It is well settled in this jurisdiction that no prejudice arises from the erroneous exclusion of evidence when the same or substantially the same testimony is subsequently admitted into evidence. State v. Matthews, 299 N.C. 284, 261 S.E.2d 872 (1980); State v. King, 225 N.C. 236, 34 S.E.2d 3 (1945). Here it is obvious that the testimony subsequently admitted into evidence was substantially the same as that excluded and which is the subject of this assignment of error.

Further, even if it had been relevant and competent, we do not think that a different result would have been reached if the evidence had been admitted. State v. Temple, supra; State v. King, 225 N.C. 236, 34 S.E.2d 3. A careful examination of this record reveals no prejudicial error.

[12-14] Defendant was entitled to full opportunity to correct or explain his answers in response to the impeaching questions. State v. King, 225 N.C. 236, 34 S.E.2d 3; State v. Oxendine, 224 N.C. 825, 32 S.E.2d 648; Keller v. Furniture Co., 199 N.C. 413, 154 S.E. 674; Stansbury, N.C. Evidence 36 (3d ed. 1963). But it appears here that defendant had already testified to the substance of the excluded testimony.

To warrant a new trial it should be made to appear by defendant that the admission of the evidence complained of was material and prejudicial to defendant's rights and that a different result would have likely ensued if the evidence had been excluded. S. v. King, 225 N.C. 236, 34 S.E.2d 3; 1 Strong's N.C. Index, Appeal and Error, 40 and 41."

To warrant a new trial it should be made to appear by defendant that the admission of the evidence complained of was material and prejudicial to defendant's rights and that a different result would have likely ensued if the evidence had been excluded. S. v. King, 225 N.C. 236, 34 S.E.2d 3; 1 Strong's N.C. Index, Appeal and Error, 40 and 41. Even if we concede that the challenged evidence of Dr. Satterfield was incompetent, McCormick on Evidence, 15 (1954); 3 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., 688 (4); 1966 pocket part to Conrad's Modern Trial Evidence, 692; 2 Jones on Evidence, 5th Ed., 421; Summerlin v. R. R., 133 N.C. 550 [ 133 N.C. 551], 45 S.E. 898; S. v. David, 222 N.C. 242, 22 S.E.2d 633; Service Co. v. Sales Co., 259 N.C. 400, 413, 131 S.E.2d 9, 20; Branch v. Dempsey, 265 N.C. 733, 747-48, 145 S.E.2d 395, 405; Keith v. Gas Co., 266 N.C. 119, 146 S.E.2d 7; Apel v. Coach Co., 267 N.C. 25, 147 S.E.2d 566, we think, and so hold, that its admission in evidence was not prejudicial, and that it is likely a different result would not have been reached if this challenged evidence had been excluded, and we base our opinion and holding upon the following facts, which the State's evidence shows: (1) Dr. Satterfield testified that he obtained from right back of the mouth of the w

A new trial will not be awarded in a criminal case in the Supreme Court for newly discovered evidence. S. v. Williams, 244 N.C. 459, 94 S.E.2d 374; S. v. King, 225 N.C. 236, 34 S.E.2d 3. Defendant, if he so desires, may make a motion for a new trial for newly discovered evidence in the trial court at the next succeeding criminal session after this case is certified down. S. v. Dunheen, 224 N.C. 738, 32 S.E.2d 322.

However, even if we consider it a shorthand statement of fact, the same witness testified to substantially the same facts immediately thereafter. State v. Humbles, 241 N.C. 47, 84 S.E.2d 264; State v. Bovender, 233 N.C. 683, 65 S.E.2d 323; State v. Werst, 232 N.C. 330, 59 S.E.2d 835; State v. King, 225 N.C. 236, 34 S.E.2d 3. He testified that the deceased 'hit him across the head, broke the round, picked the other part up and walked to the door * * *. After he struck him he tried to pick the round up, going to hit him with it again, I reckon.'

To obtain a new trial, it is not sufficient to show error, but the defendant must show that his rights were prejudiced thereby. S. v. Davis, 229 N.C. 386, 50 S.E.2d 37; S. v. King, 225 N.C. 236, 34 S.E.2d 3; S. v. Beal, 199 N.C. 278, 303, 154 S.E. 604. G.S. 9-14 reads in part: The judge "shall decide all questions as to the competency of jurors," and his rulings thereon "are not subject to review on appeal unless accompanied by some imputed error of law."

These exceptions will not be sustained. S. v. Muse, 230 N.C. 495, 53 S.E.2d 529; S. v. Fentress 230 N.C. 248, 52 S.E.2d 795; S. v. Anderson, 228 N.C. 720, 47 S.E.2d 1; S. v. Gardner, 228 N.C. 567, 46 S.E.2d 824; S. v. Brown, 226 N.C. 681, 40 S.E.2d 34; S. v. King, 225 N.C. 236, 34 S.E.2d 3; S. v. Matheson, 225 N.C. 109, 33 S.E.2d 590; S. v. Oxendine, 224 N.C. 825, 32 S.E.2d 648. Exception No. 55 is directed to the testimony of Paul C. Garrison, Sheriff of Wayne County. The Sheriff had testified without objection about arresting Hart, Woods and Sherron; and also about his trip to Philadelphia where he arrested Chappell. Chappell, according to the evidence, told the Sheriff he did not want to tell all he knew until he got back.

The undenied fact that plaintiffs are the heirs of C. C. Combs, and the admission that he was the owner in fee simple of the land, nothing else appearing, would be sufficient to make out plaintiffs' title, and by the verdict on the first issue defendants' claim of superior title by virtue of a purported foreclosure sale and deed was determined adversely to the defendants. Plaintiffs in that state of the case would have been entitled to judgment on the admissions and verdict, and any error in failing to charge more fully on the second issue would be harmless error. Collins v. Lamb, 215 N.C. 719, 2 S.E.2d 863; S. v. Ring, 225 N.C. 236, 34 S.E.2d 3. The defendants noted numerous exceptions to the charge on the third issue, but that issue, which was submitted without objection or exception, was not answered by the jury, and the question of declaring defendants trustees of the title for the benefit of plaintiffs in the event plaintiffs failed on the first issue was eliminated from the case.