to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration before trial. State v. Kingen, 39 Wn.App. 124, 127, 692 P.2d 215 (1984). Nevertheless, the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not mandate trial within 60 days.
The rule protects a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial and prevents undue and oppressive incarceration before trial. State v. Kingen, 39 Wn. App. 124, 127, 692 P.2d 215 (1984), review denied, 103 Wn.2d 1031 (1985). But a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial does not mandate trial within 60 days of incarceration or arraignment.
The rule protects a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial and prevents undue and oppressive incarceration before trial. State v. Kingen, 39 Wn. App. 124, 127, 692 P.2d 215 (1984). Nevertheless, the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not mandate trial within 60 days.
In this case, Mr. Houng was being held on no charge. {¶ 24} The state further directs our attention to the decision of the court in State v. Kingen (1984), 39 Wash.App. 124. Therein, the appellee was arrested for second degree burglary, but the district court dismissed the charge and ordered his release.
The court has no power to insert new provisions into a rule that is plain on its face. State v. Kingen, 39 Wn. App. 124, 128, 692 P.2d 215 (1984), review denied, 103 Wn.2d 1031 (1985). Therefore, we conclude the speedy trial period did not begin to run until Carmichael's actual return to custody in Washington on December 18, 1986.
The language of CrR 3.3(g)(2) has remained substantially the same since CrR 3.3 was adopted in 1973. See CrR 3.3(d)(2), 87 Wn.2d 1102 (effective May 21, 1976); CrR 3.3(e)(2), 90 Wn.2d 1149, 1152 (effective November 17, 1978); Criminal Rules Task Force, Washington Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure (1971); see also 4A L. Orland, Wash. Prac., Rules Practice § 6201 (3d ed. 1983); State v. Kingen, 39 Wn. App. 124, 692 P.2d 215 (1984). The only difference between the current version and the earlier versions is that CrR 3.3(g)(2) now extends the exclusion to calculation of the trial and arraignment periods, a change necessitated by the current rule's focus on the date of arraignment.