State v. Kimball

19 Citing cases

  1. Kimball v. Sadaoka

    548 P.2d 268 (Haw. 1976)   Cited 6 times
    In Kimball v. Sadaoka, 56 Haw. 675, 548 P.2d 268 (1976), the court, without enunciating a standard, found that an appellant, whose counsel failed to raise an issue in his written briefs but who nevertheless was permitted to present the question in his oral argument, was not denied effective assistance of appellate counsel because the issue not only lacked merit but was, in fact, noticed by the court.

    She appealed her conviction to this court, and on November 10, 1972, we affirmed the judgment and sentence of the trial court. State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972). No petition for a rehearing was ever initiated by the appellant.

  2. State v. Bloss

    62 Haw. 147 (Haw. 1980)   Cited 22 times
    Holding that although a statute was justified when enacted, it violated the equal protection guarantee of the U.S. and Hawai'i constitutions where it no longer bore a rational relationship to the harm it sought to avoid

    This court has recognized that a statute is void for vagueness if it fails to provide an explicit standard of enforcement, which in practice leaves the definition of its terms to law enforcement officers and "leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case." State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136, 597 P.2d 590 (1979); State v. Huelsman, 60 Haw. 308, 588 P.2d 394 (1978); State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972); State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527, 480 P.2d 148 (1971). Appellant's major contention in this case is that the term "to loiter about" sets forth a clearly ascertainable standard of conduct and thus does not violate the due process clauses of the United States and Hawaii State constitutions.

  3. State v. Vance

    61 Haw. 291 (Haw. 1979)   Cited 55 times
    Holding that delay was necessary due to defendant's disturbed and belligerent state

    More importantly, however, we find that the initial arrest of Michael may be upheld without necessarily establishing probable cause to arrest for the offense of disorderly conduct. In State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972), we held that a warrantless arrest is not rendered invalid by the fact that the arresting officer had a pre-empted ordinance in mind rather than a state statute with similar provisions, if the facts known to the arresting officer also constituted probable cause to arrest under the statute. We stated, "The point of importance is that the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge afforded probable cause to arrest under either the ordinance or the statute."

  4. Dural v. City of Honolulu

    658 F. Supp. 3d 855 (D. Haw. 2023)   Cited 4 times

    Id. Probable cause to arrest exits when officers have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been committed by the person being arrested. Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 803-5; see State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176, 179 (1972).

  5. Yamaguchi v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

    515 F. Supp. 186 (D. Haw. 1980)   Cited 5 times

    Since these rules and regulations are promulgated pursuant to statutory authority [Hawaii Rev.Stat.Sec. 294-37(2) (1976 Replacement)], they have the force and effect of law. See Baldeviso v. Thompson, 54 Haw. 125, 504 P.2d 1217 (1972); State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972). Regulations Sec. 2-2 lists and defines the minimum required no-fault benefits — including earnings loss caused by accidental harm — in virtually the same manner as Hawaii Rev.Stat.Sec. 294-2(10).

  6. Garcia v. State

    125 Haw. 429 (Haw. 2010)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that "retroactivity is assumed unless a 'new rule' is announced"

    2003) allows the HPA " to establish rules that have ‘ the force and effect of law’ " and (2) " [g]enerally, administrative rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to statutory authority have the force and effect of law." (Citing State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972).) In further support of the foregoing proposition.

  7. State v. Kotis

    91 Haw. 319 (Haw. 1999)   Cited 115 times
    Holding that the defendant "had the opportunity to raise the issue [(now challenged on appeal)] . . . in the circuit court, but he did not do so. Inasmuch as he is the party alleging error, it was his burden to raise the issue, and any ambiguity in the circuit court's d i n g may therefore be attributed to him"

    Administrative rules, like statutes, have the force and effect of law. State v. Kirn, 70 Haw. 206, 208, 767 P.2d 1238, 1239-40 (1989) (citing Abramson v. Board of Regents, University of Hawaii, 56 Haw. 680, 54 P.2d 253 (1976), and Aguilar v. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 55 Haw. 478, 522 P.2d 1255 (1974)); Beldeviso v. Thompson, 54 Haw. 125, 129, 504 P.2d 1217, 1221 (1972) (citingState v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972)). Kotis has not alleged any infirmity in the promulgation of HAR § 11-175-45(b)(3).

  8. State v. Bolosan

    78 Haw. 86 (Haw. 1995)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that lack of knowledge that a borrowed car is uninsured is a "defense" to HRS § 431:10C-104 and need not be disproved if the evidence does not raise it

    The police were therefore justified in stopping [Bolosan] to investigate this potential violation, and Officer Asato's articulation of the incorrect basis for the stop does not render it invalid. Cf. State v. Vance, 61 Haw. 291, 297, 602 P.2d 933, 938-39 (1979) . . .; State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 87, 503 P.2d 176, 179 (1972) . . .; State v. Hollis, 161 Vt. 87, 92, 633 A.2d 1362, 1365 (1993).Id. at 103, 890 P.2d at 690.

  9. State v. Bunker

    681 P.2d 984 (Haw. 1984)   Cited 3 times
    Concluding that where police officers are acting in concert, knowledge of one may be properly imputed to the other for determining probable cause to make an arrest

    It does not impose a mandatory requirement on the arresting officer to inform an arrestee with particularity the exact offense for his arrest. Cf., State v. Vance, 61 Haw. 291, 602 P.2d 933 (1979); State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972). Here, Bunker was informed that he was arrested for "investigation of a shooting incident."

  10. Woodruff v. Keale

    64 Haw. 85 (Haw. 1981)   Cited 22 times
    Stating that statute must "provide[] clear guidelines so as to prevent arbitrary application and enforcement" in context of parental termination rights

    Accordingly, appellants' claim that HRS § 571-61(b)(1)(D) is unconstitutionally vague must also fail. The void for vagueness doctrine, as traditionally applied to criminal statutes, requires inquiry into the following: (a) Whether the statute provides fair warning of proscribed conduct, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136, 597 P.2d 590 (1979); State v. Manzo, 58 Haw. 440, 454, 573 P.2d 945, 954 (1977); (b) whether it provides clear guidelines so as to prevent arbitrary application and enforcement, State v. Kaneakua, supra; State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83, 503 P.2d 176 (1972); State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527, 480 P.2d 148 (1971); and (c) whether the statute "overreaches" by lack of clarity so as to prohibit lawful or constitutionally protected, as well as unlawful, activites.See Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra; State v. Manzo, supra.