She appealed her conviction to this court, and on November 10, 1972, we affirmed the judgment and sentence of the trial court. State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972). No petition for a rehearing was ever initiated by the appellant.
This court has recognized that a statute is void for vagueness if it fails to provide an explicit standard of enforcement, which in practice leaves the definition of its terms to law enforcement officers and "leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case." State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136, 597 P.2d 590 (1979); State v. Huelsman, 60 Haw. 308, 588 P.2d 394 (1978); State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972); State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527, 480 P.2d 148 (1971). Appellant's major contention in this case is that the term "to loiter about" sets forth a clearly ascertainable standard of conduct and thus does not violate the due process clauses of the United States and Hawaii State constitutions.
More importantly, however, we find that the initial arrest of Michael may be upheld without necessarily establishing probable cause to arrest for the offense of disorderly conduct. In State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972), we held that a warrantless arrest is not rendered invalid by the fact that the arresting officer had a pre-empted ordinance in mind rather than a state statute with similar provisions, if the facts known to the arresting officer also constituted probable cause to arrest under the statute. We stated, "The point of importance is that the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge afforded probable cause to arrest under either the ordinance or the statute."
Id. Probable cause to arrest exits when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed by the person being arrested. Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-5; see State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176, 179 (1972).
Since these rules and regulations are promulgated pursuant to statutory authority [Hawaii Rev.Stat.Sec. 294-37(2) (1976 Replacement)], they have the force and effect of law. See Baldeviso v. Thompson, 54 Haw. 125, 504 P.2d 1217 (1972); State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972). Regulations Sec. 2-2 lists and defines the minimum required no-fault benefits — including earnings loss caused by accidental harm — in virtually the same manner as Hawaii Rev.Stat.Sec. 294-2(10).
2003) allows the HPA " to establish rules that have ‘ the force and effect of law’ " and (2) " [g]enerally, administrative rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to statutory authority have the force and effect of law." (Citing State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972).) In further support of the foregoing proposition.
Administrative rules, like statutes, have the force and effect of law. State v. Kirn, 70 Haw. 206, 208, 767 P.2d 1238, 1239-40 (1989) (citing Abramson v. Board of Regents, University of Hawaii, 56 Haw. 680, 54 P.2d 253 (1976), and Aguilar v. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 55 Haw. 478, 522 P.2d 1255 (1974)); Beldeviso v. Thompson, 54 Haw. 125, 129, 504 P.2d 1217, 1221 (1972) (citingState v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972)). Kotis has not alleged any infirmity in the promulgation of HAR § 11-175-45(b)(3).
The police were therefore justified in stopping [Bolosan] to investigate this potential violation, and Officer Asato's articulation of the incorrect basis for the stop does not render it invalid. Cf. State v. Vance, 61 Haw. 291, 297, 602 P.2d 933, 938-39 (1979) . . .; State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 87, 503 P.2d 176, 179 (1972) . . .; State v. Hollis, 161 Vt. 87, 92, 633 A.2d 1362, 1365 (1993).Id. at 103, 890 P.2d at 690.
It does not impose a mandatory requirement on the arresting officer to inform an arrestee with particularity the exact offense for his arrest. Cf., State v. Vance, 61 Haw. 291, 602 P.2d 933 (1979); State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972). Here, Bunker was informed that he was arrested for "investigation of a shooting incident."
Accordingly, appellants' claim that HRS § 571-61(b)(1)(D) is unconstitutionally vague must also fail. The void for vagueness doctrine, as traditionally applied to criminal statutes, requires inquiry into the following: (a) Whether the statute provides fair warning of proscribed conduct, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136, 597 P.2d 590 (1979); State v. Manzo, 58 Haw. 440, 454, 573 P.2d 945, 954 (1977); (b) whether it provides clear guidelines so as to prevent arbitrary application and enforcement, State v. Kaneakua, supra; State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972); State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527, 480 P.2d 148 (1971); and (c) whether the statute "overreaches" by lack of clarity so as to prohibit lawful or constitutionally protected, as well as unlawful, activites.See Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra; State v. Manzo, supra.