Opinion
I.D. No. 9904015460.
Submitted: November 21, 2000.
Decided: December 5, 2000.
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief Summarily Dismissed.
ORDER
This 5th day of December, 2000, upon consideration of the defendant's motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 and the record in this case, it appears that:
(1) On February 3, 2000, Defendant, Marzette King. pleaded guilty to Burglary, First Degree and three counts of Robbery, First Degree. On March 31, 2000, the Court sentenced King to a total of six years Level 5 incarceration, followed by eighteen months Level 3 probation, followed by two years Level 2 probation.
(2) King has now filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. King raises three grounds for relief ineffective assistance of counsel, unfulfilled plea agreement, and illegal sentencing. Under established procedure, the Court must first determine whether King has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) before the Court may consider the merits of the postconviction relief claims. Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990). This is King's first motion for postconviction relief and the Court determines that none of the procedural bars listed in Rule 61(i) is applicable. Therefore, the Court may consider the merits of King's motion.
(3) King alleges that his defense counsel was ineffective "by getting him to sign a plea agreement for [three] counts of 1st degree Robbery. Defendant also claims that the state only charged him with [two] counts of Robbery 1st.." A review of King's indictment shows that he was originally charged with eight counts of Robbery, First Degree, along with Burglary, First Degree, and eleven various other charges. Therefore, King's allegation that he was charged only with two counts of Robbery, First Degree is erroneous and his allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon that allegation clearly is without merit.
(4) In support of his second ground for relief, "unfulfilled plea agreement," King claims that his counsel was ineffective by allowing him to believe he was signing a plea for two counts of Robbery, First Degree. However, King claims that when he received his paperwork, it showed that he had confessed to three counts. King also states, without further clarification, "Rule (9) never took place. This was not the best plea bargain available."
(5) Again, the Court finds that King has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. the Plea Agreement signed by King clearly states that King entered a guilty plea to three counts of Robbery, First Degree and one count of Burglary, First Degree. On his signed guilty plea form, King indicated that he was satisfied with his lawyer's representation and that his lawyer had fully advised him of his rights and of his guilty plea. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, a defendant is bound by his signed statement on a guilty plea form. Fullman v. State, Del. Supr., No. 268, 1988, Christie, C.J. (Feb. 22, 1989) (ORDER). King has presented no such evidence. As a result, the Court finds that King's second ground for relief also clearly is without merit.
(6) Finally, King claims that the Court sentenced him illegally for three counts of Robbery, First Degree even though he was indicted only for two counts. As set forth above, King was not indicted for two counts of Robbery, First Degree, but for eight counts. As a result, the Court finds that King's third ground for relief also is without merit.
Therefore, because the Court finds that it is plain from the Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record in this case that King is not entitled to relief, the motion is hereby SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.