Opinion
No. 2-1050 / 02-1154
Filed March 26, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Thomas Bower and Stephan C. Clarke, Judges.
Defendant appeals the judgment and sentences entered following guilty pleas to multiple offenses involving the manufacture of methamphetamine. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Robert Ranschau, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas Ferguson, County Attorney, and Brad Walz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.
Defendant appeals the judgment and sentence entered following her guilty plea to several drug-related offenses. We affirm.
I. Background facts and proceedings. On March 30, 2001, Liza Dawn Kiewiet was charged by trial information with conspiracy to manufacture more than five grams of methamphetamine, manufacturing more than five grams of methamphetamine, receipt of precursor drugs for an unlawful purpose, and possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, anhydrous ammonia, ether, and lithium with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Kiewiet filed a motion to suppress statements she made during a police interview after she was arrested. The district court denied Kiewiet's suppression motion and her subsequent motion to reconsider. Our Supreme Court denied Kiewiet's application for discretionary review.
On January 17, 2002, Kiewiet filed a combined application for conditional plea and adjudication of law points. In her application, Kiewiet requested permission to enter conditional guilty pleas in order to receive a sentencing reduction and preserve her suppression issue for appeal. On February 21, 2002, the district court denied Kiewiet's request to enter conditional guilty pleas.
On March 25, 2002, Kiewiet entered pleas of guilty to all seven charges against her in accordance with a plea bargain. She was sentenced to an indeterminate term of up to twenty-five years on merged counts I and II, a term of up to ten years on count III, and terms of up to five years each on counts IV through VII. All sentences were to be served concurrently, and Kiewiet received a one-third reduction in the minimum mandatory sentence because she pled guilty.
Kiewiet appeals, alleging (1) the district court erred by accepting an invalid plea, and (2) she was denied effective assistance of counsel.
II. Standard of review. Our review of the district court's acceptance of Kiewiet's plea is for errors at law. Iowa R.App.P. 6.4 However, our review of Kiewiet's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is de novo. State v. Allison, 576 N.W.2d 371, 373 (Iowa 1998).
III. Conditional guilty plea. During the plea colloquy, after the district court had explained Kiewiet's rights to her and established a factual basis for the pleas, the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: How do you plead then to Counts I through VII as shown in the trial information?
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.
THE COURT: Either counsel know of any reason why the Court should not accept Ms. Kiewiet's plea, Mr. Walz?
MR. WALZ: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And Mr. Greiner?
MR. GREINER: Your Honor, the only thing I would just bring up at this time is that we are not waiving our previous motion or request to do a conditional plea which Judge Briner previously waived or ruled upon.
THE COURT: I understand.
MR. GREINER: But other than that, there are no arguments or problems with taking the plea.
THE COURT: All right. The Court will accept your guilty pleas, ma'am, finding them to be voluntarily and intelligently made, that there is a factual basis based upon your statements as well as a previous review of the minutes of testimony; further, that you understand your rights, the consequences of your plea and the maximum and minimum penalties a provided for by law.
Kiewiet asserts this interchange demonstrates that she entered, or attempted to enter, a conditional plea of guilty. Because a conditional guilty plea is not recognized in Iowa, Kiewiet argues her plea was invalid and should be stricken. See State v. Dorr, 184 N.W.2d 673, 674-675 (Iowa 1971).
Iowa law clearly does not allow a defendant to enter a conditional plea of guilty. A defendant has three plea options: guilty; not guilty; or former conviction or acquittal. Iowa R.Crim.P. 2.8(2)( a); see also Dorr, at 674-675. Despite adverse law on the issue, Kiewiet filed an application to enter a conditional guilty plea. This application was explicitly rejected by the district court. The law is clear, and the district court's ruling was clear. Kiewiet does not claim that she did not understand the state of the law regarding conditional guilty pleas or that she did not understand the district court's ruling on her application for conditional plea. The plea record does not demonstrate Kiewiet entered her guilty plea with "strings attached." See State v. Freilinger, 557 N.W.2d 92, 94 (Iowa 1996). Accordingly we conclude the district court properly accepted Kiewiet's guilty pleas as unconditional.
IV. Ineffective assistance of counsel. To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Kiewiet must prove both that her trial counsel breached an essential duty and that prejudice resulted. State v. Shumpert, 554 N.W.2d 250, 254 (Iowa 1996). In order to satisfy the first prong, Kiewiet must overcome the presumption that her trial counsel's actions were reasonable and within the normal range of competency. Id. To satisfy the prejudice prong, she must prove that but for her counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. Prejudice may be shown where the record establishes a reasonable probability that the defendant would have insisted on going to trial had counsel challenged the voluntariness of her guilty pleas. Irving v. State, 533 N.W.2d 538, 541 (Iowa 1995).
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are normally not decided on direct appeal, but are preserved for postconviction relief proceedings. State v. Westeen, 591 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Iowa 1999). However, when the record is adequate, as in this case, we will resolve the ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal. Id.
Kiewiet asserts her trial counsel tried to preserve her constitutional claims for appeal by attempting to enter a conditional plea of guilty. She argues her counsel should have known a conditional guilty plea was not valid and not sufficient to preserve those claims, and should have challenged the adequacy of the plea by filing a motion in arrest of judgment. However, Kiewiet does not assert that had her trial counsel filed a motion in arrest of judgment, and had the district court granted the motion, she would have elected to go to trial. In fact, Kiewiet makes no argument as to the prejudice prong. Because Kiewiet does not even contend she was prejudiced by her trial counsel's alleged ineffective actions, her ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail. Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994).